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Abstract 
This thesis examines William Herle‘s life through his surviving letters to William Cecil, 
Lord Burghley, and other Elizabethan Privy Councillors. It emphasises the centrality of 
the Elizabethan patronage system to Herle‘s life, describing how his ties to Cecil helped 
Herle escape prison, avoid his creditors, and gain recompense for his service to 
Elizabeth. In exchange for Cecil‘s protection, Herle became deeply involved in 
Elizabethan intelligence networks, both domestic and foreign, throughout the 1570s and 
1580s. Herle helped uncover plots against Elizabeth, passed vital information about 
events in the Spanish Netherlands back to England, and provided analyses of English 
foreign policy for his superiors. Despite his vital role, Herle never experienced true 
success, and died deeply in debt and abandoned by his patrons. Herle‘s life allows us 
wider insights into Elizabethan government and society. His experiences emphasises the 
inefficient nature of the Tudor foreign service, which utilised untrained diplomats who 
gained their position through political connections and were left to pay their own way 
through taking out loans they had little hope of repaying. Similarly, the numerous law 
suits which Herle describes in his letters are absent from official records, implying that 
Tudor society was even more litigious than previously assumed. Herle‘s life-long status 
as a gentleman, despite being arrested as a pirate and frequently imprisoned for debt, 
reinforces the lack of social mobility in Elizabethan England. His focus throughout his 
life on the need to support the ‗Protestant Cause,‘ and his fear of an international 
Catholic conspiracy was shared by Cecil, Leicester, and Walsingham, and shows how 
deeply religious divisions affected English foreign and domestic policy.    
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Abbreviations 
BL  British Library, London 
HCA  High Court of the Admiralty 
HMC  Historical Manuscripts Commission 
MS  Manuscript 
ODNB Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford, 2004, Online Edition, 
2008 
SP  State Papers 
STC  Short Title Catalogue 
TNA  National Archives, London 
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Transcription Policy and Note on Dates 
In transcribing Herle‘s letters every effort has been made to keep them as close to the 
original as possible. Original spelling has been used throughout, with abbreviations 
expanded in square brackets. Monetary figures have been provided in pounds when 
possible, and converted from roman numerals to modern Arabic style. Dates are in Old 
Style throughout. 
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Introduction 
 William Herle is a fascinating historical figure whose unfortunate lack of 
success during his own lifetime is equalled only by the paucity of attention historians 
have paid him since his death. Born into sixteenth-century Welsh gentry, Herle spent 
the vast majority of his life in government employ. Heavily involved in the English 
diplomatic scene, over time he moved from a promising young loans negotiator, to an 
ambassador to the Dutch province of East Friesland. Yet this respectable career arc was 
only half of Herle‘s life. While serving abroad he monitored local events, sending back 
intelligence reports to his superiors in England that helped shape foreign policy at the 
highest level. Furthermore, Herle played a vital role in uncovering two insidious 
conspiracies against the English crown, the Ridolfi and Throckmorton plots. When 
combined with accusations of piracy, a tendency to run up massive debts, and multiple 
stints in prison, however, it becomes clear that this second aspect of Herle‘s life had a 
decidedly seedy undertone. The ignoble aspects of Herle‘s career, combined with his 
inability to gain a title or substantial honours, have led previous historians to overlook 
his life. 
 Part of the twentieth century historians‘ move away from meta-narratives to 
micro- and local history has been an increased focus on studies of small communities 
and lesser known figures. The genre of biography, however, has largely avoided this 
movement. Tudor historians have focused almost exclusively on the most powerful and 
influential figures of the age. Monarchs, Privy Councillors, bishops, and nobles – the 
only low ranking figures deemed to rate in-depth study are literary luminaries such as 
Shakespeare and Marlowe. A large part of the reason for this imbalance is the lack of 
sources detailing the lives of ordinary people. Even with Shakespeare, where historians 
and enthusiastic amateurs have combed every archive imaginable, large gaps still exist. 
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Over the four hundred intervening years, most documents relating to people‘s lives have 
been lost. It is only those that remained in government archives or private collections 
that survived the passage of time, and the vast majority of these documents were written 
by, or to, those with wealth and power. As a figure who existed on the penumbra of 
Elizabeth I‘s glittering court, Herle is a prime candidate for the sort of thorough study 
that has previously been denied him. He is one of the few people from his era and caste 
about whom a significant number of documents survive. 
 While exact details of Herle‘s birth and death are missing, over three hundred of 
his letters survive in archives across Britain. The vast majority of these were written to 
William Cecil, Elizabeth‘s Secretary of State, and are stored in the National Archives, 
the British Library, and Hatfield House. Although Herle‘s letters were written to those 
of a higher rank than him, they provide valuable insights into the life and times of an 
Elizabethan gentleman.  Out of necessity most historical narratives of high level politics 
in this period are constructed from the official correspondence, minutes and letters of 
Cecil, his successors as Secretary, and his subordinates.  This thesis will follow that 
trend, although as the overwhelming majority of these primary sources were written by 
Herle himself it provides a far more personal account than most previous analyses of 
this era. 
Herle Historiography 
 William Herle has been largely overlooked by historians. Often mentioned in 
passing but rarely described in detail, Herle is almost exclusively associated with his 
role in the Ridolfi Plot. Conyers Read, in his biography of Cecil, depicted Herle in a 
distinctly negative light, describing him as ‗a cunning fellow‘ who ‗managed to worm 
his way‘ into conspirators‘ confidences before delivering them up for torture.1 John 
Bossy retained Read‘s description, but admitted that the latter‘s judgement of Herle was 
                                               
1 Conyers Read, Lord Burghley and Queen Elizabeth, New York (N.Y.), 1960, p.39. 
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somewhat harsh.
2
 Stephen Alford‘s description of Herle as an ‗expert intelligencer and 
informant‘ is both kinder and more accurate than Read‘s.3 Yet like Read and Bossy, 
Alford ignores Herle outside of his role in the Ridolfi plot, giving a distorted view of his 
role in the Tudor world. 
 In 1971 David Lewis Jones wrote the first article addressing Herle outside the 
context of the Ridolfi plot. ‗William Herle and the Office of Rhaglaw in Elizabethan 
Cardiganshire‘ focused on Herle‘s time as an official in East Wales during the late 
1570s, and included a brief biography of Herle‘s life up until that point.4 Despite its title 
Jones‘ article proved to be less about Herle than it was the many ways Cardiganshire 
locals exploited the English legal system to avoid paying taxes. Jones retained Read‘s 
harsh judgement of Herle, describing him as undertaking a ‗devious career‘ in which he 
used the influence of his friends to avoid imprisonment for piracy and benefited from 
‗the odious position of prison spy.‘5 Jones also composed Herle‘s Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography entry, providing a relatively accurate picture of Herle‘s career, 
albeit one with a distinctly pessimistic overtone. His final word on Herle was that his 
superiors ‗considered him useful but not entirely trustworthy,‘ a sure sign that his 
impression of Herle was very much based on the darker side of Herle‘s career.6 
 In 2004 Robyn Adams submitted her PhD dissertation ‗Both Diligent and 
Secret: The Intelligence Letters of William Herle,‘ doubling the historical analysis of 
Herle at a stroke.
7
 Adams was the first historian to look at a significant number of 
Herle‘s letters, and her thesis focused on their ‗epistolary and social minutiae,‘ 
providing an in depth analysis of his writing style. This study was a valuable 
                                               
2 John Bossy, Giordano Bruno and the Embassy Affair, New Haven (Conn.), 1991, p.26. 
3 Stephen Alford, Burghley: William Cecil at the Court of Elizabeth I, New Haven (Conn.), 2008, p.169. 
4 David Lewis Jones, ‗William Herle and the Office of Rhaglaw in Elizabethan Cardiganshire,‘ National 
Library of Wales Journal, vol.17, 1971-72, pp.161-179. 
5 Ibid., p.161. 
6 David Lewis Jones ‗William Herle (d. 1588/9)‘, ODNB, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/37536, 
accessed 11 May 2010. 
7 Robyn Adams, ‗‖Both Diligent and Secret‖: The Intelligence Letters of William Herle,‘ PhD 
Dissertation, University of London, 2004. 
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contribution to the small amount of scholarship on Herle, yet Adams‘ focus on the 
linguistic aspects of Herle‘s letters led her to ignore or gloss over much of their 
historical context. 
 Since submitting her dissertation, Adams has published three further articles on 
aspects of William Herle‘s life, all in 2009. The first detailed Herle‘s stint in the 
Marshalsea during the Ridolfi plot, comparing his use of epistolary formulae and codes 
to the norm of sixteenth century letters, and utilising Herle‘s descriptions to analyse 
prison conditions.
8
 Her second article compares the four surviving copies of Herle‘s 
report to Cecil on the Netherlands in various archives, noting the differing scribal and 
archival practices that each shows, and extrapolating from this the provenance of each 
document.
9
 Throughout all of these publications, Adams‘ primary focus is on epistolary 
rather than historical analysis, and this thesis argues that it is the latter which Herle now 
requires. Adams‘ most recent publication has begun to fill this void somewhat. In it she 
demonstrates how Herle fitted into Patrick Collinson‘s model of Elizabethan ―citizens,‖ 
men in government service who saw it as their duty to provide counsel to their Privy 
Councillor superiors.
10
  
While Adams has begun to move in the right direction with her most recent 
publication, there remains a distinct gap in the historical literature on Herle. Adams‘ 
work has provided ample coverage of the epistolary importance of Herle‘s letters. What 
remains unstudied, and what this thesis will address, is an overview of Herle‘s life, how 
he fitted into the Elizabethan world, and what the overarching themes of his life can tell 
us about him and his contemporaries. By studying Herle‘s life through his letters, we 
                                               
8 Robyn Adams, ‗The Service I am Here for: William Herle in the Marshalsea Prison, 1571,‘ The 
Huntington Library Quarterly, Vol.72, No.2, 2009, pp.217-238. 
9 Robyn Adams, ‗Signs of Intelligence: William Herle‘s Report of the Dutch Situation, 1573,‘ Lives and 
Letters, Vol.1, No.1, Spring 2009, pp.1-18. 
10 Robyn Adams, ‗A Spy on the Payroll?: William Herle and the Mid Elizabethan Polity,‘ Historical 
Research, Vol.83, Issue 220, 2010, pp.1-15; Collinson‘s model can be found in: Patrick Collinson, 
‗Servants and Citizens: Robert Beale and Other Elizabethans,‘ Historical Research, Vol.79, Issue 206, 
2006, pp.496-497. 
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can gain insight into a multitude of aspects of Tudor politics, economics, and society. In 
order to place Herle in the wider context of the Elizabethan world, the people he 
corresponded with and the events he was a part of must be discussed. Almost without 
exception these external agencies which informed Herle‘s life can be divided into either 
the field of foreign policy, or that of intelligence gathering. Both these fields have 
received substantial attention from academics. 
Studies of foreign policy have been a popular topic for historians throughout the 
ages. R.B. Wernham‘s Before the Armada has provided an excellent overview of the 
main shifts in Tudor foreign policy for almost fifty years.
11
 Wernham‘s focus on the 
overall picture often led him to obscure the specific details of each incident he covered, 
and his reliance on the nineteenth century calendars over manuscript originals left him 
at the mercy of Victorian tastes and prejudices.
12
 Wallace T. MacCaffrey‘s three volume 
history of Elizabethan policy provides a far more detailed study than Wernham‘s 
overview and benefits from being published over twenty years, allowing MacCaffrey to 
incorporate a range of other scholars‘ research that was published in the interim.13 
Conyers Read‘s biographies of Cecil and Sir Francis Walsingham detail the traditional 
views on Elizabethan Privy Councillors; however, his interpretations have come under 
attack by subsequent scholars. Stephen Alford‘s work on Cecil and Simon Adams‘ on 
Leicester, have forced a re-examination of many of the assumptions made about each 
man‘s position on various aspects of foreign policy, and overturned the long held image 
of a court divided into factions.
14
 
Cecil and Walsingham‘s domination of intelligence gathering and analysis in the 
Elizabethan era have led their biographers to dominate these fields of historical inquiry 
                                               
11 R.B. Wernham, Before the Armada: The Growth of English Foreign Policy, 1485-1588, London, 1966. 
12 See the incidence of calendar reference in Wernham‘s notes; Ibid., pp.409-426. 
13 Wallace T. MacCaffrey, The Shaping of the Elizabethan Regime, Princeton (N.J.), 1968; Wallace T. 
MacCaffrey, Queen Elizabeth and the Making of Policy, 1572-1588, Princeton (N.J.), 1981; Wallace T. 
MacCaffrey, Elizabeth I: War and Politics, 1588-1603, Princeton (N.J.),1992. 
14 Simon Adams, Leicester and the Court: Essays on Elizabethan Politics, Manchester, 2002; Alford. 
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as well. The vast majority of authors in this area have relied heavily on a combination of 
paraphrasing Read‘s manuscript analysis and repeating earlier historians‘ conclusions, 
rather than analysing primary sources themselves. The worst example of this is Alan 
Haynes‘ The Elizabethan Secret Services, which was lambasted by critics as raising ‗as 
many questions about the historian‘s craft as it does about quality control standards of 
the publishing industry.‘15 Amongst a torrent of cutting reviews, the kindest comment 
was that of David Loades who said that Haynes‘ book ‗is not an important historical 
study, but it is a good read.‘16  
Haynes‘ work is not the only poor attempt at history of Elizabethan intelligence 
gathering. Francis Edwards, for example, has published a number of works analysing 
Elizabethan and Jacobean plots perpetrated by Catholics. Each follows the same line, 
detailing the English government‘s Machiavellian attempts to entrap Catholics by 
manufacturing plots against the Queen. Pauline Croft has accurately noted Edwards‘ 
tendency to ignore the majority of modern scholarship which does not support his 
interpretation, and his tendency to twist facts until they conform to his argument.
17
  
Poor historical studies are not limited to historians. English literature professor 
Curtis Breight has similar views about Cecil as Edwards, arguing that the Elizabethan 
government instituted a ‗State of Terror.‘18 Breight‘s historical analysis is severely 
lacking, due to his reliance on secondary sources such as Read and Edwards.
19
 Perhaps 
most telling is his statement that he has preferred the Calendar of State Papers to the 
State Papers themselves, dismissing manuscript sources as too time consuming to study, 
                                               
15 Ronald Pollit, ‗Review of Invisible Power,‘ Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British 
Studies, Vol.25, No.3, Autumn 1993, p.487. 
16 David Loades, ‗Review of Invisible Power,‘ The English Historical Review, Vol.110, No.437, June 
1995, p.731. 
17 Pauline Croft, ‗Review of Plots and Plotters in the Reign of Elizabeth I,‘ The Catholic Historical 
Review, Vol.90, No.2, April 2004, p.321. 
18 Curtis C. Breight, Surveillance, Militarism, and Drama in the Elizabethan Era, New York (N.Y.), 
1996, p.34. 
19 Ibid. 
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and arguing that they would merely corroborate his thesis in any event.
20
 Breight‘s book 
is, in his own words, ‗neither historiography nor literary criticism‘ but a hybrid of the 
two.
21
 Unfortunately, he has failed to mesh them together adequately, with critics taking 
as dim a view of his literary criticism as this thesis does of his historical methods.
22
 
While academic studies of the Elizabethan intelligence network are largely non-
existent, works written for a popular audience are far more common. Alison Plowden‘s 
The Elizabethan Secret Service is a good introduction to the various conspiracies of the 
Elizabethan period. Plowden provides a well written, easy to follow narrative that 
avoids the worst abuses of other authors.
23
 Her opinion of Herle is less than 
complimentary, describing him as drawn by Cecil from ‗the upper ranks of [the] 
criminal underclass,‘ a statement clearly informed by Read‘s dismissal of Herle rather 
than his true status as a gentleman.
24
 Plowden‘s use of Mary, Queen of Scots, as the 
driving force of her narrative is mirrored by Stephen Budiansky‘s focus on Sir Francis 
Walsingham in Her Majesty’s Spymaster.25 Despite its title, Budiansky‘s work is less a 
biography than it is a general study of Elizabethan intelligence practices focusing on 
those under Walsingham. Much like Plowden, Budiansky has produced a readable but 
largely un-cited book that is good in general details but makes a number of mistakes in 
its particulars.
26
 
                                               
20 Ibid., p.34. 
21 Ibid., p.38 
22 See for example: Michael G. Brennan, ‗Review of Surveillance, Militarism, and Drama in Elizabethan 
England,‘ The English Historical Review, Vol.113, No.452, June 1998, pp.726-727; and Richard Burt, 
‗Review of Surveillance, Militarism, and Drama in Elizabethan England,‘ Shakespeare Quarterly, Vol.49, 
No.4, Winter 1998, pp.464-466. Both reviewers question Breight‘s faulty logic, narrow range of literary 
sources, and lack of ‗conceptual subtlety.‘ Burt also attacks Breight for spending too much time on 
historical background and playing ‗the ―I‘m more historical than thou‖ archive game.‘ The fact that 
Breight‘s archival work is almost non-existent seems to have escaped Burt.  
23 Alison Plowden, The Elizabethan Secret Service, New York (N.Y.), 1991. 
24 Ibid., p.26. 
25 Stephen Budiansky, Her Majesty’s Spymaster: Elizabeth I, Sir Francis Walsingham, and the Birth of 
Modern Espionage, London, 2005. 
26 For a discussion of some of these mistakes see: Paul Hammer, ‗Review of Her Majesty‘s Spymaster,‘ 
The Journal of Military History, Vol.71, No.1, January 2007, pp.216-217. 
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John Bossy‘s two books in this area are undoubtedly the best published works 
on Elizabethan intelligence. Giordano Bruno and the Embassy Affair and Under the 
Molehill both deal with events surrounding the Throckmorton plot, are thoroughly 
researched, well written, and include extensive sourcing.
27
 Furthermore, Bossy is the 
only published author that details this series of events who acknowledges Herle‘s 
involvement. He paints a less harsh picture of Herle than most historians, probably due 
to his focus on an incident that occurred during Herle‘s later career, describing him as 
‗nearly respectable.‘28 His reliance on Read‘s portrayal of Herle, however, leads Bossy 
to perpetuate Read‘s errors.29 
The corpus of historical work undertaken on William Herle is thin indeed. Only 
two historians have published works directly related to Herle, and Adams‘ PhD 
dissertation remains the only attempt to address more than one aspect of his life in a 
single publication. The two areas which this thesis argues are most significant in Herle‘s 
life, Elizabethan foreign policy and intelligence gathering, are better served but remain 
largely the providence of non-academic works or general histories. Half a century after 
his biographies were published, Conyers Read remains the most influential author in the 
field. His negative portrayal of Herle has contributed greatly to historians‘ tendency to 
sideline Herle, and focus exclusively on his role in the Ridolfi plot. While this thesis 
argues that this was an important aspect of Herle‘s life, it was certainly not the only one 
worth investigating. A study of Herle‘s life, and an analysis of what it shows us about 
aspects of early modern England, is long since due. What Robyn Adams has done for 
the style of Herle‘s letters since 2005, this thesis aims to do for their content. 
                                               
27 Bossy, Giordano Bruno; John Bossy, Under the Molehill: An Elizabethan Spy Story, New Haven 
(Conn.), 2001. 
28 Bossy, Giordano Bruno, p.26. 
29 Ibid. The most glaring error is his statement that Herle began his career in the public service in 1571 
(missing his reports from the 1560s). See footnote 21 in Giordano Bruno for Bossy‘s references to Read, 
showing where he picked up this erroneous idea. 
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Thesis Structure 
 This thesis is part biography of Herle, part wider study of themes connected to 
his life, and each of these halves will be addressed throughout. Its biographical nature is 
somewhat problematic in that analysing any person from the early modern period raises 
certain concerns about the ability of historians to document their lives accurately. The 
large number of Herle‘s letters that survive ameliorates this problem somewhat, 
although many of the other documents one would wish for are still absent from 
archives.  
Furthermore, when extrapolating themes from Herle‘s life to a wider context it is 
necessary to ask exactly how representative of his contemporaries Herle was. Although 
Herle was neither a member of the nobility, nor a truly exceptional person such as Cecil 
or Walsingham, his varied career makes it unlikely that there were any other people 
whose circumstances matched his. The list of those whose careers touched on an aspect 
of Herle‘s, however, is significantly larger. When the diplomats, intelligencers, sheriffs, 
negotiators, tax-collectors, and messengers of Elizabethan England are added together, 
they would comprise the majority of its civil service. If one adds the pirates, stool-
pigeons, and imprisoned debtors, a significant portion of its criminals are included. In 
fact, this thesis would argue that the varied nature of Herle‘s career means that aspects 
of his life touch on the majority of the gentry, and a significant portion of other 
commoners. 
 While Herle did not serve a singular role in the Tudor world, the records we 
have of him are unique. Over three hundred of Herle‘s letters survive, a number 
unmatched by any other person of his social station. This degree of preservation is 
generally reserved for the correspondence of Privy Councillors, and the majority of 
Herle‘s superiors have left less to posterity than he has. It would seem odd, then, that 
this resource has been left untapped for so long. Although Read‘s dismissal of Herle as 
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a degenerate criminal, and later historians‘ unquestioning acceptance of his assessment, 
has contributed greatly to Herle‘s omission, the main reason for this is the disparate 
locations of the sources. Spread across archives in London, Hertfordshire, Wiltshire, 
Oxford, and Edinburgh, and thus catalogued separately, studying Herle‘s letters 
required historians to travel the length of Britain. It is only with the advent of online 
initiatives such as the University of London‘s Centre for Editing Lives and Letters and 
the National Archives‘ State Papers Online that studying Herle‘s entire corpus of letters 
has become a realistic goal. Their transcripts and scanned manuscripts of Herle‘s letters 
are the primary resource utilised in this thesis. 
 This thesis is structured chronologically, as a linear progression of time allows 
the reader to see the natural evolution of Herle‘s career. Significant themes in 
Elizabethan policy and daily life are discussed when Herle first encounters them, 
allowing us to see how Herle adapted to changing circumstances. The exception to this 
linear structure is the third chapter, which details incidents throughout the 1570s and 
1580s in order to show how Herle‘s patron-client relationship with Cecil evolved. The 
remaining four chapters each cover a portion of Herle‘s documented life.  
 The first chapter details what little we know of Herle‘s early life. Herle‘s move 
from an undocumented early career as a merchant in training to government service is 
informed by a discussion of the Tudor system of patronage which tied Herle to Cecil. 
We then follow Herle as his early promise was derailed by accusations of piracy. The 
chapter closes with Herle imprisoned for his crimes, abandoned in the Marshalsea while 
he pleaded with his patron to secure his release. 
 The second chapter covers Herle‘s reinvention of himself as an intelligencer. Its 
main focus is his involvement in the Ridolfi plot which brought him to the attention of 
those in power and secured him a place in Cecil‘s affinity as an information broker. 
This shift from financial to political concerns involved Herle in the government‘s 
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increasing fears of an international Catholic conspiracy to destabilise the English 
throne. While Herle was rewarded for the work he undertook in the Ridolfi plot and its 
aftermath, his debts increased during this period and credit issues were foremost in his 
mind throughout it. 
 The third chapter details Herle‘s interaction with his patrons, showing how he 
leveraged his utility to Cecil into protection and rewards. The numerous examples of 
this across the 1570s are contrasted with those of the 1580s when Herle proved unable 
to exercise similar power, a fact which was largely due to his decreasing utility. Herle‘s 
disastrous argument with Cecil further contributed to his decline, as did his attempts to 
gain the support of other Privy Councillors.  
The fourth chapter covers Herle‘s increasing focus on the Spanish Netherlands 
and the plight of the Dutch Protestants there. It shows how the English government 
utilised Herle‘s Netherlands connections to inform their decisions, and details the 
problems that the ad hoc nature of the Tudor foreign service caused. Herle‘s biases and 
beliefs influenced the tone and content of his reports greatly, and he did not always 
represent Elizabeth‘s interests. He tended to make updates based on poor information, 
which caused problems such as his premature reporting of William of Orange‘s death.  
 The final chapter details Herle‘s involvement in the Throckmorton plot‘s 
uncovering, and his return to the Netherlands as ambassador to East Friesland. The apex 
of Herle‘s diplomatic career, when he negotiated with the Count of Emden in East 
Friesland, is contrasted with his rapid decline immediately after this watershed event. 
The chapter closes with a discussion of his final collapse into financial ruin, sickness, 
and death. 
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Chapter I: Herle’s Early Life 
William Herle was born into a world where connections to powerful people, 
information about the movements and probable actions of others, and access to the 
funds necessary to benefit from these considerations were vital to anyone hoping to 
forge a diplomatic or political career. This chapter will outline a number of interrelated 
concepts fundamental to understanding Herle‘s life and career: how the Tudor 
government worked; its dependence on patronage networks; and the major components 
of patronage, service and reward. It will then turn to Herle‘s early life, describing what 
little we know of his birth and the time before he entered government service. Herle‘s 
early career will also be outlined, his success in negotiating government loans in 
Antwerp and the rewards he received for doing so, followed by the collapse of this 
initial promise in the face of law suits, debt and accusations of piracy.  
Tudor Government and Patronage 
It is no exaggeration to say that the central figure in William Herle‘s life was Sir 
William Cecil, later Lord Burghley, Elizabeth I‘s Secretary of State and eventually Lord 
Treasurer. Herle‘s close ties to Cecil, as well as his later links to Robert Dudley, the 
Earl of Leicester, and Sir Francis Walsingham, are an illustration of the Tudor patron-
based governmental system in action. Much has been written by historians on Tudor 
government: whether it existed, how extensive it was, what its major components were, 
and who really held the power within it.  
Over the course of the twentieth century, there was a noticeable shift in 
historians‘ focus on the Tudor government. Read summed up the early twentieth 
century position well when he stated that ‗a great deal has been made...of the factions 
which divided the Queen‘s Council...[and found] its most striking expression in the 
13 
 
inveterate antagonism between Leicester and Burghley.‘1 Read and his contemporaries 
focused on the major personalities of the Elizabethan world: Cecil, Leicester, 
Walsingham, Sir Christopher Hatton, and the Queen herself. The interaction between 
these ―great men of history‖ was the means by which the government operated. The 
rivalry and occasional antagonism between Leicester and Cecil was extrapolated into a 
schism between the moderate and extreme Protestants in the Privy Council.  
By the 1970s a strong focus on parliamentary process and powers had come to 
the fore, with Geoffrey Elton confidently assuring the Royal Historical Society that ‗as 
the sovereign maker of laws, Parliament thus stood ideologically central to the problem 
of political stability‘ in Tudor England.2 Over time these approaches have become more 
detailed and integrated, to the point where Penry Williams devoted an entire book to 
describing noblemen‘s affinities, and their interrelated nature.3 The largest and most 
prestigious affinity was that of the monarch, which David Loades has detailed in his 
extensive research into the court‘s structure.4 
However, the court-centred system described by Williams and Loades only 
scratches the surface of the complex matrix of relationships that formed Elizabethan 
society. While Loades argues convincingly that ‗England was governed from the court, 
because the monarch governed and the court was the monarch‘s immediate context,‘ 
other historians have pointed out that the idea of a ―court‖ itself is more a ‗convenient 
conceptual piece of shorthand‘ for historians to describe those around the monarch than 
it was a genuine institution.
5
 Loades‘ ―court‖ was essentially the informal centre of 
Tudor patronage – significant mainly for the monarch‘s ability to dispense wealth and 
                                               
1 Conyers Read, Mr Secretary Walsingham and the Policy of Queen Elizabeth: Vol. I, Oxford, 1925, 
p.viii. 
2 Geoffrey Elton, ‗Tudor Government, The Points of Contact I, Parliament,‘ Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society, Fifth Series, Vol.24, 1974, p.186. 
3 Penry Williams, The Tudor Regime, Oxford, 1979. 
4 David Loades, The Tudor Court, Revised Edition, Bangor, 1992; David Loades, Power in Tudor 
England, New York (N.Y.), 1997. 
5 Loades, Power in Tudor England, p.133; Geoffrey Elton, ‗Tudor Government: The Points of Contact 
III: The Court,‘ Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fifth Series, Vol.26 (1976), p.211. 
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honours to petitioners rather than as the official seat of government. Herle himself went 
to Elizabeth‘s court a number of times, but rather than making his pleas to the Queen in 
person he usually relied on his affinity with Cecil. 
Herle‘s position at court was largely due to Cecil‘s personal dominance of the 
political scene and his influence over the Queen. A large part of what we would now 
consider the civil service was, in the Elizabethan era, part of the monarch and her 
ministers‘ private households, a fact which was especially true in Cecil‘s case. There 
was no demarcation between Cecil‘s servants‘ domestic and official duties, and they 
often worked primarily on government business.
6
 His household was largely composed 
of those with familial or regional ties to him.
7
 Despite his close ties to Cecil, and his 
employment in roles usually reserved for councillors‘ servants, Herle does not seem to 
have been permanently attached to Cecil‘s household, and their relationship was clearly 
that of patron-client rather than master-servant.  
The most significant power relationship in the Elizabethan period was the 
patron-client one, a reciprocal yet unequal bond in which ‗patrons provide material 
benefits and protection, and clients in return provide loyalty and service.‘8 Whilst a 
client could expect his patron to strive for his advancement and intercede on his behalf 
with other powerful figures, in return the patron expected absolute dedication to his 
cause. Maintaining a network of reliable subordinates was particularly important in the 
cut-throat world of Tudor politics, and no powerful figure was likely to neglect this for 
long. Information was power, and Herle‘s role as information broker made him a crucial 
part of Cecil‘s affinity.  
                                               
6 Richard Barnett, Place, Profit, and Power: A Study of the Servants of William Cecil, Elizabethan 
Statesman, Chapel Hill, 1969, p.11. 
7 George Morrison, ‗The Land, Family, and Domestic Following of William Cecil, Lord Burghley, 
c.1550-1598,‘ PhD Dissertation, Oxford University, 1990, pp.165-179. 
8 Sharon Kettering, Patrons, Brokers, and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France, New York (N.Y.), 
1986, p.13. 
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 Excepting the Queen, William Cecil was the most powerful patron in 
Elizabethan England, and Herle benefited from his ties to the Secretary. Pauline Croft 
has convincingly argued that the Cecil and his son Robert dominated the Elizabethan 
cultural and political scene through their unrivalled patronage network.
9
 Cecil‘s key 
position in Elizabeth‘s government makes it difficult to separate his influence from that 
of the Crown, and it appears that contemporaries often saw the two as much the same 
thing.
10
 With the Queen as the ultimate patron, Cecil acted as a conduit for her benefice, 
advising her on patronage decisions, and even as a filter for royal clients, deciding who 
should speak to the Queen and who he could deal with himself. Writing to Cecil in late 
1569, Herle described him as ‗the true and undowted Patron of the whole Comune 
weall,‘ indicating the breadth of Cecil‘s pervasive influence.11 
 Cecil was undoubtedly Herle‘s primary patron, a relationship forged in the early 
years of Elizabeth‘s reign which continued until Herle‘s death nearly thirty years later. 
In 1572 Herle described Cecil as ‗mi only Patron and refuge,‘ a situation which only 
seems to have changed in the early 1580s when Walsingham and Leicester became his 
secondary patrons.
12
 Despite the influence of his other patrons, Herle always returned to 
Cecil. The vast majority of his surviving letters are addressed to Cecil, including almost 
every one of those that beg for financial assistance or request personal intervention with 
the monarch, the traditional roles of a patron. 
 This relationship seems at times to have been a close one, to the point where 
some historians have assumed Herle was related to Cecil. Read described Herle as ‗a 
Welshman by birth‘ who ‗later claimed descent from the same Welsh family as the 
                                               
9 Pauline Croft (ed.), Patronage, Culture, and Power: The Early Cecils, 1558-1612, New Haven (Conn.), 
2002, pp. ix, xviii-xx. 
10 Julia Merritt, ‗The Cecils and Westminster, 1558-1612: The Development of an Urban Power Base,‘ in 
Croft (ed.), Patronage, Culture, and Power, p.233. 
11 Herle to Cecil, 22 December 1569, BL MS Lansdowne 12 f.36r. 
12 Herle to Cecil, 14 May 1572, TNA SP 12/86/36, f.165r; Thomas Dannet to William Davison, 25 
October 1586, TNA SP 12/194/60, ff.130r-131v; Herle‘s first surviving to Leicester dates from 1563 but 
it was not until 1580 that he began to write to him regularly. Similarly, Herle‘s letters to Walsingham 
begin in 1581 but are concentrated almost exclusively in 1582. 
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Cecils.‘13 Read was presumably basing this on one of Herle‘s begging letters to Cecil, 
where he described himself as ‗a poore member of your lyne.‘14 Previous historians 
have failed to note a similar comment from 1587 in which Herle stated that he was 
bound to Cecil ‗by the howse that I com of.‘15 Both these statements, however, are 
decidedly ambiguous, and could merely be an indication of Herle and Cecil‘s common 
Welsh origins. Any evidence that can be cited for a familial connection between Herle 
and Cecil is purely circumstantial, and could equally be merely indicative of their close 
patron-client relationship. 
In her PhD dissertation Robyn Adams made a strong case against Read‘s 
identification of Herle and Cecil as related, although mistakes in her evidence 
undermine her argument somewhat. Adams‘ case is based around the fact that Herle 
addressed other people clearly not related to him, such as Leicester, as ‗good cosyn,‘ 
citing a 1581 letter from Herle to the Earl.
16
 However, the communication she refers to 
was addressed to Edmund Cornwall, Baron of Burford, rather than Dudley.
17
 Little is 
known about Cornwall, although it is possible that he was sheriff in Shropshire. Given 
Shropshire‘s proximity to Wales, there is a chance that he was related to Herle, but there 
is no proof either way. Herle‘s familial relationship with Cecil, or lack thereof, remains 
similarly obfuscated. There is no conclusive evidence to support Read‘s argument, and 
it is likely that Herle‘s kinship claim was based more upon a formulaic ratification of 
the parties‘ patronage relationship than to actual familial ties. The fact that in over three 
hundred letters, only two lines could be inferred to mean that the two were related 
strongly indicates that this was not the case. Herle was not the sort of man to pass up the 
opportunity to make the most of any connection to Cecil that he may have had. 
                                               
13 Read, Lord Burghley, p.39. 
14 Herle to Cecil, 19 October 1577, BL MS Lansdowne 25, f.129r. 
15 Herle to Cecil, 19 March 1587, BL MS Lansdowne 55, f.217v. 
16 Adams, ‗Both Diligent and Secret,‘ p.74. 
17 Herle to Cornwall, 5 March 1580, TNA SP 12/148/13, ff.53r, 55v; Adams cites the same document, but 
notes the addressee as the Earl of Leicester: Adams, ‗Both Diligent and Secret,‘ p.74. 
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 A patronage relationship had the distinction of being both public and private, 
and Herle‘s use of letters as his primary means of communication meant that these two 
aspects of patronage were often presented side by side. Herle often added personal 
touches to his letters containing otherwise political information. In late 1573, for 
example, he commiserated with Cecil on the harsh vagaries of sickness, describing 
himself as ‗most humbly sorye, as it becomes me, for your L[ordship‘s] sicknes, & as 
glad to here that the payne is mitigated.‘18 Herle well understood the pains of poor 
health, as he himself was frequently ill, a typical example of which was his sickness in 
1575. The grievous nature of that illness was such that Herle apologised to Cecil for the 
‗raggednes of mi hand & my tedyowsnes, which ye may ympute to mi sycknes.‘19 Over 
a decade later he informed Cecil that he had ‗fallen sick againe, wasted with 
melancholie.‘20 In the same letter where he detailed such private information, Herle 
described the political situation in East Friesland, and enclosed letters from the Low 
Countries and France. This juxtaposition of politically sensitive and highly personal 
information is unexpected for the modern reader, but is perfectly reasonable given the 
role of the letter as the only real form of distant communication in the Elizabethan 
world.  
Communicating primarily by letter made it difficult to convey degrees of 
meaning, particularly when Herle walked the fine line between appropriate concern for 
his patron and obsequiousness. Assuring Cecil that he was on the right side of this line, 
Herle claimed that ‗mi pore mite of good will, is nott to make ani ostentacyon therof, 
butt to praye for yow & serve yow durynge life, with all truste & affection.‘21 The 
affectionate aspect of a patronage relationship was not limited to letters from the client. 
Cecil returned Herle‘s trust and affection in kind, adding personal touches to his 
                                               
18 Herle to Cecil, 8 December 1573, BL MS Lansdowne 18, f.34r. 
19
 Herle to Cecil, 11 March 1575, TNA SP 70/137/67, f.209v. 
20 Herle to Cecil, 17 August 1585, BL MS Lansdowne 46, f.36r. 
21 BL MS Lansdowne 18, f.34r. 
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patronage such as a letter of reference, recommending Herle to ‗ani wydow that he 
wolld make that superscription [of marriage] to.‘22 For a man who wrote so many letters 
to his social superiors, there is remarkably little evidence of Herle‘s early life 
remaining. 
Early Life and Education 
As is typical for the majority of Elizabethans outside the nobility, no records of 
William Herle‘s date or place of birth have survived. Nor does he appear in official 
documents, the main sources for Herle‘s later life, until the late 1550s. It is possible to 
suggest an approximate date of birth, however, from his first extant piece of official 
correspondence.
23
 As Herle was travelling on a diplomatic mission to Germany on 
behalf of William Cecil in early 1559, an important duty which would have only been 
given to an adult, we can posit Herle‘s date of birth as being somewhere in the 1530s. 
More exact dating is impossible with surviving data. 
 Herle described himself as ‗a gentillman...of honest linaige,‘ a status he 
managed to maintain throughout his life, despite his often decidedly un-genteel 
actions.
24
 Cecil himself described Herle as ‗verey well borne, & of a good kinred,‘ 
referencing Herle‘s status as a member of the gentry.25 The gentry were a social 
grouping comprised largely of landowners, although lawyers and servants of the Crown 
also tended to fall within its bounds. Once considered the lowest part of the nobility, by 
the sixteenth century they had evolved to the point where they were essentially a caste 
unto themselves, and outnumbered the aristocracy by a factor of roughly ten to one.
26
 
While the ownership of land was not a prerequisite for gentility, it was the only way of 
ensuring one‘s descendants maintained that status, making this a prime consideration in 
                                               
22 Cecil to Herle, 10 August 1573, BL MS Lansdowne 21, f.31v; see below p.68 for further discussion of 
this letter. 
23 Herle to Cecil, 14 February, 1559, TNA SP 70/11/316, f.63r-63v. 
24 Herle to Cecil, 6 August, 1587, BL MS Lansdowne 54, f.150r. 
25 BL MS Lansdowne 21, f.31v. 
26 Joyce Youings, Sixteenth Century England, Harmondsworth, 1984, p.116. 
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marriage negotiations, though Herle does not seem to have concerned himself overly 
with this. 
Little is known of Herle‘s family – his father was Thomas Herle of 
Montgomeryshire, and he had a sister who he remained close to throughout his life.
27
 
There are no records of Herle marrying, although it seems he had an illegitimate 
daughter with one Rosa Jones, who was baptised Jana at Guilsfield, Montgomeryshire, 
on 23 October 1576.
28
 While Herle himself did not marry, he maintained a close 
relationship with his sister and her husband Laurence Johnson. In fact Herle dictated 
letters to his brother-in-law when he was particularly ill himself and unable to write.
29
 
His sister died sometime in the early 1580s, and Herle took responsibility for ‗the 
mayntenance & bryngyng up‘ of her four ‗poore lyttel ynffants,‘ consigning a 
government pension he had earned through his service to paying for their upbringing.
30
 
 Herle was clearly well educated, since a number of his letters indicate fluency in 
Latin, French, Dutch, Flemish, German, Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese. In a 1587 
letter to Cecil Herle stated ‗I owe to your L[ordship] mi education,‘ indicating that these 
skills were likely gained through tutelage organised by Cecil.
31
 However, no record of 
his enrolment at Oxford, Cambridge, or any of the Inns of Court survives. Nor is there 
any record of the passport he would have required in the unlikely event that he studied 
overseas. Edwards claims that Herle was forced to leave Oxford in disgrace to escape 
murder charges, a rather salacious claim based on a letter from Sir Edward Sanders, 
Chief Justice of the King‘s Bench, to Cecil, which mentions that a ‗Mr Hearle‘ had 
                                               
27 Lewis Jones, ‗William Herle and the Office of Rhaglaw in Elizabethan Cardiganshire,‘ p.180. 
28 Lewis Jones, ‗William Herle (d. 1588/9).‘ 
29 Johnson‘s hand was significantly neater than Herle‘s own, as he wrote with a less hurried and cramped 
form of the secretary hand. In cases such as this Herle tended to annotate the letters heavily in their 
margins; See for example Herle to Cecil, 29 March 1575, TNA SP 70/137/59, ff.310r-311v. 
30 Herle to Walsingham, 13 June 1582, TNA SP 83/16/34, f.65v; Herle to Cecil, 19 February 1579, BL 
MS Lansdowne 29, f.134r. 
31 BL MS Lansdowne 54, f.150r. 
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killed ‗one Paul Penye, servant unto Sir Leonard Chamberlain.‘32 Aside from this 
passing mention there is nothing to support Edwards‘ theory, or tie this ‗Hearle‘ to 
William Herle. It seems likely that it is based more on Edwards‘ wish to characterise 
Herle as a criminal than in fact.  
Herle’s Entry into Government Service 
Our first documentary evidence of Herle‘s life indicates that he entered 
government employ alongside Cecil upon the latter‘s return to favour with Elizabeth‘s 
accession to the throne. In a 1587 letter to Cecil, Herle described himself as having 
‗served her majestie from the begyneng of her Raigne,‘ a fact of which he was 
justifiably proud.
33
 Similarly, when writing to Elizabeth in 1587, Herle stated that ‗mi 
service & sincerity is best knowen by the space of 28 yeres, & od moneths.‘34 No 
records survive of Herle being in Cecil‘s employment before Elizabeth took the throne, 
but as Cecil is the only obvious connection to the crown for Herle it is likely Herle had 
worked for him before.  
In 1587, thanking Cecil for his aid throughout their years together, Herle said 
that he was ‗drawen only [to the Queen‘s service] by your good L[ordship] therunto, 
from Sir William Garrards howse.‘35 Garrard was a successful London merchant who 
had grown rich from the cloth export trade to Antwerp, although by the 1550s he had 
diversified to luxury goods and slaves, as well as taking governorship of the Russia 
Company.
36
 Given Herle‘s estimated birth date of somewhere in the 1530s, he could not 
have been in Garrard‘s service for long before Cecil recruited him. When combined 
with Cecil‘s previous role in Edward‘s government, in which Herle is never mentioned, 
                                               
32 Francis Edwards, The Marvellous Chance: Thomas Howard, Fourth Duke of Norfolk and the Ridolfi 
Plot, London, 1968, p.39; Edward Saunders to Cecil, 17 March, 1559, TNA SP 12/3, f.113r. 
33 BL MS Lansdowne 54, f.150r. 
34 Herle to Elizabeth I, 10 April 1587, BL MS Lansdowne 54, f.151r. 
35 BL MS Lansdowne 54, 150r. 
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37441, accessed 11 May 2010. 
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the likeliest scenario is that Herle entered Cecil‘s service towards the end of Mary 
Tudor‘s reign when Cecil was positioning himself for Elizabeth‘s accession. 
Cecil‘s early career had been promising, but he gained real power through his 
relationship with the new Queen, who trusted his advice. Beginning as secretary to 
Edward Seymour, Duke of Somerset, he had survived Somerset‘s fall to become 
Secretary of State under the Duke of Northumberland. This service culminated in his 
knighthood on 11 October 1551. Cecil‘s rise halted upon the staunchly Catholic Mary 
Tudor‘s accession. Historians‘ traditional view is that Cecil disappeared from public 
office for the duration of Mary‘s reign, only returning to his previous position when 
Elizabeth was crowned.
37
  
Stephen Alford, however, has recently argued that Cecil lived a double life 
under Mary, outwardly conforming to what was expected of him while secretly 
criticising the Catholic Queen and her government by supporting John Day‘s 
underground Protestant press. Alford further contests that Cecil did not become the 
recluse he is often portrayed as over this period, and he ‗flirted with office‘ in the new 
government.
38
 During Mary‘s reign Cecil was known, even favoured, at court and 
maintained his political and social connections. He was far too talented a man to slip 
into obscurity, and in late February 1558 he took his chance at a return to power, 
organising a confidential meeting with Elizabeth. When Mary died on 17 November 
1558, Cecil was already working as Elizabeth‘s Secretary of State, although he was not 
formally appointed until the twentieth.
39
 
The office of Secretary of State had steadily grown in importance throughout the 
early modern period, and under Cecil became the most important office in England. As 
McCaffrey has noted, the fact that all official correspondence flowed through Cecil‘s 
                                               
37 Wallace T. MacCaffrey, ‗William Cecil, first Baron Burghley (1520/21–1598),‘ ODNB, 
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office allowed him a unique level of control over the realm‘s public business.40 As 
Secretary, Cecil emphasised certain attributes amongst those in his service, placing a 
premium on secrecy, intelligence, and information gathering.
41
 Herle clearly had all the 
attributes the Secretary needed amongst his employees, exhibiting an obsession with 
secrecy and the passing of private information that rivalled Cecil‘s own. From the start 
of the young Queen‘s reign, Cecil‘s was the dominant voice in the new government, and 
those with ties to him were well positioned to reap the benefits of his rapid elevation.  
Negotiating Government Loans 
In February 1559 William Herle wrote to Cecil from Antwerp, in the Spanish 
Netherlands.
42
 This was not Herle‘s first epistolary contact with Cecil, as he refers to 
earlier letters sent when in Dunkirk, but it is the earliest surviving document relating to 
Herle‘s life. Herle reported rumours of nobles gathering in Germany in response to the 
King of Poland‘s death, a fact which Herle was clearly mistaken about as Sigismund II 
was alive and well in 1559. While the accuracy of Herle‘s intelligence is certainly 
questionable, the potential importance is not. As Secretary, Cecil needed information on 
continental politics, and risked the occasional premature report such as Herle‘s in order 
to encourage timely updates. Herle comes across as a young man, eager to perform his 
service well and ingratiate himself with his powerful patron. He emphasised his ‗good 
zele to serve mi charge under your mastership, bothe faythfully & dilygentlye.‘43 Even 
though the letter is a mere fifteen lines, minute in comparison to Herle‘s later reports 
which often ran from three to five pages, various details within it carry forward 
throughout Herle‘s life. 
Herle‘s location in Antwerp from where he sent the letter is particularly 
significant when seen in light of his later career. Ties to the Netherlands were a 
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continued theme throughout Herle‘s life, with his extended stays there vastly 
outnumbering his other overseas postings. Antwerp was vital to England‘s strategic 
interests, as the centre of its wool exports and financial dealings. It was therefore a 
natural place for government agents to gather. Herle‘s mission to Antwerp must have 
been a success, as when he next appeared in the records, Herle was undertaking 
significantly more important work for Cecil. 
 In early April 1560, Herle was in Europe organising loans on behalf of the 
government, and writing of his efforts to Sir Thomas Parry.
44
 It seems he travelled 
under the guise of a merchant, discussing rates of interest and the availability of cheap 
credit with merchant bankers in the aftermath of wars amongst the Germanic states. 
Herle‘s previous work with Garrard made him a natural choice for this role, and 
probably allowed him to blend in with relative ease. While Herle was in Hamburg, a 
merchant named Henrick Rantzow told him that there was so much ready cash in 
Antwerp that loans could be had for a lessened rate, and that he hoped that through his 
‗mene no small som shold have ben employed to th'use of your englyssh nacion.‘45 It 
seems that Herle had been attempting to set up loans from Rantzow and the other 
merchants he represented for a time the previous summer, but negotiations had 
collapsed when Herle was forced to return to England abruptly. There is no indication in 
Herle‘s letter of why he would have needed to leave so abruptly, although given his 
later problems it seems likely that the cost of acting on the government‘s behalf was 
proving prohibitive.  
 Herle travelled on to Bavaria, where he contacted the merchants again, 
discussing details for the proposed loan. Herle offered ‗th'assuraunce to obtain the 
                                               
44 Parry was a significant figure in the early Elizabethan government, rivalling Cecil for influence until 
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accessed 11 May 2010. 
45 Herle to Thomas Parry, 7 April 1560, TNA SP 70/13/451, ff.29r-29v. 
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Cytye of Londons bond‘ for a loan of £20-30,000.46 Unfortunately for Herle the 
merchants had little money left to lend, as the combatants in recent wars amongst the 
German princes had yet to repay their loans. Herle informed Parry that the merchants 
would be able to scrape together little more than a third of the required sum, but that if 
he was given sufficient authority he could garner the full amount by ‗Christmas next.‘47  
 In January 1561 Herle received detailed instructions from the Queen regarding 
his powers in negotiating loans and the need for him to do so. At this point Herle was in 
Hamburg, so it seems likely that Cecil had ordered him to Europe in anticipation of the 
Queen‘s permission to negotiate loans. These instructions were merely formalising what 
he was already intended to do, and Elizabeth intimated this when she said that ‗we have 
perceyved by your l[ett]res...to our principall Secretary...that...yow have obteynid the 
loane.‘48 The loan in question was for £80,000 and 50,000 crowns, ‗upon six in the 
hundred, to be delyverid at Hambourgh abowt the next Aprill.‘ The interest of six 
percent was a problem for Elizabeth, who wished Herle to ‗obteyne it upon fowre or 
fyve at the most per cento.‘ She was also uncomfortable with the fact that the bankers 
required ‗two of the thre Marityme Cites, Hambourgh, Lubeck, and Lunenbourgh‘ to 
provide surety of repayment, rather than her own bond.
49
 Overall, however, she seemed 
pleased with Herle‘s accomplishments, and ordered him to see if a similar loan would 
be available at Emden.  
 While organising these loans for the government, Herle was undertaking a 
sideline in information gathering, a typical occurrence in the informal English 
intelligence community. Cecil, Leicester, and Walsingham all had private networks of 
contacts who acted for them in other capacities while feeding information to the 
Councillors as a favour. Intelligence gathering methods were crude, and much of the 
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data gathered amounted to little more than local gossip. The method Herle planned to 
use to gather information in this instance, was to go to taverns with merchants and, 
‗when they lie dronke,‘ ‗feadinge of theire humor and inclynacon,‘ take advantage of 
the situation to lead them into revealing more information than they would sober.
50
 He 
obviously experienced some success with this plan. 
Herle‘s intelligence focus in this series of letters was on detailing the 
connections that his merchant contact Rantzow had at the Danish court. He felt this 
particularly important because of the ‗ancyent amitye which ever was betwixt the howse 
of Denmarke & Frawnce,‘ giving Rantzow, and through him Herle, insight into French 
plans to aid Scottish rebels against England.
51
 Yet Herle also raised more general 
concerns, reporting on such minor matters as Westphalius of Hamburg railing at 
England and its chief magistrates in an open pulpit without check from the authorities. 
This intertwining of minor details more indicative of local colour than national 
importance, and potentially explosive information appears throughout the corpus of 
Herle‘s letters. By placing concrete details of minor matters and nebulous information 
about more significant ones in such close proximity, Herle lent a subtle credibility to 
each statement that would have been lacking had each been presented in isolation. 
Between 1561 and 1563 Herle disappears from official records once more, only 
reappearing when he returned to Europe for further loan negotiations. In May 1563 he 
wrote to Cecil reporting his arrival at Antwerp, and detailing what intelligence he had 
gleaned on his way north from Dunkirk. He briefly detailed a conflict between the 
Kings of Sweden and Denmark, rumours of negotiations between the Russians and the 
Danes, and movements of the Spanish navy to counteract a planned Turkish invasion of 
Corsica. Herle was also running short of funds, asking Cecil for ‗a l[ett]re of credit for a 
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foure or fyve hundrethe crownes.‘52 This was necessary as he had been ‗consumed with 
long expenses this laste yere, and yet reqwiringe no allowaunce till my purpose be 
perfected.‘ Ambassadors and agents such as Herle generally paid their own way then 
attempted to recoup expenses after the fact. Convincing Elizabeth and Cecil to 
compensate Herle for losses incurred in their service proved Herle‘s greatest problem 
during the course of his life, and he experienced little success in doing so. 
From a series of letters across August-November 1563, it is clear that Herle‘s 
primary purpose upon the continent was once again negotiating loans. By 2 August 
1563, Herle had completed his business in Antwerp, informing Cecil that ‗mi charge 
being to your full contentment fynisshed‘ he carried a contract for £37,000 ‗under their 
fyrme & seales.‘53 Herle‘s time on the continent had obviously been extended, and he 
bemoaned the fact that ‗in the mene season I was forced‘ to borrow £100 ‗in Andwerpe, 
for furniture of mi busynes & charges.‘ While he mentioned that he would like to be 
reimbursed upon his return, Herle‘s primary concern was gaining timely transport 
across the Channel, and he asked that Cecil aid him in this. 
Unfortunately for Herle, Cecil does not seem to have been the most attentive 
patron at this point. On 13 October 1563, two months after he asked Cecil for 
assistance, Herle still waited in Dunkirk for a ship to take him across to Dover. In the 
intervening months he had taken ill, ‗shaken with a meane agew,‘ and could ‗scarse 
write ani thing to your honor presently for wekenes.‘54 He repeated his pleas of August, 
adding the detail that the banker whose loan he had organised had sent his principal 
clerk to carry over the legal documents with Herle, and they both now waited for 
transport. In addition to asking for ‗credyte of 2 or 300 [crowns] with Richard Clough to 
satisffye suche chargs as by waye of credyte I was fayne to take up,‘ Herle requested 
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‗your honors authoritye for som smal vessell of good conduct over.‘55 Two weeks later 
Herle was still waiting. 
By 26 October, Herle was becoming frustrated at the lack of aid he received 
from Cecil, decrying that in his last letter ‗dyd I certeffye throwlye the state of mi 
busynes, wherin wanted nothing butt mi comyng over, all other things were 
determyned, & fullye concluded upon.‘56 As he had received no answer from the 
Secretary, Herle planned to write to ‗Maye of Dover for mi spedye transport‘ across the 
Channel. This would not solve his credit problem however, and he begged Cecil for aid. 
On 5 November Herle repeated this letter, informing him that: 
I sollycyte styll on thing Right honorable, & in respect of mi servyce 
well fynisshed, do confydentlye attend som credyte of 300 [crowns] to 
dispatche me hence, the which most willinglye I wold refferre to mi 
comyng over, so my promis & faythe were nott presentlye to be 
discharged beffore mi departure.
57
 
This indicates Herle had been able to procure passage across the Channel without 
Cecil‘s aid, but felt unable to leave the continent until his loans had been repaid. Clearly 
Herle was worried about his continued credibility in the Low Countries. No further 
letters in this sequence survive, and Herle‘s next contact with Cecil was not until 
September 1564.
58
 Herle had clearly returned to England by this point, although we 
cannot be sure when in the intervening ten months Cecil had brought him home. 
For a short period then, Herle was acting as an organiser of government loans, 
roughly analogous to a less empowered version of Sir Thomas Gresham, the founder of 
the Royal Exchange. Gresham spent a significant portion of his time between 1551 and 
1564 in Antwerp raising credit and consolidating loans at the money market there.
59
 He 
also acted as a merchant, trading for himself while steadily reducing government debts 
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run up during Mary‘s reign. Herle‘s role as a loan negotiator was an entirely respectable 
one, and likely a sign of a young man on the rise. 
 Herle‘s success in his early loan raising and intelligence gathering work can be 
seen in the substantial reward he received from the Crown in 1565.  In partnership with 
Armagil Waad, Herle received a patent for manufacturing sulphur and oil.
60
 Couched in 
the formal language of royal proclamations, the patent acknowledged that the two men 
had discovered a new process for the creation of flax seed oil, and granted them 
exclusive rights to pursue such measures within Elizabeth‘s realm for the next thirty 
years. This patent was clearly a reward for Herle‘s dutiful service, and it seems likely 
that Cecil had persuaded the Queen to aid his client in this way. It would seem that 1565 
started out as the culmination of years of dedicated service on Herle‘s part. Soon after 
Herle received this reward, however, his career prospects began to fall apart. Over the 
next few years, Herle was involved in a series of disastrous court cases that forever 
tarnished his reputation. 
Herle’s Foray into Piracy 
In both 1565 and 1570, William Herle was arrested on charges of piracy. That 
Herle, a respectable member of the gentry, should find himself in such a seemingly 
nefarious ―trade‖ seems strange. However, sixteenth century England had a substantial 
piratical fleet, stemming largely from changes in the fishing industry. As an island 
nation where fish was a staple of most people‘s diet, England maintained significant 
fishing fleets and used these as a training ground for mariners to defend the realm in 
times of need. Across the Tudor period, Dutch fishermen gradually grew to dominate 
the waters around England, due to their superior vessels and ability to salt vast 
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quantities of fish onboard.
61
 The English response to this change was twofold: at the 
parliamentary level, legislation was enacted to force Englishmen to buy from English 
fishermen rather than Dutch; at the local level, many fishermen turned to piracy to make 
ends meet. Geoffrey Elton exhaustively detailed the former process, but the latter has 
been largely overlooked by historical scholarship.
62
  
England had a long tradition of piracy, which the formation of the league of the 
Cinque Ports in the fourteenth century had done little to ameliorate.
63
 The league was 
intended to protect the south-east coast and police the seas. In fact, by granting members 
the prerogative to plunder non-English ships which passed through the Channel, the 
Ports merely regulated piracy into a commercial weapon. Attempts made by Elizabeth‘s 
grandfather, Henry VII, to check piracy through the issuing of letters of marque which 
entitled the bearer to seize goods of an equivalent value from the nation of those who 
had robbed him exacerbated the problem, and by the mid-sixteenth century English 
waters were notoriously dangerous.
64
 
Throughout Elizabeth‘s reign, piracy was a constant menace to sea trade. By the 
1560s the French Wars of Religion and the Dutch Revolt had caused a general 
breakdown of central authority across the north-west coast of Europe, leaving large 
areas of the coast unpatrolled and intensifying the pirate problem. Portuguese and 
Spanish ships were the most common targets for English pirates, due in large part to 
their use of Antwerp as the prime location for distributing their merchandise into central 
and northern Europe. The principle route from the Iberian peninsula to Antwerp lay 
through the English Channel, past the south coast from Cornwall to Kent.
65
 In addition 
to supporting semi-official piracy through the Cinque Ports, these areas were dotted 
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with the sort of small fishing villages and isolated coves that encouraged small-scale 
piratical behaviour.  
A number of measures were suggested to lessen the pirate problem. In his 
General and Rare Memorials John Dee argued that a ‗Pety-Nauy-Royall‘ could be 
maintained at minimal expense and expanded as needed.
66
 All the ‗pyrats, our own 
cuntrymen‘ could be absorbed into this navy, both preventing their further predations, 
and making use of ‗their bodyes (already hardened to the seas) and chiefly of their 
courage and skills.‘ Dee‘s suggestion was implemented when the onset of the Spanish 
war necessitated the employment of a large number of former pirates in the navy. The 
natural outcome of this was that entrepreneurial piracy rapidly diminished. In 1565 
when Herle was arrested, however, piracy was still a major problem in England. 
Herle‘s piratical activities were concentrated in the 1560s, a period when 
Elizabeth constantly vacillated about England‘s relations with Spain. While Valois 
France had descended into turmoil with the onset of the Wars of Religion in 1562, there 
was no indication yet that its weakened state would be permanent. In fact Herle‘s first 
bout of piracy, in 1565, occurred during the period of relative peace within France 
following the 1563 Edict of Ambrose. England needed to maintain cordial relations with 
Habsburg Spain in order to preserve their alliance against France and Scotland. The 
thriving wool trade at Antwerp was also vital to English interests, necessitating close 
ties with the Spanish authorities in the Netherlands. Attacks on Spanish ships travelling 
to the Low Countries, then, were likely to be frowned upon by the Crown. 
In mid 1565 a ship hailing from the Spanish Netherlands was attacked by 
English pirates, who made off with its cargo. Herle was entangled enough in this raid on 
Spanish shipping that the High Court of Admiralty, as part of its investigation into the 
incident, required him to give a deposition detailing his involvement. No full record of 
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the case survives, although Admiralty Court sessions were largely formalities, more 
about observing due process before passing judgement than investigating evidence.
67
 
However, the depositions of Luke Spracklinge, Mary Best, and William Herle survive, 
the former accusing Herle of complicity in piracy, and the latter defending himself.  
Spracklinge, a ‗sercher‘ or customs official, based in the coastal town of 
Margate in Kent, deposed on 25 July 1565. He related how on 4 July two men sailing 
with Herle informed him that Herle‘s ship was docked nearby. Spracklinge was 
delighted to hear this as Herle owed him £4 17s, a sum which he immediately set out to 
collect. Unable to find Herle aboard the ship, Spracklinge was entertained by Charles 
Morehouse, who ‗declared to him that Herle and he had a licence from the Kinge of 
Swethland [Sweden] to apprehend and take all suche shipps and goods as did appertaine 
to any of his enymies.‘68 The ship remained there until 10 July, its occupants hoping 
that Spracklinge would sell them provisions, but he refused as he suspected ‗that they 
should be pirats.’  
Mary Best, another Margate local, gave evidence that Herle and four others had 
lodged at her house one night. Best thought this odd, as Herle usually stayed with 
Spracklinge when he was in Margate. Further rousing her suspicions was the ‗great 
bage‘ filled with ‗divers peeces of goold’ that one of Herle’s companions carried, a 
possible sign of the profits of their piracy.
69
 Best’s comments place Spracklinge’s 
deposition in an interesting light. He and Herle were clearly old friends, as ‘Herle was 
accustomably used to lodge at the sayd serchers howse.’ Furthermore, Best’s belief that 
she saw a man carrying a sack of gold, if accurate, indicates that Herle and his 
companions had brought significant spoils with them. Perhaps Spracklinge was more 
involved in the piratical activities than he let on, and his accusations were less about a 
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concerned citizen warning the authorities than they were the outcome of a disagreement 
over the division of spoils. 
On 2 August, Margaret, Duchess of Parma and Governor of the Netherlands, 
wrote to Elizabeth complaining of ‗several depredations carried out previously by 
subjects of your Majesty, and recently (among others) by one Willem Eerle at the very 
mouth of the Thames.‘70 Further, the Duchess claimed that these pirates had been 
carrying their winnings ashore and selling them under the eyes of the authorities. This 
was particularly galling, as Elizabeth had recently promised to crack down on piracy 
during their negotiations in Bruges for continued peace. In light of her ‗respect for the 
firm friendship existing between your Majesties [Philip and Elizabeth],‘ the Duchess 
had ignored pleas for restitution through the seizure of English cloth ships in Antwerp, 
but unless Elizabeth responded to these grievances she would feel compelled to do so 
herself.  
The authorities reacted quickly to Margaret‘s complaint, calling Spracklinge to a 
second deposition.
71
 Spracklinge gave additional evidence about the Swedish letter of 
marque Herle and Morehouse had been granted, claiming they showed it to him at 
Dover the year before but he had been unable to read it as it was in Latin. When he went 
aboard Morehouse‘s ship to look for Herle on 4 July, he was told Herle had gone ashore 
the night before and would come to see him at his house. Herle‘s position onboard the 
ship is unclear. Morehouse was evidently the captain, but Spracklinge was unsure if 
Herle was ‗owner, capitaigne, peticapitaigne or howe he served.’ 
In response to Spracklinge’s accusation of piracy, Herle gave his own deposition 
to the court.
72
 Furthermore, on 3 August 1565, Herle sent Cecil a letter explaining why 
he had recently been caught in the company of pirates. Enclosed within the letter is a 
                                               
70 Margaret to Elizabeth, 2 August 1565, BL Cotton Galba CII, (Jean Anderson trans.), f.166r. 
71 Deposition of Luke Spracklinge, 6 August, 1565, TNA HCA, 1/26/393, f. 395v. 
72 Herle‘s Deposition, August 1565, TNA HCA, 1/38/16, ff.16r-18v. 
33 
 
detailed diary of his movements over the course of July, Herle‘s attempt to prove to his 
patron that he was not involved in anything as untoward as piracy.
73
 He was quick to 
assure Cecil that he had been staying ‗in company of honest gentyllmen & well 
knowen,‘ not scoundrels. The details given in his diary and deposition, however, 
indicate that this was not entirely the case. 
In his deposition, Herle claimed that he had been travelling with William 
Wilson, another of those Spracklinge accused of piracy, as Wilson owed him a debt. 
Wilson promised to repay Herle out of his cut from the first ship they captured while 
sailing under commission. Herle claimed that he been told by ‘lerned men that suche 
service was not unlawfull, butt approved by sondrye arguments & presydents agaynst 
Ffrance & agaynst Fflanders.’74 While there is a degree of logic to the idea that French 
ships could be robbed legitimately, given the tacit support England showed to the 
Huguenot rebels, Herle’s claim that the Spanish Netherlands were an approved target 
seems odd. Elizabeth and her councillors were carefully avoiding provoking Spain in 
this period, and attacking vessels from a Spanish possession would be a reversal of this 
policy.  
Herle also argued that he had been on the ship ‘as a private person, nether 
captayn as som say, nor owner, vyttayler, adventurer, nor servitor in that jorney,’ and 
was therefore not responsible for the actions of others on the ship.
75
 No evidence 
survives of who it was that said Herle was captain of the ship, as neither Spracklinge or 
Best’s statements do more than say that they were unsure of Herle’s role. It is likely that 
Herle was referring here to rumour rather than an actual charge. With a number of 
weeks having passed since Spracklinge’s initial deposition, there was ample time for 
details of the investigation into Herle’s doings to have spread. 
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After weeks of beating against the prevailing winds with Wilson, claimed Herle, 
he jumped ship and returned to England on a vessel captained by William Monck, a 
servant of Thomas Howard, the Duke of Norfolk. He lodged in Weymouth for a few 
days, until he was contacted by one of Wilson‘s men who told him that ‗they had taken 
a dansker laden with sallt’ and if he would travel to the Isle of Wight where they were 
berthed, he ‘shold have satisfactyon of my monney presentlye.’76 Herle went on to 
Dorset to speak with Norfolk, asking him for permission to sell the salt in his shire, but 
the Duke told him he would have to seek permission from the Queen. There is no 
evidence of Herle having further contact with Norfolk, and it seems this was purely a 
business transaction, with Herle taking advantage of Monck’s connection to Norfolk to 
sell off the plundered goods quickly. Given Herle’s later involvement in exposing the 
Ridolfi plot that led to Norfolk’s execution, however, this meeting with the Duke is 
certainly an interesting coincidence.  
Herle travelled on to the Isle of Wight to report this setback to Wilson, but was 
apprehended by the Vice-Admiral’s men on suspicion of being captain of a pirate ship. 
Herle was released upon showing the Vice-Admiral a letter he had from Wilson 
disproving this accusation. Perhaps more telling is that Herle offered to ‘perswade with 
Willson & Morehowse & with the better sort of the ship to bring in their prise’ and turn 
themselves in, in exchange for a lighter sentence.
77
 Herle claimed he attempted to do so, 
but that the others refused to return with him, and further carried him off so that he was 
unable to return alone. Despite this, he claimed, they remained ‗in that degre of 
dutifulnes to their prince, as they wold do nothing which were unsemelye‘ and so 
returned to Weymouth.
78
 
                                               
76 ibid. 
77 ibid., f.17r. 
78 Herle to Cecil, 3 August 1565, TNA SP 15/12/76,f.221r. 
35 
 
No record survives of the outcome of Herle‘s trial, but it seems his account of 
his doings was enough to satisfy the Court. Given his appeal to Cecil, it is even possible 
that the Secretary interceded on his servant‘s behalf. Cecil, however, could not have 
been happy with his servant‘s antics, and one imagines he made his displeasure known 
to Herle. None of Herle‘s letters state why he would have risked Cecil‘s ire by turning 
pirate, although his letters of the next few years hint that he was trying to pay off the 
debts he incurred while organising loans overseas. 
In December 1569 Herle wrote to Cecil, asking him for financial aid. As Herle‘s 
primary patron, Cecil was the natural man for Herle to turn to in his hour of need, and it 
seems he was in dire straits: 
I know your hevy cowntenance towards me hath bin grett, which partly 
mi supplanters have incresed, & partly those ynfelicityes have bred, 
which communely follow a nedy man: yett mi ynnocency doth so assure 
me again, if I may be indiffrently hard, with mi contynuall devotion 
borne to your honor, as pardonably I presume to write these few lynes 
unto yow.
79
 
Herle‘s mention of Cecil‘s ‗hevy cowntenance towards me‘ further indicates that all was 
not well in their relationship by 1569. A large part of Cecil‘s displeasure can likely be 
laid at the feet of the ‗ynfelicityes‘ Herle mentioned. Having gone from a useful 
negotiator and travelling loan organiser to a pirate who Cecil was forced to save from 
prison, Herle‘s stock with his patron was plummeting. His early promise seems very 
much to have dwindled, and the Secretary must have wondered what he ever saw in 
Herle. The mention of ‗mi supplanters‘ is also interesting. Clearly Herle felt that there 
were those around Cecil who were undermining his relationship with the Secretary, 
perhaps in an attempt to increase their own ties to Cecil. Herle‘s primary concern in this 
letter, however, was one which would dog him throughout his life. 
Herle was interminably impecunious, and a large number of his letters are 
concerned with ameliorating this condition. By 1569 Herle asking Cecil for aid was an 
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occurrence so common that he felt the need to preface many of his pleas with an 
apologetic acknowledgement of this fact. Despite not wishing to trouble his patron, 
Herle felt that his situation was so dire ‗as non can be more, nott having had a peni in 
the world of myne own since mydsomer.‘80 Constantly hounded by creditors, Herle 
feared being placed in debtors‘ prison, a fate which befell him more than once.81 The 
men Herle was indebted to, he wrote, ‗so vexe me with arrests & charges... that I dare 
no more go owtt of doors.‘82  
These debts had a vastly influential effect on Herle‘s life. Over the course of 
thirty years and almost three hundred letters, Herle‘s debts were often his central 
concern. While he employed a number of means in these attempts, his most commonly 
used method was working on government business abroad. This had the dual benefits of 
being work that Herle‘s linguistic skills gave him an aptitude for, and being out of the 
reach of his creditors. Significantly, letters to Cecil beginning for monetary relief or 
letters to ward off debtors greatly increased whenever Herle returned to London. In 
1569, however, Cecil ignored Herle‘s pleas for financial aid. In a little over a year, 
Herle was imprisoned. 
On 18 November 1570, the Privy Council met at Hampton Court. The second 
item on their agenda was a letter to the Knight Marshal ‗to receve into his custodye 
John Keele, Avery Phillippes, John Poole, and William Herle.‘83 He was to keep the 
four men isolated in ‗severall wardes, suffering none of them to have conference with 
another,‘ and allowing ‗no other to have conference with them.‘ During the winter of 
1570-71 William Herle languished in the Marshalsea prison. Located on the south bank 
of the Thames, it had been the traditional place of internment for London‘s debtors 
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since the fourteenth century.84 When combined with Herle‘s history of poor financial 
management, one‘s first assumption would be that he was in prison because of his bad 
debts, rotting there until his friends could gather the funds required to procure his 
release. In fact, it seems Herle had been implicated in piratical activities again, and this 
time was unable to talk his way out of it. 
Writing to Sir Francis Bacon, Elizabeth‘s Lord Keeper, Herle begged for release 
from the Marshalsea. He bemoaned how life had treated him badly, that no matter how 
hard he worked ‗in place of gaine I have losse, & for prefferment destruction.‘85 While 
this was perhaps a little melodramatic, Herle‘s conclusion cannot really be gainsaid. 
After working tirelessly for Cecil and Elizabeth for almost a decade, he seems to have 
gained remarkably little in the way of rewards. His difficulty in gaining recompense for 
the expenses he ran up in Crown service could very well have been what reduced his 
finances to such a level that he turned to piracy.  
Herle‘s customary lack of ready cash reared its head when he claimed that those 
who were arrested alongside him had since bought their way out, while he remained 
stuck in prison ‗wholy voyd bothe of mony, creditt & apparayll.‘86 Presumably Keele, 
Phillippes, and Poole had managed to scrounge together the funds required for their 
release in the two months since the four of them were imprisoned. Herle instead offered 
his service in a task ‗of importance to her Majestie‘ in exchange for his freedom.  
At first glance it seems odd that Herle would appeal to Bacon when he had 
established a close relationship with Cecil over the preceding decade. However, it is 
possible that the Secretary‘s ‗hevy cowntenance‘ still weighed on Herle‘s mind.87 
Perhaps he felt that his demands on his patron were growing too frequent to maintain 
balance in their relationship, perhaps he was leery of asking Cecil for help when he had 
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been bailed out of similar trouble before. Whatever the reason, it is clear that Herle felt 
it prudent to avoid reminding Cecil of his existence until it could be under less dire 
circumstances. No order for Herle‘s release survives, so it is impossible to know how 
his appeal to Bacon fared. 
By April 1571 Herle was again funnelling information to the Secretary. An 
undated letter from Herle to Cecil, which was probably written at some point during this 
period based upon Herle‘s interest in piracy, puts forward a plan for eliminating piracy 
from Elizabeth‘s realm.88 It is possible that this letter was composed in 1565, when 
Herle undertook his first piratical endeavours; however 1571 seems the more likely date 
as Herle‘s stay in prison would have given him ample time to muse on ways to regain 
Cecil‘s favour. Herle‘s plan to combat piracy essentially boiled down to a yearly survey 
of ships owned by each merchant and fisherman in the realm. According to Herle, this 
would let officials keep track of the movement and sale of ships, preventing ship owners 
from turning pirate on the side. Herle‘s proposal, particularly the idea that ship owners 
would fund this policing of their industry, seems naïve. 
While Herle‘s plan for reforming England‘s sea trade was unlikely to appeal to 
Cecil, it was enough to remind the Secretary of his existence. In all likelihood Cecil 
arranged to have Herle released from prison, although it is possible that his friends 
scrounged together the cash required to pay his release fee. Given that we can place him 
in the Marshalsea again in March 1571; it is entirely possible that Herle remained there 
during the intervening months. Perhaps Cecil merely arranged for his bond to be paid, 
allowing him out into London but keeping a tight rein upon his activities. No matter 
what the full story was, Cecil was clearly interested in Herle once more.  
* 
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In this chapter we have seen how Herle entered government service at the 
beginning of Elizabeth‘s reign. Well educated, with some experience in the London-
Antwerp trade, Herle was a prime candidate for recruitment by William Cecil. The 
Secretary of State inducted Herle into the world of Tudor foreign relations, an area 
where great rewards were there for the taking, but where power and wealth was 
concentrated in the hands of a lucky few. While Herle performed his duties admirably, 
the casual nature of the Elizabethan civil service worked against him. Expected to pay 
his own way when on government service, Herle ran up debts that would plague him for 
the rest of his life.  
Strands that would run throughout Herle‘s life surfaced here first. The coming 
conflict between Protestant England and the Continental Catholic powers was 
foreshadowed by Cecil‘s recognition of the strategic and political importance of the 
Netherlands. Herle‘s role in this conflict was also hinted at with Cecil‘s emphasis on the 
importance of rapidly transmitted accurate information. Herle‘s descent from loan 
negotiator to alleged pirate shows the lengths to which financial hardship could push 
even a respectable gentleman. Most importantly, we have seen how important a 
powerful patron was to a successful career in the Tudor civil service. It was only 
through Cecil‘s benefice that Herle could hope to ensure that his rewards for service 
outweighed the debts he incurred. While Herle ended this chapter languishing in prison, 
he was about to experience a life-changing shift in his career. After an extended lull in 
work, and with his reputation in tatters, Herle would receive an opportunity to ingratiate 
himself with Cecil to a degree he could never have managed through his loan-
organising missions of the 1560s. 
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Chapter II: The Ridolfi Plot 
In April of 1571 William Herle was entrusted with an important mission. During 
the next few months, he would play a vital role in Cecil‘s attacks on Thomas Howard, 
the Duke of Norfolk, and Mary Stuart, exiled Queen of Scots and a devout Catholic. 
Mary and Norfolk challenged Cecil‘s position as foremost councillor and his 
unparalleled access to the Queen. While Herle played a comparatively small part in 
Cecil‘s attempt to discredit these powerful figures, it nevertheless proved vital to his 
relationship with Cecil, his position within Elizabethan society, and his continued 
employ in government service.  
Cecil attacked Mary and Norfolk by creating a picture of an impending Catholic 
assault on the Protestant establishment. By weaving together a series of seemingly 
disparate incidents, Cecil created the impression of a coherent plot to depose Elizabeth 
and reinstitute Catholicism in England. Cecil and Walsingham repeatedly employed this 
tactic throughout the Elizabethan period. By creating a sense of imminent crisis the two 
strongly Protestant councillors managed to push the usually conservative queen into far 
more radical actions than she wished to take. The scheme detailed in this chapter, 
commonly referred to as the Ridolfi plot after its enigmatic instigator, was the final link 
in a chain of events stretching back to the late 1560s.  
This chapter considers William Herle‘s role in the Ridolfi plot, focusing on his 
second stint in the Marshalsea – this time as a government agent rather than a legitimate 
inmate. The letters Herle wrote to William Cecil, elevated to Lord Burghley in February 
of 1571, and John Leslie, the Bishop of Ross, from March to April of 1571 are the focus 
of both narrative and analysis. Cecil‘s summary of the plot and letters between other 
participants in the intrigue are also examined. Herle‘s role in the Ridolfi plot was a 
watershed moment in his life, transforming him from a disgraced negotiator to a useful 
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intelligencer. The success he experienced here revitalised his career, and garnered him a 
number of rewards. Yet Herle remained deeply in debt, and his initial foray into 
intelligence gathering proved his most successful. This chapter will contrast Herle‘s 
work in uncovering the Ridolfi plot with a number of his less successful reports of other 
conspiracies.  
Cecilian Construction of Crises 
As a well documented example of Elizabethan treason, the Ridolfi plot has been 
discussed in passing by virtually every Elizabethan historian. Conyers Read provides a 
perfect example of the sort of view most historians have reading the Ridolfi plot, 
following Cecil‘s narrative of the plot almost exclusively.1 Francis Edwards, however, 
has consistently provided a counter to the more usual acceptance of the narratives of 
these incidents. The events of the Ridolfi plot seem fantastical to the modern reader, and 
Edwards has claimed that the plot was both too far-fetched and too convenient for 
William Cecil to be anything other than a Cecilian plan to eliminate Norfolk. Edwards‘ 
three books each focus on different aspects of the plot, the first on Mary‘s role, the 
second on Norfolk‘s, and the third on its place amongst the various plots of the 
Elizabethan era.
2
 All three consistently present Edwards‘ basic thesis: that the Ridolfi 
plot was a Cecilian construction, designed to discredit his enemies as traitorous 
Catholics and ensure his own continued hold on power. Cecil cynically crafted the plots 
from thin air as weapons for attacking his enemies.  
Edwards questions the validity of the primary narratives of the various plots, 
based upon the fact that they occurred during what he describes as Cecil‘s domination, 
the period between 1558 and 1612 where William Cecil and his son Robert 
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overshadowed English politics.
3
 The Ridolfi plot was the first in a long line of similar 
smear campaigns conducted by the Cecils to bolster solidarity against Catholicism 
amongst English Protestants. Edwards invests the Cecils with a Machiavellian 
willingness to corrupt historical perception of these events through distorting public 
records and destroying private ones, including those of the Duke of Norfolk, the Earls 
of Oxford and Leicester, and Sir Francis Walsingham.
4
  
Edwards‘ identification of Walsingham as a target of Cecilian distortion would 
seem to undermine his thesis somewhat, given the commonality of interest between 
Cecil and Walsingham. While Walsingham was the acknowledged instigator of anti-
Catholicism for much of Elizabeth‘s reign, at this point Cecil was the most prominent 
and powerful Protestant in England. Although historians have generally portrayed Cecil 
as relatively impartial in comparison to Walsingham, a new picture has begun to emerge 
recently, particularly in the work of Stephen Alford, of Cecil as a committed Protestant 
with every interest in suppressing Catholicism as thoroughly as possible.
5
 While this 
supports Edwards‘ criticism of Cecil as a cynical manipulator to a point, this thesis 
would argue that his argument is flawed because he fails to recognise the distinct 
possibility that Cecil himself actually believed in the reality of these conspiracies. 
Rather than a cunning manipulator and fabricator of lies, Cecil was a justifiably 
paranoid man, who realised exactly how tenuous his Queen‘s grip on power was. 
In a recent article, Peter Lake argued that not only did Cecil believe in an 
international Catholic conspiracy to destroy England, but this belief so distorted his 
world-view that he saw discrete events as part of a giant tapestry of plots and counter-
                                               
3 Edwards, Plots and Plotters, p.21. 
4 ibid., pp.21-22. 
5 Alford; Patrick Collinson, ‗Pulling the Strings: Religion and Politics in the Progress of 1578,‘ in Jayne 
Archer, Elizabeth Goldring, and Sarah Knight (eds), The Progresses, Pageants, and Entertainments of 
Queen Elizabeth I, Oxford, 2007, pp.124-125, 134-136. 
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plots.
6
 Applying Lake‘s thesis to the Ridolfi plot allows us to see Cecil‘s actions less as 
manufacturing a plot, and more as uncovering a series of events which Elizabethans saw 
as dialectically connected in a way that a modern reader cannot.
7
 The concept of a vast 
Catholic conspiracy to overthrow England‘s current regime was closely tied into the 
sixteenth century world view of politics as an essentially moral encounter between good 
and evil. As those who held authority did so by divine grace those who stood against 
them were consequently enemies of God‘s natural order seeking nothing but discord.8 
Who the enemies of order were was uncertain during Elizabeth‘s reign, as the 
Queen tended to deal severely with extreme Protestants and Catholics alike.
9
 Anti-
Puritanism and anti-Catholicism were used by the Queen‘s councillors and courtiers 
trying to push her into acting against rival religious groups. In the mid-1570s, for 
example, Bishop Aylmer of London and the swiftly rising Sir Christopher Hatton rode a 
wave of anti-Puritanism to power, with Hatton following in Leicester‘s footsteps by 
making the transition from Queen‘s favourite to serious councillor.10 At the time of the 
Ridolfi plot, however, anti-Catholicism was on the rise, and the Privy Council was 
dominated by what Patrick Collinson describes as the ‗hotter sort of Protestants.‘11  
 If Cecil truly believed that Catholic plots were symptomatic of a wider 
conspiracy, it raises the question of whether William Herle believed in this scheme, or 
was merely facilitating Cecil‘s anti-Catholic fears to further his own personal and 
political advancement. Breight has argued that Herle was ‗particularly adept at 
                                               
6 Peter Lake, ‗A Tale of Two Episcopal Surveys: The Strange Fates of Edmund Grindal and Cuthbert 
Mayne Revisited,‘ Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Sixth Series, No.18, 2008, pp.129-163; 
The idea of Cecil believing in an international Catholic conspiracy has been best articulated by John Guy: 
John Guy, ‗Imagining and Detecting Conspiracy, 1571-1605,‘ http://www.tudors.org/public-lectures/77-
imagining-and-detecting-conspiracy-1571-1605.html, accessed 11 May 2010. 
7 Lake, p.135; A similar point about Elizabethans‘ propensity towards seeing conspiracies everywhere 
was made twenty years earlier: Lacey Baldwin Smith, Treason in Tudor England: Politics and Paranoia, 
Princeton (N.J.), 1986, p.125. 
8 Baldwin Smith, p.59. 
9 Lake, p.135. 
10 ibid. 
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encouraging ministerial paranoia,‘ citing his letters to Leicester and Cecil about those 
who slandered them.
12
 It is difficult to judge if Herle modified his level of anti-
Catholicism to cater to the privy councillors‘ fears, as all our surviving evidence is in 
the form of epistles from Herle to various ministers and officials, leaving us with no 
baseline for comparison. The most we can say with certainty is that Herle‘s letters 
exhibit similar fears of Catholic conspiracies to Cecil‘s writing. 
Cecil, Norfolk, and the Catholic Threat 
Cecil‘s response to the Ridolfi plot can only be understood in the context of the 
wider pattern he identified. This pattern was that of a great conspiracy being 
masterminded against England by the Pope, the Spanish king Philip II, and a variety of 
English peers, with the Ridolfi plot as the most important link in this chain of events. It 
was used by Cecil as part of a carefully constructed campaign against Norfolk, designed 
to topple him from his position as premier peer of the realm. The success of Cecil‘s 
attack on Norfolk indicates that he had judged his ability to manipulate Elizabeth 
correctly, while Norfolk and his supporters had foolishly relied on the Duke‘s position 
to protect him. 
The first event Cecil identified in this conspiracy was the foreign policy crisis of 
1568 known as the Spanish pay-ships controversy, an event that threatened to unseat 
Cecil from his privileged position and plunge England into war with Habsburg Spain. 
The détente between Spain and England almost evaporated in November 1568 when 
five Spanish ships, carrying bullion to pay Philip‘s troops in the Low Countries, took 
shelter in English ports from the storms of the Channel. Seizing the opportunity offered, 
Cecil ordered the gold unloaded – purportedly as a precaution against theft.13 The gold 
                                               
12 Breight, p.106. 
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was a loan from Genoese bankers and was technically still in their possession, meaning 
the English were not so much stealing Spanish gold as appropriating the loan.  
Unfortunately for England, the newly arrived Spanish ambassador to London, 
Don Guerau de Spes, immediately wrote to the Duke of Alva demanding that English 
ships and property in the Netherlands be confiscated in reprisal.
14
 Elizabeth responded 
in kind and by early 1569 the lucrative trade between London and Antwerp had 
essentially halted. Facing potential economic disaster, a significant portion of the 
nobility turned on Cecil for his role in the debacle, in an attempt to oust him from his 
position. Elizabeth stood by her Secretary, and the action against Cecil crumbled.
15
 
The majority of those who had turned on Cecil were part of a powerful 
aristocratic and semi-Catholic lobby at court, including the Duke of Norfolk, the Earls 
of Arundel and Pembroke, and Lord Lumley.
16
 These peers were loosely allied with 
certain members of the Northern nobility, primarily the Earls of Westmorland and 
Northumberland, and Lord Dacre. Both groups hoped to rescue Mary Stuart‘s fortunes 
by marrying her to Norfolk.
17
 Leicester was also involved in the plan, although he 
proved its undoing. Elizabeth‘s unequivocal support of Cecil during the pay-ships fiasco 
convinced Leicester that there was little point in continuing to undermine him, and he 
revealed Norfolk‘s intentions to Elizabeth, preserving himself while ruining the Duke. 
Norfolk was placed in the Tower, while Arundel, Lumley, and Pembroke were confined 
to their lodgings.
18
  Hoping to ensnare Mary, Cecil ordered her belongings to be 
searched, but no damning evidence was found. In a move typical of Cecil, he quickly 
                                               
14 Geoffrey Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II, New Haven (Conn.), 1998, p.155. 
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16 John Warren, Elizabeth I: Religion and Foreign Affairs, 2nd ed., London, 2002, p.67. 
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ensured the situation was turned to his advantage by the means of a pamphlet, attributed 
to the zealous Protestant Thomas Norton but filled with Cecilian logic and rhetoric.
19
 
The Ridolfi plot was the next part of the puzzle to come to light. Through a 
series of investigations and interrogations masterminded by Cecil, Herle extracted 
enough damning evidence from one of the conspirators to implicate a number of 
prominent Englishmen in treasonous activities. An Italian banker named Roberto 
Ridolfi had orchestrated a plan to instigate another rebellion against the Queen, this 
time with Norfolk and Mary Stuart at its head, and the Spanish Duke of Alva‘s troops 
backing the rebels. Caught secretly communicating with Ross and Mary, and turned in 
by his own secretary William Barker for sending £600 in gold north to foment rebellion, 
Norfolk had foolishly placed himself in Cecil‘s hands. 
Imprisoned in the Tower on September 6 1571, Norfolk denied all association 
with Ridolfi‘s plot.20 Unfortunately for the Duke, Cecil was convinced of his guilt, and 
determined to persuade Elizabeth of it. In mid-October Cecil began a propaganda 
campaign designed to blacken Norfolk‘s name. The campaign started with an 
anonymous pamphlet, Salutem in Christo (1571), which claimed the Duke had 
continued to plot with Mary and Catholic figures.
 21
 The pamphlet was printed by one of 
Cecil‘s favourite printers, John Day, and it is almost certain that Cecil composed it 
himself. In early January of 1572 Cecil produced another anonymous pamphlet, The 
Copie of a Letter (1572), which denounced both Mary and Norfolk.
22
 Cecil succeeded 
in turning public opinion against the Duke and by the time of his trial for treason on 16 
January 1572 there was little doubt left as to the outcome.  
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To Cecil‘s dismay Elizabeth stayed Norfolk‘s execution, and he was forced to 
wait until Parliament was called in the late spring of 1572 in order to force the Queen‘s 
hand. Cecil and his Protestant allies pushed for Norfolk‘s execution and Mary‘s formal 
exclusion from the succession.
23
 In the end, Elizabeth sacrificed the Duke to quiet the 
House in the face of her defence of Mary. On the morning of 2 June 1572, Norfolk was 
beheaded on Tower Hill. Cecil was triumphant. 
The Ridolfi plot, then, was a crucial turning point in Cecil‘s struggle with 
Thomas Howard. Even a man as powerful and politically astute as Cecil could not bring 
down the scion of one of England‘s oldest surviving families easily, and it was almost 
four years from the moment when Norfolk undermined Cecil during the pay-ships 
controversy until Cecil had his revenge. The Ridolfi plot was central to Norfolk‘s 
downfall from premier peer of the realm to executed traitor. Mary‘s involvement 
effectively eliminated any remaining chance of her taking the throne upon Elizabeth‘s 
death.  
As Cecil‘s official narrative of the Ridolfi plot was written after events had 
already occurred, when he was trying to ensure Norfolk‘s execution, it is only through 
the study of contemporary letters that the gradual coalescence of its disparate parts can 
be seen.
 24
 Herle‘s letters provide the most detailed available account of the Ridolfi plot. 
The other figures involved in the plot left no accounts, apart from confessions covered 
in Cecil‘s marginal notes, and in at least one case written at his direction. Herle‘s letters 
then, provide valuable detail and colour which Cecil‘s concise narrative cannot hope to 
match. 
Herle‘s Ridolfi letters, while detailed, have gaps in their narrative. Herle met 
with Cecil on multiple occasions to discuss ‗sondry things [he had] to say unto you by 
                                               
23 Alford, pp.192-195. 
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mowth,‘ a clear indication that Herle withheld his most pertinent information for these 
face-to-face meetings.
25
 Whether he did so to avoid discovery, or in the belief that 
delivering information in person would make a better impression upon Cecil, is difficult 
to say. Further, while Herle‘s letters survive, Cecil‘s replies do not. Cecil, it seems, was 
not entirely comfortable with his peers knowing of his association with Herle‘s 
nefarious activities, and preferred to state his case through official channels and 
pamphlets. 
William Herle in the Ridolfi Plot 
The story of the Ridolfi plot begins a month before Herle became involved, 
when an Italian banker named Roberto Ridolfi was arrested by Walsingham at Cecil‘s 
command. Born in 1531, Ridolfi had exploited his family‘s noble connections to 
become a nuncio segreto, or informal papal ambassador. His family interests brought 
him to England in the early 1560s, and by 1569 he was suspected of cultivating 
connections with Catholic rebels. Based on these facts, Walsingham confined the 
banker at his home in London where he threatened Ridolfi with imprisonment and 
torture in the Tower.
26
 Oddly, Walsingham did not charge Ridolfi with any crime and, 
in March 1571, allowed him to leave England with his bags unexamined. Carrying 
letters from his various English contacts, Ridolfi set off to meet Catholic leaders in 
Europe.
27
 Between March and July, he visited the Duke of Alva, governor of the 
Spanish Netherlands, the Pope, and Philip II. 
Ridolfi detailed a plan, debated vigorously by the Spanish Council in July, 
involving a rather optimistic three-part attack on England consisting of assassination, 
domestic rebellion and foreign invasion. Elizabeth would be captured or killed while on 
her annual Progress through the Home Counties. This would spark a general rising of 
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English Catholics, led by Norfolk and Mary, reinforced by Alva‘s troops, transported 
from the Netherlands by a Spanish flotilla standing by at Santander.
28
 Mary would be 
crowned queen, returning England to the Catholic Church and making it a Spanish 
dependency resembling the Netherlands. The familiar elements of the plan did not make 
it any more workable, though it must be remembered that Philip delighted in overly 
detailed tactics requiring precise timing that often failed in execution, the Gran Armada 
of 1588 being a perfect example.
29
 
While Ridolfi discussed the invasion plan in Brussels with Alva, he met with 
Charles Bailly. Born in Brussels, Bailly entered Mary Stuart‘s service in the mid-1560s. 
After Mary‘s confinement in 1568, Bailly acted as sometimes secretary and messenger 
for Ross.
30
 In early 1571 the Bishop engaged Bailly to travel to the Low Countries to 
arrange for the printing and importation of books responding to a government attack on 
the possibility of a marriage between Norfolk and Mary.
31
 The ideas contained within 
these books were a serious threat to Elizabeth, as they supported Mary‘s title to the 
Crown of England, and attacked the Protestants who had ousted Mary from her Scottish 
throne.
32
 Bailly failed to gain a license for printing, as Alva was wary of overtly 
supporting pretenders to Elizabeth‘s throne while she lived. Before he returned to 
England, however, Bailly met with Ridolfi, and agreed to carry letters across the 
                                               
28 Consulta of the Spanish Council of State, 7 July 1571, Archivo General de Simancas Estado 823/150-
158; and Philip II to Alva, 14 July 1571, Archivo de la Casa de los Duques de Alba 7/58; both cited in 
Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II, pp.130-131. 
29 Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II, p.131. 
30 Herle to Cecil, 19 April 1571, BL Cotton Caligula C III, f.178r; Bailly‘s confession to Cecil states that 
he has been a servant of Mary and Ross for seven years (since ca.1564); Bailly to Cecil, 2 May 1571, 
Murdin (ed). 
31 Bailly to Cecil, 5 May 1571, Murdin (ed.); the government tract is often attributed to Sir Francis 
Walsingham: Norton, A Discourse Touching the Pretended Match. 
32 Herle later described two of the books Bailly carried, both already well known in England and penned 
by the Bishop of Ross. Due to the use of ‗good arguments, grett reson and plenty of our Comune Lawes,‘ 
Herle believed the Bishop could not have written it alone. This comment of Herle‘s seems odd, given that 
the Bishop had studied canon and civil law at Potiers, as well as serving as a judge of the Court of 
Sessions and on the Scottish Privy Council. Presumably Herle assumed that Ross had not bothered to 
familiarise himself with English common law. A legal-based argument would certainly not have been 
outside of Ross‘ abilities; BL Cotton Caligula C III, f.178r. 
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channel for him. These letters were ‗directed to two lords of this realm, advertising…his 
[Ridolfi‘s] safe arrival‘ from England, and his subsequent meeting with Alva.33 
The authorities searched Bailly‘s bags upon his arrival at Dover on 12 April, 
discovering both the unbound book manuscripts and letters.
34
 Bailly was sent to 
William Brooke, Lord Cobham and Warden of the Cinque Ports, who interrogated him 
at his house in Blackfriars.
35
 Herle referred to this event in a letter to Cecil, where he 
mentions Bailly as having brought ‗over nowe sondry writings which be dangerous as I 
heare and intercepted by the Lord Cobham.‘36 Herle‘s identification of Cobham, and his 
brother Thomas who was later charged with treason, as being associated with Ross at 
this point is particularly significant. According to Cobham‘s later declaration, taken by 
Cecil in October 1571, he was convinced by his brother to secretly forward the letters to 
Ross while passing the books on to Cecil. Cobham took the letters to Ross who was 
unable to decipher them.
37
 By noting this information, and passing it on to Cecil, Herle 
revealed the Cobhams‘ treachery at an early stage, even though Cecil chose to stay his 
hand for six months. Further, this early warning likely contributed to the Council‘s 
issuing of a warrant for Bailly to be held in the Marshalsea.
38
 
Herle and Bailly 
In early April 1571 Herle was ensconced in the Marshalsea prison. While his 
previous stint in this jail had been for piracy, Herle was now there to extract information 
about the Ridolfi plot from Bailly. Cecil and Herle obviously knew of Bailly‘s arrival at 
Dover before he was apprehended, as two days before the arrest Herle had asked Cecil 
                                               
33 Bailly to Cecil, 2 May 1571, Murdin (ed.). 
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to hold Bailly in solitary confinement upon his imprisonment. Herle claimed that if this 
was done the ‗whole masses of their secretts‘ he knows could be ferreted out.39 The next 
day, Herle asked Cecil for ‗some secret token‘ to show the warden, so that he could 
have access to Bailly once he was imprisoned. He expected little trouble ferreting out 
any secret Bailly may be hiding as ‗he is fearefull, full of words, glorious, and given to 
the cup.‘40  
Ross took Bailly‘s imprisonment ‗verey displesantly,‘ particularly as the 
Spanish Ambassador‘s secretary had been with Bailly when he was apprehended.41 The 
Bishop feared this fact ‗might brede grett suspicyon‘ ‗of som privy juggling bettwen‘ 
Ross and the Ambassador, as ‗allredy their familiarity was vehemently noted‘ by 
others.
42
 At this point, Ross clearly believed that Cecil did not know about the letters 
Lord Cobham had brought him for, as far as he knew, Cecil was only holding Bailly for 
the importation of illegal books. Herle was a natural plant for Cecil, with his previous 
record of imprisonment, and when the Bishop of Ross inquired around town about 
Herle, he found that the general opinion was that he was a ‗discontented man and 
factyows.‘43 There was little, then, to rouse suspicions about Herle, and he was able to 
extract information from Bailly and Ross, implicating both with little difficulty.  
With Bailly incarcerated and unable to contact his friends on the outside, Herle 
became a significant player in the story of the Ridolfi plot‘s collapse. Shortly after 
Bailly‘s arrival at the Marshalsea the warden had placed him in isolation, a tactic which 
Herle applauded, telling Cecil that many of Bailly‘s friends had visited him before the 
order was issued, and that now they were denied access Herle could step in as the 
prisoner‘s confidante. Already William Barthlett, one of the friends Herle mentioned, 
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41 BL Cotton Caligula C III, f.179v. 
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had come to Herle bemoaning Bailly‘s isolation. Herle offered to convey messages 
between Bailly and the Bishop of Ross, a proposal which Barthlett quickly accepted.
44
 
Over the following weeks Herle met regularly with Bailly, stealing up to the 
window of his cell to take the enciphered letters Bailly wrote to the Bishop and pass 
them on, after Cecil copied them. During these visits, he pretended to be ‗in grett fere to 
be surprised [caught] there, hazarding mi life as it were for his comfort and ayd,‘ all the 
while encouraging Bailly‘s fears to ‗work hym the more.‘45 While Herle tried to draw 
the ‗masses of their secretts‘ from Bailly by false friendship, Cecil made similar efforts 
through torture, threatening Bailly with the rack. Cecil later proved willing to rack 
Bailly within an inch of his life to extract a confession. Meanwhile, Herle worked to 
implicate others in Ross‘ entourage. Two of Bailly‘s friends, Mattinson and Melchior, 
visited on 18 April and were immediately imprisoned by the warden.
46
 Much as he did 
with Bailly, Herle encouraged Mattinson to spout treasonous declarations, marvelling 
that Mary was still imprisoned when she had so many influential friends and her 
delivery always seemed imminent. Deploring Elizabeth‘s treatment of the Scots, 
Mattinson bemoaned the catalogue of broken promises which accompanied England‘s 
abuses.
47
 Herle also made contact with the Spanish ambassador‘s secretary, but found 
him more circumspect than Bailly and his friends. 
On 24 April, Herle made a drastic error which almost ruined his chances of 
extracting any further information from Bailly. Following Cecil‘s example, Herle 
subjected Bailly to a cross-examination ‗in the B[ishop]‘s name,‘ asking him if he had 
confessed that John Hamilton gave him the letters.
48
 At this point, Herle made a crucial 
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slip, asking Bailly ‗whither his examinatyon extended not to know whatt delyng he had 
with the English rebelles.‘ This last phrase shocked Bailly: 
He was so astonyed, as albeit though there were no light, his allteracion 
was apparent & falling he fell into a sodein trembling & to suche a 
faltryng of his tong, as in som whyle he cowd expresse nothyng well, 
butt in th'end he axed, whye then hath nott mi Lord his l[ett]res?
49
 
Herle recovered from this blunder by telling Bailly that the Bishop had indeed received 
the letters, but had asked him to question Bailly before he was able to decipher them so 
would not have the benefit of the information contained therein. Bailly seemed to 
believe him, and stammered that he had ‗confessed nothyng of Hamilton‘ and detested 
the rebels, ‗using suche vehement passion in speking of them, as though they had byn 
fellowes to the devyll.‘50 He also told Herle that Cecil had ‗threttned hym dethe or att 
lest wise the losse of his eres.‘  
Herle realised that he was pushing too hard and backed off, ‗reconcileng hym 
with more plawsible & sweter matter‘ before he left. 51 The next morning, Herle hid in 
the privy in the garden and gave Bailly the letter from the Bishop. Bailly was delighted 
and promised a response that afternoon. On his way out Herle was reproved by Bailly's 
guard who saw him leaving the privy. That afternoon, he went to an alley near Bailly‘s 
cell and received Bailly's answer through the grate, quickly sending it on to Cecil. A 
baker's wife spotted him lurking round the alley, told him ‗ytt cowd be no honest matter 
that I [Herle] offred in so unffytt a place,‘ and threatened to report him to the Keeper. 
Herle fled, rounding out a less than impressive day. 
Herle‘s plan to extricate information from Bailly and secure Cecil‘s continued 
favour seemed close to collapsing completely. On 24 April, Bailly communicated his 
fear that Herle may be a plant to the Bishop.
52
 It seems a mysterious Catholic priest 
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warned Bailly that he should not put too much trust in Herle.
53
 Bailly asked Ross if he 
had received his earlier letter proposing an alternative means of communication, 
whereby letters would be passed through the small window in his cell to an adjoining 
alleyway, so that Herle could be bypassed. 
By 26 April, Herle had told Ross that he had been put in close confinement for 
association with Bailly. The problem of how he could send and receive letters while 
Bailly, ostensibly in the same conditions of imprisonment, could not was explained 
away by Herle being held on the ‗street side‘ of the prison, where his man could deliver 
letters and writing materials to him.
54
 Herle attempted to deflect any suspicions the 
Bishop may have had about him by posing as a fellow suspect, claiming he had been 
examined by the Council and threatened with the rack.
55
 Unfortunately for Herle, this 
explanation does not seem to have allayed the Bishop‘s suspicions, as his reply the next 
day was decidedly guarded.
56
 Yet letters continued to flow. Having no other contact 
with Bailly, the Bishop needed Herle, even if he was a decidedly suspect courier. 
Ross had heard that Herle had ‗beene before the Councell and Charles [Bailly] 
face to face,‘ and desperately needed to know ‗what you have said to him or he to you 
in their presence.‘57 Presumably Ross feared Cecil may have established some link 
between Bailly‘s actions and those of his master. While the Bishop‘s next letter to Herle 
does not survive, we can glean some of its contents from Herle‘s reply. Herle wrote that 
he was shocked by the Bishop‘s lack of trust in him, and saw himself as being ‗bettwen 
the hard Annevylld and the hamer,‘ yet hoped to reassure Ross that there was nothing 
untoward going on.
58
 He attempted to further alleviate the Bishop‘s fears by telling him 
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that ‗the Cowncell stormes that Charles [Bailly] will utter nothing.‘ Unfortunately for 
Ross, this was not the case. Bailly soon confessed and the Bishop was placed under 
house arrest. While Cecil continued to investigate the Ridolfi plot, and use it as 
ammunition for his attack on Norfolk, Herle‘s part in the process was done. 
Outcomes of the Ridolfi Plot 
The Ridolfi plot had significant consequences for the future of Catholicism 
within England. The threat of internal Catholic dissent seemed much diminished in the 
wake of the plot‘s discovery and failure. While closet Catholicism still remained a 
concern to the government, it was increasingly obvious that few, if any, Englishmen 
were willing to risk death or exile by overt action on behalf of Catholicism. Ross and 
Mary‘s involvement in the plot tarnished the Queen of Scots‘ image to the point where 
she posed little immediate threat, and the downfall of Norfolk, Northumberland, and 
Westmorland quietened those magnates who had posed such a threat to the Crown‘s 
power in the late medieval period.
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The plot also altered English foreign relations, moving Elizabeth towards a 
closer relationship with France, England‘s traditional enemy, at the expense of her 
relationship with Spain. The Spanish ambassador‘s peripheral involvement in the 
Ridolfi plot, combined with news of the Spanish naval victory at the battle of Lepanto 
which reached England in early November 1571, raised alarms that Philip, apparently 
freed from the Turkish threat in the Mediterranean, might mobilise his resources against 
England. Foreign policy in the aftermath of the plot was largely concerned with 
Elizabeth‘s proposed marriage to the French Duke of Anjou. The ―Anjou Match‖ served 
to hold Philip at bay, with the constant threat of a marriage alliance between France and 
England putting his hold on the Spanish Netherlands at risk.  
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Herle‘s involvement in the plot had a significant impact on his life, even after 
his part in it was finished. The most obvious benefit it had for him was that it brought 
him closer to William Cecil. Norfolk‘s elimination, combined with Leicester‘s decision 
to side with Cecil, put the Secretary in an almost unassailable position of power. Herle 
benefitted commensurately from his patron‘s increased access to power and influence. 
Of more immediate aid to the interminably indebted Herle, Cecil seems to have paid 
well for his services. In his final report on the Ridolfi plot, Herle admitted that Cecil had 
been generous thus far, sending him a total of £11 to cover various expenses.
60
 Finally, 
he asked the Secretary to commend him to the Bishop of Salisbury and ‗the Master 
Comptroller [of the Tower],‘ an indication that his rewards for service were social as 
well as pecuniary.
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Further Intelligence Work 
Gaining Cecil‘s approval through his work on the Ridolfi plot also helped Herle 
in gaining continued government employment. Herle clearly felt Cecil favoured him at 
this point, as he applied for a number of positions. In October 1571 he wrote to Cecil 
asking for his support in securing a position to ‗survey strangers,‘ a euphemism for the 
hunting of ‗Papistes, Anabaptistes, Libertynes, dronckards, Comune women, & Brothell 
howses. Allso espyalles, murtherers, theves, & Conspirators.‘62 Herle‘s petition failed, 
and he wrote to Cecil again in January 1572, asking that the Secretary petition Elizabeth 
on his behalf for the ‗reversyon of the gentillman porters office in the Towre.‘63 This 
time it seems he was successful in his petition, as a letter from a counterfeiter named 
Edward Phaer mentions Herle in this context. Phaer wrote to Cecil in December 1577, 
confessing to counterfeiting coins and saying that ‗it pleased M[aster] Lieutenant and 
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M[aster] Herle‘ to confirm this.64 Similarly, a letter from Cecil to Herle in August 1573 
described him as having received a ‗sute of som good valew‘ from Elizabeth, the timing 
of which would indicate it was likely this post.
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A pair of letters from the early 1570s also show that Herle and Cecil‘s patron-
client relationship had evolved in the aftermath of the Ridolfi plot. In a November 1571 
letter to Cecil, Herle detailed the activities of John Horneby and ‗Dawbney.‘ These men 
had been caught burning a book which Cecil wished to get hold of, and now hoped that 
Cecil would accept their apologies.
66
 Herle appears to have been acting as an 
intermediary between Horneby and Cecil, an indication that he was confident in his ties 
to the Secretary. Nowhere else, with the exception of his support of Paul Buys‘ Dutch 
delegation, did Herle really act as a channel for Cecil‘s patronage. Usually Herle was at 
the bottom of the patronage ladder, but for this short period Herle felt confident enough 
in his position to use some of his precious time with Cecil to represent others‘ interests. 
A fortnight later Herle detailed further information about Horneby‘s activities. 
Herle was trying to uncover fraud amongst customs officers, and was encouraging 
Horneby to inform on other officials. Desperate for release from prison, Horneby 
offered to ‗declare suche matter as noman can do butt hym self, discovering grett frawds 
& those verey secret, which the customers & officers have robbed the Q[ueen] majestie 
by.‘67 Dawbney was mentioned as one of these corrupt officials, alongside ‗Mathewes,‘ 
‗an ignorant grosse fellow, a verey belly God & comune dronckard.‘ The real 
mastermind of the scam, however, was ‗Smith the Customer,‘ who had ‗secrett metyngs 
in Saint Georges filds‘ with Mathewes. Smith tried to bribe Horneby £100 to help cover 
up their doings ‗lest your L[ordship] shold discover the gret disceytts & infinite robryes 
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by this service.‘68 According to Horneby, Dawbney and Mathewes organised his 
imprisonment so that he could not inform on them. 
The scam these customs officials were running was based around mispricing 
imported alcohol. Herle stated that ‗the Customers did abuse the Q[ueen] grettly in 
matter of lycens, aswell of Bere as wyne.‘69 They granted licences for the transport of 
beer ‗without ether subsedy or imposte,‘ allowing those who paid them for licences to 
import ‗17 or 1800 tone of bere yerely‘ while keeping it off the books and avoiding 
duties. Wine was noted being ‗wynes of Navarra & highe Contrey wynes‘ when it was 
really ‗Gascoyn & frenche wynes,‘ thus avoiding higher duties.70 Herle estimated that 
the Crown could make £10,000 a year if Cecil took the time to ‗redresse it hereafter for 
the Q[ueen] majesties singuler benefyte.‘ The sums Herle alleges were being stolen 
were substantial, and it is impossible to imagine Cecil ignoring the possibility of 
increasing the Crown‘s income by such an amount.  
Herle wrote no more of this potentially explosive scandal however, and it seems 
little came of it. As Horneby was in prison, he may have been spinning Herle a tale 
designed to lure Cecil into organising his release. While Herle was surely suspicious, he 
could hardly have passed up the chance to further ingratiate himself with Cecil. 
Sensitive information was the primary commodity Herle provided to his patron, and 
details of a widespread scam by customs officials were certainly that. His time in prison 
during the Ridolfi plot had clearly provided Herle with useful contacts, and he must 
have seen them as a potential cornucopia of intelligence to pass to the Secretary.  
Herle continued to make intelligence reports to Cecil throughout 1572. The 
influence his success with the Ridolfi plot had on the type of information Herle passed 
is obvious throughout this period, as he continued to focus on conspirators‘ activities. 
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Writing to Cecil in late February 1572, Herle detailed the danger posed by 
‗Maisonfleur.‘ This man had ties to the same players that Cecil had identified in the 
Ridolfi plot, as he was:  
first being secretorye to the late duke of Gwise..., & then to the scottish 
Q[ueen] that now is, all his affectyons ar to the sayd Q[ueen] & to the 
howse of Gwise.
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Having snuck into England ‗pretending som matter here from the Duke of Alenson,‘ the 
Frenchman proceeded to have ‗secrett conference with the Frenche ambassador‘ and 
now had ‗at his devotyon bothe sowdyors & desperate fellowes, redy to execute ani 
mischeeff‘ that he might require. Many of those he hired were formerly in Mary‘s 
employ, and Herle suspected that they intended ‗som ille disposityon‘ as they and their 
mistress bore ‗an ill mynde... to this state & tyme.‘ 
Herle gave Cecil further details of Maisonfleur‘s nefarious plan. The Frenchman 
had been bragging that the next day there would be ‗suche an alteracyon here uppon the 
sodeyn, as never was sene.‘72 When this occurred, ‗those that be in prison shalbe 
delyverd, & liberty shalbe turned into Captivitye; mene men shalbe raysed highe & 
those that be highe abbused.‘ Herle then explained the meaning of these words to Cecil, 
somewhat unnecessarily one feels, ‗that the Scottish Q[ueen] is ment for on partye, & 
the Q[ueen] majestie our soveraigne for another.‘ The links to the Ridolfi plot are clear, 
and show how Herle attempted to recapture past successes. Much like Horneby‘s 
revelations of crimes by customs officials, there is no further evidence of this plot, an 
indication that Herle‘s intelligence was probably greatly inflated. This did not stop him 
making reports of further conspiracies he had discovered. 
In March of the same year Herle wrote to Cecil, informing him that a number of 
men intended to travel to Spain and aid Sir Thomas Stucley in his invasion of Ireland. 
Stucley was a former soldier who spent most of his time at the Spanish and Papal 
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courts, attempting to persuade Philip and other Catholic leaders to invade England.
73
 
There were rumours of such an enterprise‘s imminence throughout the 1570s, and it 
seems Herle was caught up in reporting one of these. The men he claimed were 
travelling to aid Stucley were ‗Sir Warham Sentliger,‘ ‗Jerom Brett,‘ ‗Martin 
Furbisher,‘ ‗Haselby a seaman & John Poole mi frind.‘74 Herle was extremely 
apologetic that Poole had been caught up in this madness, informing Cecil that ‗I 
prefferre loyallty to ani friendship.‘  
In this letter we also gain a glimpse of Herle‘s own network of informants and 
the means by which he gathered information to pass to Cecil. Furbisher‘s wife was ‗the 
discoverer of this pack,‘ and Herle warned Cecil that her willingness to inform on her 
husband was based ‗partly of displesure borne to Sir Warham Sentlyger as I perceve, & 
partly of som jarre hapned bettwen Furbisher & her.‘75 Nevertheless, said Herle, ‗there 
is grett likelihood that every parte therof shold be true,‘ and through ‗suche displesures, 
women mani tymes have disclosed grett treasons.‘ Herle recommended that Cecil send 
for her and hear her story for himself. 
Nothing more was said of Furbisher‘s plans to travel to Spain, but the letter 
contained details of certain rewards Herle received for his part in the Ridolfi plot and 
his subsequent role as an information gatherer. Herle stated that he had been ‗modestly 
attending whatt shold be disposed of me, than craving whatt becam me nott.‘76 He 
admitted that the Queen had bestowed ‗somes of money uppon me‘ for his service, but 
that the money had been used up paying off debts incurred during his imprisonment in 
the Marshalsea. Elizabeth had also granted Herle a ‗lease in reversion,‘ giving him an 
income from property. In addition to these rewards, Cecil had granted Herle the 
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‗stallment of Richard Smiths detts,‘ presumably holding off Herle‘s most rapacious 
creditor.
 
 
By May 1572 Herle‘s financial situation had become truly dire. His creditors 
pursued him ‗with a vexatyon worse than dethe it sellf,‘ and Herle wrote to Cecil again 
asking for help.
77
 Closely tied to his financial difficulties was the adverse effect on his 
social position that Herle‘s time in prison had caused. This is hardly surprising of 
course, as a gentleman would not generally expect to be clapped in irons and dragged 
off to the Marshalsea. He seems to have been particularly aggrieved by this loss of 
standing though, and complained that: 
By mi late servyce [I have been] brought into suche a disdayne & hatred 
in the world, as besyde these thretts that I suffer daylye, sundry qwarrells 
ar made unto me, & mi grettest frynds vowchesave nott to loke uppon 
me. 
Between the loss of his friends and his lack of funds, Herle felt he was far worse off 
now than before he entered into the Queen‘s service. He lamented that he was shunned 
by all, despite the fact that he was ‗nott in ani danger nor extremitye butt for her 
[Elizabeth‘s] sake, & for the zele I have to her safety.‘  
This loss of status and money led Herle to give the impression that government 
service had ruined him. In addition to complaining about debts and loss of status, Herle 
noted that imprisonment cost him investment opportunities. In the margins of the letter 
bemoaning his hard state, Herle claimed that:  
mi frynds the laste yere whles I was in the towre that wold have given 
me a [£100] in cattell in wales, will nott now upon this mi generall 
disgrace give me a peny. besyde other expencs & losses sustayned 
therby.
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Herle‘s list of losses he had sustained through government service was substantial. It is 
of course possible that this letter was merely an attempt to get money out of Cecil to pay 
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off his debts. Given Herle‘s continued service in the Secretary‘s employ, despite claims 
that it was ruining him, this seems a likely alternative. 
In the first half of the sixteenth century, France and the Habsburg Empire were 
the dominant powers of Europe. Yet by the late 1570s the French monarchy had been 
weakened by a series of civil wars between the ultra-Catholic house of Guise, often 
backed by the Crown, and the Protestant Huguenots, represented at a national level by 
the princes of Condé and Navarre.
79
 On 24 August 1572, the French king Charles IX 
ordered the massacre of thousands of Huguenots, shocking Protestants all across Europe 
and inciting fear of further Catholic atrocities. Herle responded to this event in 
characteristic fashion, by informing Cecil of the doings of one ‗Mowlyns..., an 
englishman verey stowtt in Papistry...[and] cam owtt of frawnce of late.‘80 Mowlyns 
and his associates were ‗resortyng verey familyerly to the frenche ambassador,‘ linking 
them to the government which had recently ordered the execution of its own Protestant 
citizens. By specifically tying this report of Catholic insurgency in England to France, 
Herle showed his ability to identify pertinent threats to English security and adjust what 
information he funnelled to Cecil to best exploit the fears of Privy Councillors.  
Two days after this first letter, on 30 September 1572, Herle wrote to Cecil 
again, increasing the complexity of this purported Catholic plot by speculating that ‗the 
frenche king wold verey shortly joyne in open maner with the king of Spaigne against 
the Q[ueen] majestie of England,‘ and ‗wold be glad to fynde the lest qwarrel, wherby 
he might breke the leage with England, & wold leve no occasyon unsought to provoke 
the same.‘81 Herle referred to the Treaty of Blois, an accord between England and 
France which had survived the shock of the St Bartholomew‘s Day Massacre, and 
which he now claimed France was subtly undermining in a dastardly Papacy-approved 
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plan to marry Mary Stuart to the Duke of Anjou, so joining England, Scotland, and 
France under Catholic rule.
82
 The vast conspiracy Herle outlines is remarkably similar 
to that which Cecil described during the Ridolfi plot and its aftermath, and this is 
unlikely to be a coincidence. Much as Herle‘s letter of the twenty-eighth evoked the 
Ridolfi Plot to catch Cecil‘s attention, this one regurgitated Cecil‘s own propaganda 
back at him. The focus on France over Spain as the primary instigator of Catholic 
aggression, however, was indicative of the mental shift which St Bartholomew‘s Day 
had inspired. 
With the French monarch under the influence of the Catholic Guises, France no 
longer seemed the reduced threat it had been through the first decade of Elizabeth‘s 
rule. Cecil and the Queen moved to counter the potential alliance between Spain and 
France that Herle feared, by pacifying Spain. Cordial relations were restored via the 
Convention of Nijmegen in March 1573, and further formalised in the Treaty of Bristol 
in August 1574. While the Tudor-Habsburg relationship never again reached the level 
of amicability that it had enjoyed during Mary‘s reign, or even that before the pay-ship 
fiasco of 1568, tensions were certainly relaxed to a significant degree. The issue which 
prevented further reconciliation was England‘s tacit support of the Netherlands rebels. 
Susan Doran has gone so far as to argue that if the revolt in Holland and Zealand had 
petered out in 1572, it is quite possible that Anglo-Spanish relations would have 
returned to their earlier footing.
83
 It was Spain‘s continued attempts to crush the 
rebellion, and England‘s tacit support of the rebels, which placed an intolerable strain 
on the traditional amity and ensured the Netherlands remained the main theatre of 
contention throughout this period. 
* 
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 William Herle‘s involvement in uncovering the Ridolfi plot was clearly a 
turning point in his life. Having begun the 1570s in disgrace for his alleged piracy, and 
with his career prospects dimmer than ever, Herle was able to turn his life around and 
carve out a new niche for himself in the Elizabethan government. This period is the part 
of Herle‘s life where he most often makes it into wider histories, and with good reason. 
The Ridolfi plot was one of the most significant non-events of Elizabeth‘s reign, with its 
discovery marking the execution of England‘s premier peer and Cecil‘s main rival at 
court. This chapter has argued that the Ridolfi plot must be understood as part of a 
series of conspiracies that Cecil saw as a coherent Catholic attack on the throne. Despite 
what historians such as Edwards have argued, this chain of conspiracies was not 
cynically crafted by Cecil but a genuine fear. Herle‘s many allusions to this conspiracy 
indicate that he knew Cecil believed in its veracity, and likely feared it himself. 
Norfolk‘s execution left Cecil unchallenged as the most powerful man in England, and 
Herle benefited from his patron‘s rise to primacy.  
Herle‘s success in uncovering information about the plot led him to reinvent 
himself as primarily an intelligence gatherer rather than the financial negotiator he had 
been throughout the 1560s. While his career focus changed, Herle remained deeply in 
debt, the rewards he received for his intelligence gathering never outweighing his costs. 
Nor did he ever manage another intelligence coup of the Ridolfi plot‘s magnitude. 
Throughout the remainder of his life, however, Herle was able to combine his early 
experience in the Netherlands with his newly honed intelligence skills. 
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Chapter III: Contrasts in Patronage 
 Understanding the Tudor patronage system affords an important insight into 
Tudor history, and Herle‘s letters provide an unusually detailed example of the system 
in operation. This chapter therefore develops a theme raised in the first chapter, Herle‘s 
patron-client relationship with William Cecil, to provide a detailed study of this often 
overlooked area in Tudor history. Herle‘s letters illuminate two starkly contrasting 
examples of patronage. In the aftermath of the Ridolfi plot Herle utilised his 
increasingly impressive patronage connections, enlisting Cecil‘s support for a lucrative 
marriage that would end his financial difficulties, and convincing both Cecil and 
Leicester to support him against his creditors, the Waad brothers. Herle‘s letters 
illustrate how even those of low social standing could leverage their connections to 
powerful patrons for beneficial outcomes.  
Herle‘s letters also demonstrate that that leverage came from the client‘s 
immediate value to his patron. Herle‘s influence in the mid-1570s contrasts with a 
decade later, when his patrons declined to save him from ruin. This change reflected his 
deteriorating relationship with Cecil, and the diversification of his patronage base. 
Cecil‘s anger when Herle displayed his letters to other Privy Councillors fractured their 
relationship, from which Herle never truly recovered. Herle increasingly cultivated 
other patrons such as Leicester and Walsingham, gaining the support of other Privy 
Councillors, but reducing his value to Cecil. Sir Christopher Hatton‘s increasing 
influence, at the expense of Herle‘s Protestant patrons on the Privy Council, further 
contributed to Herle‘s misfortune. His inability to gain the Council‘s clerkship, despite 
Cecil and Leicester‘s support, demonstrates how closely the success of a client such as 
Herle was tied to that of his patrons‘. 
66 
 
Because the evidence about political patronage is sparse, the historiography of 
patronage is extremely limited. A number of historians have discussed the patronage of 
art, theatre, and economic or building projects, but few discuss political patronage. 
Simon Adams‘ collection of essays Leicester and the Court, and Pauline Croft‘s edited 
collection Patronage, Culture, and Power: The Early Cecils are exceptions, but eschew 
the details of patronage interactions in favour of broad thematic coverage.
1
 The primary 
reason for this historiographical neglect is that the vast majority of patron-client 
interactions occurred verbally in personal meetings. Herle‘s letters contain a wealth of 
information about patronage interactions and often record details of personal meetings. 
This makes them a rare, if not unique, resource for the study of Elizabethan patronage. 
This chapter utilises Herle‘s letters to demonstrate how his patron-client relationships 
changed and evolved over time. 
Herle’s Marriage Prospects 
In August 1573 Cecil recommended Herle to ‗ani wydow that he wolld make 
that superscriptyon unto.‘2 Marriage to a rich widow could have ended Herle‘s financial 
difficulties, and Cecil likely provided the letter to end Herle‘s requests for money from 
his patron. Despite being addressed from Cecil to Herle, this letter is in Herle‘s hand, 
because it is a draft Herle made for Cecil‘s use. This explains why a letter seemingly 
from Cecil survived when the majority of their correspondence consists of Herle‘s 
letters directed to the Lord Treasurer.  
The letter praises Herle extensively, and tries to convince the intended recipient 
that Cecil considered him a trusted client. As Herle‘s opinion of his value to Cecil, it is 
worth quoting from at length: 
I understand that on master William Herlle a gentillman whom I have 
long knowen, & that is verey well borne, & of a good kinred, dothe make 
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menes to have your good will to becom your husbond, & becawse I have 
good cawse to know hym & to love hym, & therfore I am desirows to do 
hym good, I am thus bolld to require you to credit me, that I thinck 
assuredly he will prove an honest husband & will behave hym self 
towards you like a gentillman to be loved of you.
3
 
Herle‘s letter to Cecil the following November suggests that Cecil had acquiesced to 
this description, for it recalls that Cecil had given him a letter ‗towards ani wydowe 
where I wolld sue (though yett I never shewed it to ani),‘ and included a copy of it ‗to 
remember yow therby of the goodnes that ye have used to me & to desire humbly the 
contynuance therof.‘4 Unfortunately this copy has been lost. 
 Herle‘s draft not only stressed his good birth, Cecil‘s appreciation of his 
character, and his personal honesty, but the Queen‘s appreciation of his extensive 
abilities, which she would continue to reward: 
He is surely a gentillman of verey good qwalityes, wise, lerned, & of 
grett experyens in mani thynges, & so hath bin employed in sondry 
services for the Q[ueen] majestie: in which respect he hath her majesties 
favor & is well knowen of her, insomuche as now verey lately, her 
majestie hath granted to hym a sute of som good valew for his reward, & 
is further to be considered by her majestie whan tyme may serve with 
som convenient office.
5
 
All this would help to establish ‗his better cowntenance mayntenaunce & credite,‘ 
which would also reflect well on Cecil. 
 Herle‘s concern with maintaining and increasing his reputation at court was 
reiterated in August 1573, when Herle asked Cecil to help him overcome his mounting 
debts. Herle confidently assumed that Cecil would help him, ‗knowing verey well that 
her majesties inclynatyon & yowres is, to rayse me from these miseryes & wants wherin 
I have bin, & to make me hable to lyve competently in the world.‘6 While Herle claimed 
a status appropriate to them, they had in fact produced little money, so that ‗mi creditors 
in the mene tyme supposing that I have even mowntaynes,‘ earned through crown 
service, ‗do so importune me, as that I am wery to be in ani place.‘ Herle encouraged 
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Cecil to help him out of this double bind by warning that though he was ‗more redy to 
do ani servyce that lyes in me‘ his creditors ‗give me no tyme to attend suche an 
occasion.‘ 
 Herle summarised the rewards the Queen had given him, and how they had been 
spent in her service. He asked Cecil to ‗be the judge[,] for of [£200] that her majestie 
hath bestowed uppon me in money att iij severall tymes,‘ the majority had been spent 
on debts incurred in his work.
7
 Two-hundred marks (£130) went to his creditors who 
‗had most nede of it,‘ and a further £50 maintained him during his imprisonment to 
investigate the Ridolfi plot, leaving Herle less than £20 ‗for me to lyve upon.‘ Herle 
noted that Cecil had helped earlier that year, when Elizabeth ‗dyd by your honorable 
motyon grawnt me a lease in reversion.‘ But he was now ‗content to resigne it agayn, & 
beseche only to have som other thyng bestowed uppon me‘ in its place. This last point 
shows that Herle essentially rejected Elizabeth‘s gift because it had no resale value.  
 The ‗other thyng‘ was the right to police the correct production of cloth. Herle 
had previously petitioned Cecil unsuccessfully for this office ‗att Hampton Cowrte 
when her majestie this last sumer began her progresse.‘8 The lucrative office involved 
the ‗surveyng of clothyers to make trew drapery‘ and, because of its opportunities to 
collect fees and bribes, attracted considerable politicking. Both Hatton and the Leicester 
had requested it for their clients, and to Herle‘s disgust Hatton‘s man had been granted 
the office. Herle now hoped that Cecil would speak with Leicester and offer his client, a 
clothier named Blackburn, a deal where Herle would ‗have the Q[ueen] m[ajes]ties 
parte for my portyon & the sayd Blackburne to have the other moytye [half].‘ This plan 
went counter to Elizabeth‘s decision, and was clearly against her interests. 
Herle used several arguments to support his position.  He claimed that many 
merchants agreed that the office should be reassigned. Otherwise, he argued, ‗the 
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clothyers fallse drapery‘ would lead to both a ‗generall losse att home‘ and ‗a generall 
sclander abrode, which in th'end will overthrow the credite of our clothing throwowtt 
the world.‘9 Inevitably, Herle argued that if granted this office he would ‗use suche 
modesty & discretyon, as nether disorder shall follow.‘ The fact that Herle did not 
receive the office is less important than his claim to a gift which ran counter to 
Elizabeth‘s interests and would require Cecil to challenge the increasingly influential 
Hatton. This indicates that Herle believed he could exert substantial leverage over his 
patron.  
When combined with his willingness to reject Elizabeth‘s previous gift, it shows 
that Herle‘s own estimation of his worth to Cecil was at a peak. Herle was obviously 
mistaken, as Cecil‘s refusal to spend some of his political capital to secure the position 
shows that he felt no need to make a concerted effort on his client‘s behalf. 
Furthermore, because he had failed to gain significant recompense for his crown 
service, Herle perforce had to continue working for Cecil and the Queen. Cecil could 
continue to manipulate Herle with the expectation of future relief from his debts, which 
shows that despite Herle‘s attempts to leverage Cecil‘s goodwill, the power in their 
relationship remained with Cecil.  
 In November 1573 Herle informed Cecil about the result of his recent journey to 
Wales. Herle had been part of a ‗Comissyon of Conselements‘ with ‗other of her 
majesties offycers,‘ which lacked sufficient time to gather evidence of concealed crown 
lands and return a verdict.
10
 However, he had been able to uncover land worth ‗wellny 
[£133] by the yere, in that Cownty of Meryoneth, which wolld have com peceably to 
her majestie.‘ Herle predicted that he could gather ‗a grett dele more in the other shires 
adjoyneng.‘ He planned to pass his commission to ‗master Fanshawe‘ and asked to be 
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‗employed in ani other thing,‘ which he ‗wolld to mi power & capacity faithfullye & 
diligentlye discharge the same.‘  
 This letter reveals how the patronage system rarely worked in Herle‘s favour, as 
well as the limits of Cecil‘s influence. Herle thanked the Lord Treasurer for asking 
Elizabeth to grant him ‗the offyce of the wood wardship of the Cownty of Herryfford,‘ 
the official keeper of the Queen‘s forests in that shire.11 Cecil had stayed ‗master 
Smithes‘ application for the office ‗tyll ye moved her majestie to bestowe it uppon me.‘ 
Unfortunately for Herle ‗the office was given to master Woodfford of the spycerye.‘ 
Despite his disappointment, Herle took care to thank Cecil ‗for your goodnes to me, 
which is noles than if I had enjoyed it.‘ He also took care, however, to accuse Woodford 
of corruption, informing Cecil that: 
Woodfford hath made suche a on his depute as was in hand to have 
bowght a wood which he termed a vallett wood nere unto his howse, & 
now by this deputacyon, he hath gotten som part of his will withowt 
charge more to his own proffitt than the Q[ueen‘s]. 
Naturally Herle would have never used the office for gain at the Queen‘s expense, 
despite his willingness to do so in the case of the cloth surveying position. 
 Woodford used his position as the keeper of Herefordshire woods for financial 
profit, but Herle had planned ‗cheefflye to make an entrye of speche & familyarity with 
master Herryffords wydowe.‘12 Herryford had been the previous ‗woodward in that 
shire‘ and to Herle the office ‗wolld have served for a good introductyon‘ to his widow. 
The widow herself was ‗a propper yong gentillwoman of 28 yeres of aige‘ and ‗without 
children.‘ More importantly, as far as Herle was concerned, she was: 
lefft well furnisshed & wellthye in howse & movables, with [£267] a 
yere besyde whatt in lands & leases, besyde the facilyty (if I were 
matched there) to compasse the gretter parte qwyckly of the feesymple 
that herryford had, to me & my heyres. 
                                               
11 ibid., f.29r-29v. 
12 ibid., f.29v. 
71 
 
Herle had ‗fownd good lykeng bothe of her [the widow] & her frynds,‘ and now asked 
Cecil and Elizabeth to provide ‗som ayde & cowntenance.‘13 
 Herle was confident Elizabeth would support his suit, as ‗I am incoraiged by her 
majesties own words [affectunes] repeted & conffirmed‘ that she would ‗favor & 
cowntenance me, doing me ani resonable good she cowd.‘14 Herle added that the Queen 
had also promised to ‗gyve me a [£66] pensyon by the yere,‘ though in bringing that up 
he emphasised, ‗I am nether importunate nor a craver.‘ Herle was similarly confident of 
the Lord Treasurer‘s support.  
 There were, however, impediments to Herle‘s planned marriage to this rich 
widow. Foremost amongst these were his debts. Herle sought Crown protection from 
his creditors, asking Cecil to ‗renew her majesties comandement uppon me till 
mydsomer next,‘ certifying that ‗all mi busynes & difficultyes by your L[ordship‘s] 
goodnes & favor were settled & stayed.‘15 He hoped that his status as a Crown servant 
would give him immunity from imprisonment for debt. Though Herle had already paid 
off ‗a grett masse of detts‘ he could not ‗dispatche the remnant so sone.‘ If Cecil could 
hold off Herle‘s creditors for a while longer, Herle hoped that ‗bettwen this & 
mydsomer‘ he could ‗finisshe all.‘ Ironically, it appears that all that stood between 
Herle and the marriage that would settle his debts were those very debts. 
 Herle‘s debts continued to plague him, and in April 1574 he asked Cecil for help 
with his sorry state. Herle again claimed that the ‗lease in reversion‘ Elizabeth had 
granted him for his work against the Ridolfi plot, worth £50, had already cost him more 
than £60 in extensive travel ‗to seke owt partyculers to fille up the same‘ and ‗make the 
most of mi booke [lease].‘16 Herle admitted that his ‗lack of skylle, how to dele in these 
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matters...made it the derer & harder unto me,‘ but also blamed ‗Awditors & other 
Clerckes, who lye in waytt to bye up bookes [leases] good chepe.‘ 
 The lease had produced less income than Herle expected, and what little there 
was his creditors soon collected. He asked for two privileges to compensate, that ‗I 
maye have mi booke passe for 31 yeres, & where there is somwhatt more than [£50] in 
my sayd booke, that it may nott be stucke att.‘17 He worried that if ‗the extraordinary 
yeres & this littell overplus shold be taken away,‘ then ‗the whole booke when it comes 
from the grett seale...will nott yelde clene unto me above [£250]‘ if sold. One of Herle‘s 
creditors named Coleman had deducted £50 from Herle‘s lease proceeds ‗for dett due 
unto hym by assignation,‘ and the remainder was too ‗small to satisfye other men with.‘ 
Herle provided further details of the remaining funds in the lease a few months later, 
noting that it was made up of thirteen separate interests which Herle referred to as 
‗habendums,‘ the subsection of a deed that defines the estate granted, each worth £3/3/- 
for a total of £40/19/-.
18
 
 Herle claimed he stood on the brink of ruin. He assured Cecil that ‗as God help 
me, I am driven to borow even from hand to mowth, to fede mi self with all.‘19 Worse 
still, his crippling debts meant that ‗muche les am I hable to enter into ani new charge,‘ 
a particularly dangerous state for a Crown servant such as Herle who relied on the 
proceeds of his service for his livelihood. He asked Cecil to either permit him to flee 
overseas where he could alleviate his debt without fear of imprisonment by his 
creditors, or to intervene with them on Herle‘s behalf. These creditors were ‗so gredy & 
so inexorable, hoping to have even the extremity of their owne demands...that they have 
putt my bonds in sute secrettly.‘20 There is no evidence of these proceedings brought 
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against Herle to bankrupt him and seize his remaining property, although if they were as 
secret as Herle claims this is unsurprising. 
This letter shows how vital the protection of a powerful patron was to Herle. The 
situation threatened ‗to bryng me to an owttlawry, unles her majestie & your L[ordship] 
do favorably assiste me.‘21 Being outlawed for debt would not only cause Herle to 
forfeit all his goods, but prevent him from launching a counter-suit. Herle repeated his 
request that the Queen ‗graunte me a Protectyon for a yere, therby to bryng them to som 
reson & to deffend mi self from prison.‘ By the end of 1574, Herle assured Cecil, he 
would be able to ‗judge how eqwally & justly I will dele with them [Herle‘s creditors] 
& all others.‘ It was only through his patron‘s power that Herle stood a chance of 
avoiding utter ruin. 
 Cecil came to Herle‘s aid a few month later. In July 1574 Herle thanked Cecil 
for ‗the favor shewed by the L[ord] Keper at your L[ordship‘s] motion.‘22 With Cecil‘s 
letter in hand, he had gone to Sir Nicholas Bacon, who acceded to Cecil‘s request to ‗be 
good unto me in the chargs of my booke.‘ Bacon ‗discharged with grett willingnes‘ 
£20/9/6, half ‗the fees belonging to the sealle‘ needed for Herle‘s lease. Herle‘s 
experience showed how vital Cecil‘s powerful influence was to his entire future, for 
Bacon had ‗so willingly don me good‘ only ‗for your L[ordship‘s] sake.‘23 
The Waad Suit 
 While Cecil enabled Herle to hold off the worst of his creditors and gain some 
recompense for his services, the situation became more complicated when Herle faced 
others with patronage ties as strong as his own. Herle‘s next few letters to Cecil 
describe his dispute with fellow monopolist in oil Armigal Waad‘s two sons, William 
and Thomas. Waad had died in 1568, but managed to make his fortune through other 
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investments in the interim, aided by a good marriage and the annuity of £50 per year he 
received for his service as a clerk of the Privy Council.
24
 Herle was vague about the 
suit‘s details, but it appears that he had borrowed at least £100 from the Waad brothers 
to repay his other, pressing creditors, but failed to repay them.
25
 In early November 
1574 Herle told Cecil that he had attempted to settle the dispute out of court. Over the 
previous week both Herle and his brother in law, Laurence Johnson, had found Thomas 
Waad unwilling to discuss the matter. Thomas ‗sheweth suche roughnes of speche & 
suche extremityes, as thowgh he wold ether undo me clene, or ellse provoke me to som 
qwarrell with him, to withdrawe your L[ordship‘s] favor therby from me.‘26  
Herle told Thomas Waad that William ‗had refferred the whole matter‘ to 
Cecil‘s secretary Vincent Skyner‘s determination.27 Given Herle and the Waads‘ mutual 
ties to Cecil, Skyner seemed a logical choice for an arbitrator, but Thomas Waad ‗wold 
nott enter into bond to stand unto master Skyners award‘ unless he could choose another 
to debate the issue with him. No court records survive of the suit between Herle and the 
Waad brothers, and we are forced to rely on Herle‘s account. However, in an earlier 
letter he had alluded to Skyner‘s offer to help Herle ‗make som good end with master 
Wade,‘ so at least part of Herle‘s story was accurate.28 
 Herle claimed that Waad‘s suggestion would prove expensive and fruitless. 
Letting two lawyers negotiate a solution would ‗entangle the matter more than to end 
it,‘ devour money, and sideline ‗that conscyens & charity that the cause required.‘29 He 
countered with a compromise, that ‗Skyner and Master Smith the customer‘ could 
mediate the dispute. Herle likely referred to Thomas Smythe, the wealthy merchant who 
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collected London‘s import subsidies and was closely tied to Cecil and Leicester.30 Waad 
agreed at first, since ‗master Smith was a fitt man for the purpose.‘31 However the next 
day he flew into a rage, asking ‗if I sholld prescribe hym whom he sholld chuse for the 
determinatyon of his owne matters.‘32  
 Herle worried that his indebtedness to the Waads would affect his recovering 
social standing and career prospects. He told Thomas Waad that ‗mi credyt dyd begyn 
to awgment,‘ and he was therefore loathe that ‗every stranger sholld be privy to these 
grett bonds that he had of myne.‘33 Waad dismissed Herle‘s pretensions, saying ‗he 
estemed nether me nor mi credyte‘ and demanded surety that Herle would abide by the 
arbitrators‘ decision ‗beffore he wold prejudice his brothers right.‘ Waad offered an 
important insight into how Herle‘s contemporaries saw him. Waad considered Herle 
‗butt newly start up by the favor of som,‘ presumably meaning Herle‘s success under 
Cecil‘s patronage, and ‗growen far to hawthy.‘ Obviously Herle‘s claims to gentility did 
not impress all who knew him. Herle passed on these criticisms, knowing they were 
also an implicit attack on Cecil. If Waad actually said what Herle alleged, it would help 
push Cecil to favour Herle over the Waads in the feud between his clients. 
 The arguments Herle presented to Cecil intimate that he had tried to use his 
standing with the Lord Treasurer to bully the Waads into agreeing to Skyner‘s 
arbitration. Herle warned Thomas Waad ‗that his brother was more beholldyng to your 
L[ordship] than so hardly to use me,‘ and reminded him that Cecil ‗for bothe our 
qwyettnes was desirows that he sholld suffer the matter to be taken up.‘34 This 
emphasises the leverage that the patronage system gave even to minor clients. Invoking 
Cecil‘s name gave Herle a significant advantage over his peers in negotiations, although 
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he would have been unwise actually to involve Cecil in anything short of a dire 
situation, making his threat somewhat hollow. When Thomas Waad called his bluff by 
refusing to agree to Herle‘s proposed arbitration, however, Herle had to ask Cecil ‗to 
preserve me from undoing herin‘ by intervening himself.35 Herle concluded with an 
appeal to Cecil‘s self-interest in protecting his clients, asking that he ‗whom your 
L[ordship] hath only raysed, therfore will have the more regard...that I may nott be over 
throwen by extremity.‘ 
 Unfortunately for Herle, the arbitration never eventuated. The following June he 
again wrote to Cecil, asking him to revitalise the negotiations. Skyner had been unable 
to arbitrate ‗by reson of his contynuall attendance uppon your L[ordship‘s] servyce,‘ 
and Herle requested that the Treasurer allow Skyner half a day off to do so.
36
 It seems 
Herle had had to acquiesce to Waad‘s desire for a second arbitrator, as this letter placed 
‗master Hastings‘ alongside Skyner as an arbitrator of the dispute. If Skyner and 
Hastings proved unable to find a compromise, Herle hoped that Cecil ‗wolld of your 
eqwity furnissh it.‘  
Cecil eventually agreed to help Herle, and in February 1576 Herle thanked the 
Lord Treasurer for his aid. His intervention had proved decisive, in ‗advancyng me mi 
justyce towards som end of mi long sute.‘37 According to Herle‘s letters, when the 
Waad dispute resurfaced four years later in August 1580, both Cecil and Leicester had 
intervened on his behalf, ‗in your littell chamber att White hall by the Tarresse‘ where 
they ‗toke the payne to make an end for me with Thomas Wade.‘38 Leicester had agreed 
to pay the £100 that Herle owed Waad in two instalments of £50, one then and the other 
‗in November following.‘ 
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Soon afterwards Herle agreed to ‗surrender his interest graunted by her 
Majesties l[ett]res patents to him,‘ and transfer to William Waad his rights to the oil 
manufacturing monopoly he and Armigal had been granted.
39
 Felicity Heal and Clive 
Holmes have argued that Herle‘s request to transfer his patent was part of Cecil‘s wider 
policy of strengthening, stabilising, and increasing the wealth of England.
40
 From 
Herle‘s viewpoint, it was an enforced part of the deal that Cecil brokered. 
By the time Herle wrote to Cecil accepting William Waad‘s monopoly over the 
making of oil, others had sought similar monopolies over oil production. Herle‘s letter 
focused on excluding foreign competition from the English market, probably in 
response to the competing application of the Italian Michel Andrione, and ensuring that 
Waad would have a ready supply of material through a conciliar command ‗enjoyneng 
of men to sowe as muche grownd with rape & cole seeds, as is provyded by statute, that 
they sholld sowe with lyne & hemp.‘41 While Waad received his patent, Cecil 
recognised the futility of statutory enforcement such as Herle requested, for ‗if it be 
more profitable [to farmers,] gain will avail more than law.‘42 The fact that Herle gave 
up his half of the patent is surprising when one considers how much political capital he 
must have spent garnering it in the first place. One can only conclude that it was either 
unprofitable, an unlikely state given that William Waad wished to acquire the whole 
patent, or that when Herle surrendered his interest in the patent he still owed the Waad 
brothers money.  
Cecil‘s interventions, first to hold off Herle‘s creditors, then to ensure the 
payment of his lease, then to resolve his dispute with the Waads, left Herle financially 
settled for the first time in many years. He soon became embroiled in the negotiations 
between England and the Netherlands that will be discussed in Chapter IV. This fact 
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goes some way to explaining Cecil‘s intervention on Herle‘s behalf, after many years of 
ignoring his pleas. The Lord Treasurer needed Herle‘s skills to provide a backdoor 
channel for negotiations between himself, Elizabeth, and Orange‘s representatives in 
London. Herle‘s facility with languages, and extensive time spent in the Netherlands, 
made him the perfect man for the job. Despite Herle‘s ability to extract significant 
rewards and aid from Cecil, it appears that these were only forthcoming when Cecil 
needed him. 
 Herle‘s ugly suit with the Waad brothers resurfaced in August 1580. Cecil‘s 
previous intervention had clearly been less effectual than Herle claimed at the time, 
because he owed the Waads more money than he had revealed. He had been cast into 
the Wood Street prison by that August for not paying his debt to Thomas Waad. Waad 
now claimed that Herle had owed him £200, rather than the £100 that Leicester had 
agreed to pay on Herle‘s behalf in 1576, ‗denying the substance of that agrement that 
passed.‘43 
 By now the suit between Waad and Herle had become vicious. Waad had 
spoken with the Lord Treasurer at Cecil House, trying to undermine Herle‘s standing, 
and ‗entred four actyons agaynst me of [£667] to vexe me & kepe me for all together.‘44 
According to Herle, Waad‘s claims had rapidly increased from £100 to £200 to over 
£600, leading to his imprisonment. Herle responded by asking Cecil to ask Leicester to 
retrieve the contract Waad had signed, currently held by ‗Ambrose his man,‘ so that the 
two Councillors could recall the terms of the agreement.
45
 Herle then hoped that ‗it 
might plese your Lordships bothe, to write 3 lynes to the sayd Waade, of the agrement 
that passed.‘46 Herle also asked Cecil to ‗write fryndlye to Master Jasper Sowthcote [the 
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head jailer in Wood Street] to take resonable byll for mi apparence that next Terme.‘47 
This time Cecil complied, and Herle‘s next surviving letter makes it clear that he had 
been released from prison some weeks before September 1580.
48
  
In early 1581, Waad‘s suit against Herle again emerged. Herle was not 
imprisoned this time, but he complained to Cecil that he ‗shalbe forced to be a 
Banisshed man owtt of myne own contry‘ unless he received protection.49 Herle asked 
Cecil to join with Leicester in persuading Walsingham to ward off Waad as ‗on word of 
master Secretoryes may end it.‘ More specifically, Herle had arranged for £150 he now 
acknowledged he owed Waad to be paid: £100 from two Exchequer officials, masters 
Osburne and Fanshaw, who owed Herle money, £10 from Herle‘s brother in law 
Laurence Johnson who ‗hath a Bond of Wades brother‘ Thomas, and the remaining £40 
from Leicester‘s own pocket.50 This mention of £150 is particularly interesting, since 
with the £50 Leicester had previously paid Waad on Herle‘s behalf, it corresponds to 
the £200 figure Waad had claimed Herle owed him the year before. As Herle had 
previously told Cecil that Waad was inflating this figure from the £100 Herle actually 
owed him, it may have caused the Lord Treasurer to doubt Herle‘s honesty. 
Unfortunately for Herle Leicester was slow in keeping his promise. In May 
1582, over a year later, Herle asked the Earl to please ‗end the cawse with Waade, 
accordynge to your honorable promis...& disberse the [£40] which of your goodnes ye 
had offred towards the discharge of the sayd dett.‘51 Herle also wrote to Walsingham, 
asking the Secretary to aid him in the ‗cawse that suspends betwen master Waad & 
me.‘52 No replies survive from either Leicester or Walsingham, but another letter Herle 
sent to Walsingham indicates that both eventually helped him, in June 1582.  
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Upon returning to Antwerp after a mission to Holland, Herle received letters 
from the two Councillors. These were ‗bothe so tenderlye wrytten, with suche 
honorable respect to mi poore cawses there, as I thynk mi sellf bownd to ether of yow, 
whiles brethe & memorye remaynes.‘53 Herle thanked Walsingham for promising to 
help him gather the money he owed Waad, and agreed to apologise to Waad for taking 
so long to pay his debts. Herle‘s letters do not mention the Waad suit again, and it 
seems that with Walsingham‘s help it was finally ended for good. Despite Herle‘s letter 
to him, Walsingham‘s intervention was likely for Waad‘s benefit, as both he and Cecil 
supported Waad‘s bid for a post as clerk to the Privy Council the following year.54 
Settling any long-standing feuds of Waad‘s would have been a necessary precursor to 
making his bid, and it is likely that this was Walsingham‘s primary concern. 
 The difficulties Herle had in settling the Waad dispute had encouraged him to 
curry favour with several patrons rather than focusing exclusively on Cecil. This 
brought short-term benefits, as both Leicester and Walsingham‘s intervention was 
required to end the Waads‘ suit against him, but proved problematic in the long run. 
Tying himself to multiple powerful men was only a valid strategy as long as their 
interests coincided. There was no guarantee that what one councillor wanted Herle to do 
would not antagonise another. Up until the mid-1580s, however, there was little doubt 
that Herle was primarily Cecil‘s man, a fact which is further shown through his appeals 
to Cecil regarding a office which had been granted to him in the 1570s. 
Herle and the Cardiganshire Gentry 
Even while Herle struggled to end his dispute with the Waad brothers in early 
1577, the people of Cardiganshire accused him of abusing the office of Rhaglaw in their 
shire. Herle had been granted a lease on the office of Rhaglaw in November 1573, an 
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office whose duties largely consisted of gathering rents.
55
 Herle himself described the 
Rhaglaw as existing ‗long before the Conqwest & was a sheriff, which name & office 
contynewes to this daye & not begon in ani tyme of Rebellyon, to be abrogated when 
the cawse of his office cessed.‘56  
Herle‘s involvement with the people of Cardiganshire is one of the few areas of 
his life that has received detailed historical study. David Lewis Jones, however, 
approached the issue by deriding Herle‘s ‗devious career,‘ as an ‗odious...prison spy‘ 
who took part in a ‗piratical attack.‘57 All of these criticisms are true, if harshly phrased, 
but Jones ignores Herle‘s loyal service to the crown and devotion to Cecil‘s cause. His 
analysis of the confrontation between Herle and the people of Cardiganshire is similarly 
imbalanced, painting a picture of Herle as a villainous oppressor, eager to grasp every 
last penny the locals had. 
Herle had initiated an Exchequer case in November 1576, accusing 
Cardiganshire locals of withholding rent from the government. Upon questioning by the 
judges, the majority of the defendants agreed to pay Herle, but a number refused.
58
 
Herle renewed his prosecution in 1577, targeting the recalcitrants, but they countered by 
writing to Cecil, who forwarded their complaint to Herle for his response. The men of 
Cardiganshire described Herle as ‗an unkinde and cumbersome man to his owne 
country people,‘ and claimed that they had been willing to pay a rent of ‗20s by the 
year‘ but no one had collected it.59 Even though Lewis Jones shared that opinion of 
Herle, he admits that ‗this was not entirely correct, probably through guile rather than 
innocence.‘60  
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 Herle responded to Cecil in March 1577, accusing the Cardiganshire 
complainants of lying and slandering him. ‗Besyde the fallshod of their suggestion,‘ 
argued Herle, ‗they leve all owtt that appertaynes to the matter in theyre complaynt.‘61 
Those who wrote it were not poor, and merely styled themselves as such while keeping 
the rents due to the Queen for themselves, ‗whereby [£666] have ben gathered this 
way.‘ The claim that ‗nether awditor nor recevor hathe demanded the rent insomani 
yeres‘ was patently false. Previous attempts to extricate the rents had been ‗certefyed 
into the Excheqwer.‘ Herle claimed that he had gone out of his way to deal kindly with 
the people of Cardiganshire, and ‗never woulde suffre man to be ymprisoned, but was a 
suter withall to the Court, to have ther fynes remitted.‘ Nothing seems to have come of 
this exchange of letters sent to Cecil, but the following year the matter was raised again. 
 In late June 1578, Herle asked Cecil to intervene personally in his dispute with 
the men of Cardiganshire. The situation had altered, as now the Cardiganshire gentry 
were attempting to purchase the Rhaglawship. Herle described the man trying to buy the 
office as ‗pryses brother in Lawe,‘ almost certainly referring to John Price of 
Gogerddan.
62
 Price‘s family were the most powerful members of the gentry in 
Cardiganshire, and he was probably instrumental in organising the previous resistance 
against Herle. Now, however, he wished to buy Herle‘s office for £1,000. Herle was 
amenable to the sale but was ‗standyng styfflye uppon mi demande‘ of £3,000.63 He 
now asked the Lord Treasurer to use his ‗awthoritye & good favor‘ to ‗drawe theme to 
the som‘ of £1,500. Herle thought that the members of the gentry whom Price 
represented would be ‗glad...to com unto [that price], in respect of your honorable 
cowntenance & goodnes to theme herafter.‘  
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 It appears Cecil intervened on Herle‘s behalf. On February 15 1579, Herle 
thanked Cecil for ‗bryngeng mi werysom sute, so long deppending yn the Excheqwer 
towards som more certayn conclusyon.‘64 Despite Herle‘s elation, haggling continued 
until June 1581 when he could finally write to Sir Walter Mildmay, the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, about his success in selling the Rhaglawship. Despite the extensive legal 
proceedings, and the negotiations for sale which followed them, the matter had been 
settled in such a way that ‗the tenants & comodites lyable to the said office, as they & 
the whole contrey are highelie contented & pleased...with the freedom that they & their 
posteritie ar to receve ther by.‘65 
 Herle could have only felt relief at the end of a gruelling series of court cases. 
He detailed the means by which payment for the office was to be made to him and his 
creditors:  
They having compownded with me, to paie into the handes of certayne 
feoffies of trust vz. to master Fanshawe, master Osburne, master 
customer Smythe & others [£1,600] for the said feeffarme and the 
arreraigs.
66
 
With the promise of money coming in to pay off his debts, Herle hoped that Mildmay 
would release his ‗pensyon in the Exchequer‘ which was being stayed from payment ‗at 
the sute of on Lynfford a servante of master Carye,‘ another of Herle‘s creditors. 
Lynford, said Herle, could ‗take in equitie & reson his satisfactyon as the other creditors 
do‘ rather than interfering with his pension ‗which is the onlie thing that I have to lyve 
upon.‘ 
 In the period between his letter to Cecil of 1579, when he expected to sell the 
office, and his letter to Mildmay of 1581, when he had finally arranged the sale, Herle‘s 
financial difficulties had been growing steadily worse. Mere days after his hopeful letter 
to the Lord Treasurer, Herle wrote to Cecil again, this time from a more perilous 
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position. Vincent Skyner, Cecil‘s secretary who had arbitrated Herle‘s dispute with the 
Waad brothers, had also lent Herle money. Herle informed Cecil that in violation and 
‗contempt of the Cowncelles warrant‘ Skyner had imprisoned Herle to regain the money 
he lent him.
67
 Skyner, alleged Herle, paid a number of sergeants £10 to ‗bryng me 
dyrectlye to prison & to leve me there,‘ despite having previously told Herle that ‗he 
wolld bere with me tyll Ester Terme.‘  
A large part of Herle‘s outrage at this incident seems to have been the 
embarrassment it caused him. He alleged that Skyner had told him that ‗he wolld arrest 
the prowdest of those, that do owe hym money in Cowrtt, yf ether he durst or myghte.‘68 
Such foolish words, said Herle would enable Cecil to see ‗the presumptyon of the man, 
& the upbraydeng of those,‘ including Cecil, ‗that by their liberalitye have made hym.‘ 
Herle thus sought to alienate Cecil from Skyner, and requested that he revoke the 
warrant that held Herle in prison. No evidence survives to show whether Cecil asked 
Skyner to drop his suit against Herle. 
Throughout the late 1570s and early 1580s, Herle‘s financial problems had 
forced him to ask much from his patrons. During the three legal disputes detailed above, 
Herle was forced to expend much of the capital he had built up with Cecil during the 
preceding years. The limits of patronage are revealed by Herle‘s difficulties in dealing 
with those who had similarly powerful connections to Cecil, such as Skyner and the 
Waads, or those who were remote from Cecil‘s sphere of influence, such as the gentry 
of Cardiganshire. Despite this, it is clear that until the mid-1580s Herle was relatively 
successful in using his leverage with Cecil to advance himself and deal with the 
resultant issues.  
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Cecil and Herle’s Argument 
In late 1585 Herle‘s client relationship with Cecil threatened to dissolve 
completely in the face of accusations of misdeeds on Herle‘s part. Their argument 
occurred shortly after Herle tried to ingratiate himself with Cecil by reporting slanders 
against Cecil and his son Robert. Herle often included such details in his letters, but the 
aspersions detailed in this letter were particularly vicious, focusing as they did on 
Cecil‘s excessive influence, with undisclosed persons claiming ‗thatt England was 
becom Regnum Cecilianum, your bylldengs ynfinite, & eqwall to Kings Palacs.‘69 Cecil 
responded mere days later, thanking Herle for his vigilance and detailing a list of 
answers to the slanders that he wished Herle to make known. He finished the letter with 
a sentence which was to cause significant difficulties for Herle: ‗Yow si, how I am 
carryed by these provocations to wryte more than I intended, and yet I wryt nothyng, 
but I will affirme in presence of any Company good or bad.‘70 
In Herle‘s reply to Cecil, he implied that he planned to accept Cecil‘s offer to 
affirm the statements by showing it to ‗som of mi frynds (not many) of the better sort, 
that mene well, but waver with the sondry and vehement ympressyon of others.‘71 
Cecil‘s rapid response to this throw-away line accused Herle of showing Cecil‘s private 
letters around town. Herle‘s use of Cecil‘s patronage had clearly become excessive in 
the eyes of Herle‘s rivals, because they had ‗friendly informed‘ Cecil that: 
you mak ostentation of your greatness with me and do send all my 
l[ett]res abrod in the Cite, which I send yow. I am well content that every 
man shuld know that I lyk yow. But to send and disperss my l[ett]res in 
that sort I can not allow.
72
 
What worried Cecil, it seems, was that ‗many may think grett levity in me, to have my 
privat l[ett]res in this sort spred abrod.‘  
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This highlights the problems raised by the Elizabethan practice of placing 
matters of state concern and personal nature in the same letter, as well as the often 
verbal nature of patronage. Robyn Adams has argued that the difference between 
showing letters to others and reading them aloud was particularly significant in this 
period, as the latter allowed for careful editing and removal of personal comments.
73
 
Cecil and Walsingham, for example, read most of Elizabeth‘s correspondence to her, 
allowing them to tailor the contents as they went. Herle‘s reply emphasised the entirely 
verbal nature of his mistake. Herle denied showing the letters themselves, explaining 
that all he had ever done was tell others ‗of your favor, or of ani grettnes that I have 
with yow,‘ and that though this ‗might argue a foolyssh zele & presumptyon in me, 
thowgh no discretyon, which truly I never dyd.‘74 Further, he asked that Cecil inform 
him ‗to whom, when & how I dispersed your sayd l[ett]res.‘75 
Cecil did not deign to reply to Herle‘s request for details of his misdeeds for two 
months, and when he did it was in the form of a scathing rebuke:  
That I charged yow with dispersyng my privat l[ett]res abrode, I am 
worthewise suer, but that they which did se them, yea some that saw 
them also whan yow sent them to the Court, yea to Counsellors. And as 
ther Creditt is with me, so and in that proportion I am moved to thynk it 
trew. And therfor I desyre to have my l[ett]res back.
76
 
The phrase ‗yow sent them to the Court, yea to Counsellors‘ implies that Herle had 
over-stepped the bounds of clientage and favour by distributing unedited letters, which 
had given ammunition to rival Councillors. Perhaps Cecil had been indiscreet in letters 
to Herle that do not survive, attacking other Councillors. Read assumed that the letters 
Cecil referred to were the defences of his actions detailed above. Even as ardent an 
apologist for Cecil as Read was forced to concede that if this was so the Treasurer was 
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acting in a distinctly odd fashion, asking Herle to answer accusations against him one 
week and then attacking him for doing so the next.
77
  
In the face of Cecil‘s suspicion and demand for the return of his letters Herle 
scrambled to apologise and comply, admitting ‗I am most humbly to obey yow,‘ hoping 
this had not ‗trobled your L[ordship] withal,‘ and trusting that he had ‗mi sellf nott 
prejudicated by ani sinister oppynion.‘78 Herle‘s relationship with Cecil survived this 
disaster, although it never seems to have been as close again. The fact that Cecil could 
withdraw his patronage from Herle for months at a time highlights exactly how 
dependent Herle‘s life had become on the whims of one man. When seen in conjunction 
with his success in ending the Waad case by securing the support of several Privy 
Councillors, it is no wonder that Herle came increasingly to rely on several patrons. 
Herle’s Patronage Revisited 
 During the 1580s, Herle‘s interaction with Councillors other than Cecil steadily 
increased. His involvement in uncovering the Throckmorton plot and leading an 
embassy to East Friesland, discussed in Chapter V, brought him closer to both 
Walsingham and Leicester. While Cecil remained his primary patron, there is a distinct 
sense that Herle was diversifying his patronage base. Two letters of October 1586 
exemplify Herle‘s changing circumstances, and show how he employed the support of 
multiple patrons for his advancement. 
 By 21 October 1586 Herle was acting as a courier for Leicester, taking messages 
between the Earl, Elizabeth, and Cecil. Leicester had dispatched him to Elizabeth with 
‗sondry cawses of ymportance,‘ with instructions to return upon completing his tasks.79 
Herle described himself as a liaison between Cecil and Leicester, informing Cecil that 
the Earl had ‗charged me, in ani matter that conserned him, or mi sellf (coming from 
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him) to addresse mi sellf to your L[ordship] freely.‘ This implies that Herle was no 
longer so dependent on Cecil‘s goodwill that he had to emphasis his subservience in 
language and gesture.  
Herle was evidently relying on Leicester‘s backing in this proposal, a fact which 
indicates that the disagreement between Herle and Cecil over the latter‘s letters the year 
before may have had lasting consequences. The vast majority of Herle‘s surviving 
correspondence was still with Cecil, which suggests that they still shared a close patron-
client relationship even if Cecil had personally withdrawn. Yet it could be argued that 
the surviving letters fail to reflect reality, because the majority of Leicester‘s private 
correspondence has not survived. It is possible that by this point the Earl was Herle‘s 
primary patron. Leicester had for years been more eager to intervene on behalf of the 
Dutch, a cause close to Herle‘s heart. However, the surviving evidence only allows us to 
conclude that Herle had greatly increased his ties to another Councillor. 
 Further evidence of Herle‘s current rise in the esteem of Councillors other than 
Cecil can be seen in a letter of 26 October 1586, in which two of Elizabeth‘s secretaries 
discussed who would be granted the important post of clerk to the Privy Council. 
Thomas Dannet informed William Davison that he had spoken to Cecil‘s son Robert 
while visiting the Lord Treasurer at Windsor, who had told him ‗he shoulde neither doe 
yowe nor me pleasure, in this cause of the clarkeshipp of the Councell because he 
thought it woulde be bestowed uppon Herle.‘80 In 1586 Robert Cecil was only 23 years 
old and, despite his rapid rise as assistant to his father, would certainly have had little 
say in this appointment.
81
 Dannet was using the younger Cecil to gauge his father‘s 
opinions, and feared that William Cecil ‗hadd a propos to place Herle.‘82 Dannet 
himself had the support of Sir John Wolley, Elizabeth‘s Latin secretary who acted in 
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Walsingham‘s place as Secretary during his frequent bouts of illness.83 Dannet did not 
think much of his chances with Wolley‘s backing against Herle with Cecil‘s, lamenting 
that ‗it shalbe my misfortune to receive a foile by meanes of Herle.‘84 
 It was not Herle who proved Dannet‘s foil. Despite Cecil‘s support, and 
presumably that of Leicester, Herle lost the post to Sir Anthony Ashley, who enjoyed 
Hatton‘s support.85 Hatton‘s close personal relationship with the Queen proved decisive, 
and Ashley‘s appointment also enabled Elizabeth to balance Hatton‘s more conservative 
outlook against Leicester and other Councillors‘ Godly Protestantism. Herle had failed 
to secure the position despite Elizabeth‘s verbal appointment. The following year, Herle 
reminded Elizabeth that ‗your majestie graciouslye...appoynted me with many good 
woords a yere past, to succede master Beale in the Clerckship of the Cowncell,‘ and 
lamented that ‗others...had obtayned‘ it despite her promises.86 Missing out on this post 
was a major blow to Herle‘s career, as it provided income, prestige, and ready access to 
the most powerful men in England.  
 It is possible to illustrate exactly how such a posting could make a gentleman‘s 
career by comparing the previous and subsequent career arc of one of Herle‘s 
contemporaries, who succeeded in becoming a clerk of the Privy Council a few years 
earlier. William Waad, Herle‘s nemesis throughout the 1570s and 80s, had received a 
clerkship in 1583 with Walsingham and Cecil‘s support.87 Waad was a generation 
younger than Herle, and had been educated at Gray‘s Inn. Unlike Herle, Waad had the 
benefit of a father who had been in Cecil‘s service for many years, and his early career 
consisted largely of European travel as secretary to a number of ambassadors.  
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It was not until Waad received the clerkship in 1583, however, that his career 
truly took off. After an embassy to Vienna in 1583 he was made ambassador to Spain in 
1584 and to France in 1587.
88
 After his return from France he was instrumental in the 
government‘s attack against recusants and Jesuits, and eventually served at various 
parliaments during 1585-1604. Knighted in 1603, Waad became Lieutenant of the 
Tower. A successful career in diplomacy and administration such as Waad‘s was 
probably the most Herle could have aspired to. His failure to secure the clerkship was a 
severe blow to his chances of taking the next step up the social and political ladder. 
While Waad rode Walsingham and Cecil‘s support to a clerkship in 1583, Herle proved 
unable to do the same in 1586. 
Financial Collapse 
 After this failure, Herle‘s life began to spiral downwards. The surviving 
evidence indicates that his failure to secure further rewards was due to a combination of 
his declining leverage over his established patrons, and the increasing influence of 
Councillors he had few ties to, particularly Hatton. Herle‘s later surviving letters are 
largely concerned with his inability to pay his mounting debts. He tried all his 
previously successful strategies throughout 1587, asking Cecil, Leicester, and Elizabeth 
for aid, begging to have his debts stayed, and offering to do any service he could in 
exchange for assistance. However, none of Herle‘s patrons relieved him, a fact which he 
blamed on Hatton‘s malevolence.  
 In January 1587 Herle began a series of letters pleading for Cecil to help him 
with his financial difficulties.
89
 He asked for repayment from the Crown for the 
expenses he had incurred during his various missions to East Friesland, hoping that 
‗som tender consyderacion be had of mi poore estate, & of the long pacyens I have 
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endured, having had no releeff these 4 yeres att her majesties hands.‘ Herle claimed that 
he had only received £100 recompense for the money he had spent on all his 
‗chargeable vyages...abrode.‘ As these journeys were made ‗by her majesties owne 
choyse & comandement,‘ Herle felt he should not bear the cost himself. These 
arguments repeated those Herle had been unsuccessfully making his whole career, but 
where he had previously gained some small recompense, he now gained none. 
 Herle‘s patrons were clearly uninterested in granting Herle‘s requests, indicating 
his declining utility. Although Herle noted that ‗her majestie bestowed on me by paroll 
[verbally] a [£100] pencion‘ Cecil had not organised its confirmation, and Herle implied 
that it had been sitting on the Lord Treasurer‘s desk for ten weeks.90 Nor was Cecil the 
only patron who was ignoring Herle. Herle asked Cecil to ‗move favorably on mi 
behallf‘ with Walsingham, ‗withowt whose furtherance I shalbe never hable to 
advance.‘91 It could be argued that the letter‘s phrasing made it a gentle rebuke, asking 
the Treasurer to remember his duty as patron and ensure the just reward of his client.  
Herle‘s invocation of Elizabeth‘s role as the chief patron in England implied that 
Cecil‘s delay in bestowing her benevolence would be overstepping his authority. ‗I 
humbly presume,‘ wrote Herle ‗that it is far from her Royall disposityon, ether by 
defferryng, to demynisshe the qwality of her gyffte, or by withdrawing from her 
pryncely woorde ani parte of the substance therof, to depryve me of hope & of it 
together.‘92 The rebuke demonstrates how significantly Herle‘s patronage relationship 
with Cecil had been affected by their falling out in 1585. Despite the critical undertone 
of the letter, however, Herle finished with an appeal to Cecil‘s conscience, claiming that 
he was not ‗hable to endure ani longer delaye, nor the expences that may succeede.‘ 
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 Cecil failed to respond as swiftly as Herle hoped. In early February 1587, Herle 
wrote a short note to Cecil so that he might ‗be humbly remembred of mi state & 
neede.‘93 Nor had his situation improved by 21 February, when Herle begged Cecil to 
‗attend your opportunitye for mi releeff att her majesties hands.‘94 Herle tried to 
emphasise, despite his previous attachment to Leicester, that he could ‗relye of non butt 
your sellf theryn‘ as Cecil was ‗the sole hellpe & mediator‘ of his ‗harde state.‘ Herle‘s 
claim to rely solely on Cecil‘s benevolence to solve his financial difficulties by 
appealing to the Queen, illustrates Leicester‘s declining influence in the aftermath of 
Elizabeth‘s fury at his acceptance of the governor-generalship of the Netherlands. 
 When Cecil finally appealed to Elizabeth on Herle‘s behalf, things did not go as 
Herle had expected. In late March Herle thanked Cecil for taking his suit to the Queen, 
but admitted his disappointment at ‗the diffinityve sentence that her majestie hath given 
to your L[ordship] towching me.‘95 He could not criticise Elizabeth too heavily, 
claiming that ‗I am most humbly contented with her good plesure, whattsoever she 
decree.‘ Throughout this letter, however, Herle sprinkled critiques of Elizabeth‘s 
capricious nature and implicitly of Cecil, saying that ‗she hath graciously 
accomplisshed to others (better frynded) & I alone excluded & contempned, after the 
disbursement of myne owne, ye all & more then I had, in her service, as yett unallowed 
or recompensed.‘ Given these criticisms, and the absence of any reply from Cecil to 
Herle‘s earlier letter, it seems likely that the two had met in person in the interim, and 
that Cecil had attributed Herle‘s lack of reward to the Queen‘s declining opinion of him. 
 A month later Herle wrote to Elizabeth, asking her to ignore those who 
demeaned his good name to her, and solve his financial difficulties. He complained that 
those who had ‗sowght mi disgrace & undoing with your majestie...have informed that I 
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am a raver, thatt yow have bestowed uppon me manifold things‘ despite Herle‘s 
protestations of poverty.
96
 Elizabeth, these anonymous attackers claimed, had given 
Herle over £2,000. Herle responded to these accusations by listing the rewards he had 
received from Elizabeth for his service to her: 
I only had duryng mi service 2 gyfftes, & those nott propperly of mi sute, 
butt of your free disposityon, The first a lese in reversyon, & the other a 
pencion, which may be valued att bothe to [£900] for gyfftes bestowed 
on me in the placs of mi employment, besyde a chaine worth [£50]. 
Herle‘s claim that he only received ‗2 gyfftes‘ is clearly false. As detailed above, he had 
also received a patent, a position as porter of the Tower, and a position as Rhaglaw of 
Cardiganshire, not to mention Cecil‘s aid in staying his debts repeatedly. The only way 
Herle‘s statement to the Queen could be considered true is if he believed all these other 
rewards were granted purely through Cecil‘s influence. 
 Herle‘s downplaying of the rewards he received for his service makes perfect 
sense when taken in conjunction with his focus on the expenses the same service had 
cost him. Herle claimed that he was ‗so far from benefyteng‘ through his service that in 
East Friesland had cost him £860.
97
 Herle estimated the entirety of expenses accrued 
during the course of his career at £4,500. He asked Elizabeth to consider ‗mi weke 
estate‘ and ‗inhable me at laste, with somwhat convenyent for me in reputacion & 
comoditye.‘ Elizabeth followed a similar patronage strategy to Cecil. While she did not 
grant Herle any secure offices or pensions, ‗she sollicited master Secretory her sellf, to 
provyde som convenyent staye for me‘ and hold off his creditors a little while longer.98 
 Elizabeth‘s intervention failed to solve Herle‘s problems, and he continued to 
bombard his patrons with requests for money throughout 1587. In July Herle told Cecil 
that he had ‗morgayged & forffayted mi pencyon. & burdened my frynds above mesure, 
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among whom master Secretory hath answerd & payd for me‘ £155.99 Yet even with 
Walsingham‘s help his debts continued to mount. ‗There rests‘ said Herle, ‗nothing 
more to sacrifise, butt mi lyfe, which is redy for ani service of the state.‘ Herle‘s 
appointment to expensive duties such as ambassadorships, combined with his failure to 
secure well paying offices, placed him in an unwinnable situation. Herle was obviously 
aware of this, repeatedly attempting to secure such lucrative offices through Cecil. Even 
as he lamented his unpaid debts, Herle noted that ‗master Hayes on of the awditors of 
the duchye is this daye decessed, the gyffte of whose office is meerley in her majestie,‘ 
and asked the Treasurer to intervene with Elizabeth so that she would bestow it upon 
Herle.
100
 Cecil, it seems, did not. 
 Herle failed in every suit during 1587, which he blamed on Hatton‘s influence. 
In August [1587], having been passed over for yet another office, Herle complained that 
the recently appointed Lord Chancellor was undermining him. When Herle applied for 
the ‗clerckship of the casuall fynes‘ Hatton ‗bestowed it uppon his kinseman Fr[ancis] 
Flower;‘ when he ‗sued by l[ett]re for Tussers office of the duchie...it was yett ones 
agaynst crossed by the L[ord] Chancellor.‘101 Even his application for the ‗Clerckship of 
the Cowncell‘ had failed because of Hatton‘s intervention. Herle‘s portrayal of a 
personal vendetta is explicable if we accept that Hatton saw Herle as Cecil and 
Leicester‘s partisan in the Protestant cause, supporting aggressive foreign policy which 
Hatton opposed. An alternative explanation is that Hatton‘s influence in these matters 
had begun to eclipse Cecil‘s, and the service Herle could provide could not recompense 
Cecil for expending his influence with the Queen.  
Herle had benefited greatly from Cecil‘s dominance of patronage over the years, 
but by the late 1580s the Lord Treasurer‘s ability to reward his servants had clearly 
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diminished. The loss of personal influence over Elizabeth when Cecil stepped down 
from the position of Secretary, was only partially made up for by his new role as Lord 
Treasurer and Master of the Court of Wards. Cecil moved closer to Elizabeth again 
through his role in the Anjou marriage negotiations, but his central role in tricking the 
Queen into signing Mary Stuart‘s death warrant in 1587 led to his dismissal from Court. 
In contrast, Hatton‘s influence grew steadily from his induction into the Privy Council 
in 1579. Wallace MacCaffrey has argued that Hatton‘s support was considered crucial 
by other councillors due to his high degree of personal influence over Elizabeth.
102
 This 
influence, when combined with Elizabeth‘s bestowal of the Lord Chancellorship on 
Hatton in April 1587, gave Hatton immense influence over Crown patronage. In much 
the same way that Cecil and Leicester‘s affinities had benefited from the peaks in their 
power, so Hatton‘s followers benefited in the 1580s. Herle was unfortunate enough to 
seek positions at a time when Hatton was busy rewarding his established clients. 
* 
This chapter has examined Herle‘s interactions with his patrons throughout 
several decades. Herle‘s letters allow us an unprecedented glimpse into the minutiae of 
patronage relationships, demonstrating a number of consistent themes. While patronage 
involved a mutually beneficial relationship where the patron rewarded his client for 
loyal service, as was argued in Chapter I, this did not always eventuate in practice. 
Herle‘s relationship with Cecil seems to have involved rewards for future possible 
services as much as it did those for recent ones. This was based around the ability of a 
client such as Herle to exert leverage over his patrons. In the aftermath of the Ridolfi 
plot, Herle was eminently useful to Cecil, a trusted client with years of service ahead of 
him. From the mid-1580s, when Herle was coming towards the end of his career, his 
potential utility was greatly diminished. The problems Herle experienced in exerting 
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leverage over Cecil were exacerbated by the loss of trust which ensued after their 
argument in 1585. Cecil‘s willingness to go for months without contacting Herle 
demonstrated their unequal relationship. Herle‘s expansion of his patronage base to 
include Leicester and Walsingham also contributed to a shift in the dynamic between 
him and Cecil. While it made Herle less reliant on the benevolence of a single patron, it 
lessened his utility to Cecil by visibly dividing his loyalties. 
These observations about Herle‘s patronage relationships provide wider insights 
into Elizabethan patronage. As was noted in the introduction, Herle was hardly a unique 
figure in the Tudor world, and much of what we have seen can likely be extrapolated to 
other minor civil servants and members of the gentry. Patronage was the glue that held 
Tudor society together. Herle‘s reliance upon Cecil‘s patronage to extricate himself 
from any number of situations demonstrates that the support of a powerful patron was 
vital to advancing oneself in the Tudor world. Similarly, it was only through Cecil‘s 
intervention that Herle could hope to gain recompense for his service and the promise of 
future rewards. The proximity of Herle‘s patrons to the Queen was instrumental in their 
importance to their clientele. So many of Herle‘s letters ask Cecil to intervene on his 
behalf with the Queen, because a large part of a patron‘s importance to his clients lay in 
his proximity to Elizabeth. Hatton and Leicester developed their clientage by exploiting 
the Queen‘s favour, and Cecil himself was not unwilling to do so. In exchange for the 
many benefits a client garnered from his patron, he was expected to perform equivalent 
services. Herle‘s abilities to gather useful intelligence and conduct negotiations in 
multiple languages were the primary currency he used to exert leverage over Cecil and 
his other patrons. The following chapters will examine how Herle held upheld end of 
the patron-client bargain. 
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Chapter IV: Herle in the Netherlands 
William Herle‘s work against the Ridolfi plot has generated far more historical 
interest than any other phase of his life, but his periods in the Netherlands had more 
influence on his career. At different times in his life, Herle served there as a negotiator, 
a financier, and a diplomat, while constantly sending information back to England. 
During the decade after the Ridolfi Plot, between 1573 and 1582, Herle spent much of 
his time in the Netherlands. He travelled back and forth between Antwerp and London 
repeatedly, and his letters describe diplomatic discussions with the Dutch one month 
and his financial dealings in England the next. There is evidence that a significant 
amount of Herle‘s correspondence from this period has been lost. In a letter of 18 May 
1576 for example, Herle mentions ‗the l[ett]re that I shewed you that Powell Buis [Paul 
Buys] & Ortell wrytt me.‘1 Despite these gaps in Herle‘s correspondence, his 
involvement in negotiations between the Netherlands and England is one of the most 
interesting periods of his life, and shows how the English government utilised his 
Netherlands connections to inform their decisions. 
Herle‘s letters provide ample evidence of how English foreign policy was 
conducted, utilising connected individuals such as Herle on an ad hoc basis, rather than 
negotiating through an established diplomatic corps.
2
 The problems this unsophisticated 
and decentralised approach caused Herle were shown above, in the form of his debts 
which increased significantly each time he was forced to pay his own way on a 
government posting. It was equally problematic for the government, with Herle and his 
peers not always proving up to the task of keeping Elizabeth and her councillors 
accurately and timely informed of overseas events. Despite Herle‘s mistakes in this 
area, most notably his premature report of William of Orange‘s death, English policy 
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makers still relied on the information he provided. This was because Herle was one of 
the few sources, if not the only source, they had on events in the Netherlands through 
much of this period. Policy makers were forced to rely on information that was often 
months out of date, and any source of news was appreciated, reliable or not. 
The Netherlands were vital to English interests throughout the late medieval and 
early Tudor periods. English foreign policy was based upon the dual precepts of 
hostility towards France and friendship with the rulers of Burgundy. During Elizabeth‘s 
reign, however, practical and religious considerations slowly dissolved the Tudor-
Habsburg alliance until outright war was declared against Habsburg Spain in 1583. The 
most important contributory factors to this dissolution can be summarised as: religious 
strife; competing territorial interests; and the sudden weakness of both sides‘ traditional 
enemy, France, all of which are reflected in Herle‘s letters. Henry VIII‘s decision to 
discard his Habsburg wife Catherine escalated tensions between England and Spain, 
although these were ameliorated by his daughter‘s marriage to Philip after his death.3 
While this alliance seemed initially to restore the ancient amity between the houses, in 
retrospect it merely postponed long-term change. 
England and Spain‘s main point of contention was their competing strategic 
interests in the Low Countries. Both sides saw the Netherlands as a natural extension of 
their sphere of influence: the English because of the London-Antwerp trade, as well as 
the threat that Holland and Zealand provided as natural bases for invasion of England 
through their deepwater ports and prevailing winds; the Spanish because of the 
hereditary position of the Habsburgs as rulers of the provinces, and the substantial 
wealth the Dutch and Flemish entrepôts and markets funnelled into Spanish hands.
4
 
This strategic conflict was exacerbated by increasing religious extremism on either side. 
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During Elizabeth‘s reign, England slowly but clearly became a Protestant nation, 
while Philip II sought to impose Catholic uniformity in the Netherlands. Although 
revisionist historians such as Christopher Haigh have argued that England remained 
overwhelmingly Catholic well into the Elizabethan era, it is clear that for the majority of 
her reign those in a position to influence foreign policy were convinced Protestants.
5
 
Elizabeth‘s right to the throne was based upon the legality of Henry‘s divorce from 
Catherine, necessitating a certain degree of Protestantism on Elizabeth‘s part, and the 
Queen‘s ego benefited from her claim to hold both temporal and spiritual power.6 
However Elizabeth‘s love for ritual made her loathe to abandon some of the formal 
aspects of Catholicism, and she preferred private prayer over the public sermons so 
popular amongst Protestants.
7
 Given her religious ideas and the international 
complexities, the Queen was often of two minds, a state which encouraged her advisors 
to attempt to persuade her to their own lines of thinking – in Cecil‘s case the nightmare 
vision of vast international Catholic conspiracy against her, which required a similarly 
unified Protestant world to counter it.
8
  
With Protestantism dominating England, and Catholicism doing likewise in 
Spain, there was a significant proportion of English Privy Councillors who felt that they 
needed to align themselves with fellow Protestants in the Germanic states and the Low 
Countries.
9
 This way of thinking was exemplified by the Earl of Leicester, but shared 
by Cecil, Walsingham, and other councillors to varying degrees. This idea of 
Protestantism as a pan-European ideological and religious alliance, often referred to as 
the ―Protestant Cause,‖ was seen as the natural counterpoint to the international 
Catholic conspiracy described in Chapter II. While ideologically sound, an alliance 
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based upon confessional similarities proved difficult to implement in reality. English 
diplomats had failed to establish ties to the Lutheran princes of North Germany and 
Scandinavia, largely due to their own ineptitude. English agents demonstrated a 
remarkable lack of understanding about German politics, treating the many princes as a 
single group and ignoring differences between them.
10
 Having ruined any chance they 
had with German Protestants, those in the Netherlands were the last ally that radical 
English Protestants felt they could rely on. Herle seems to have been a believer in the 
Cause, and it is in his attitudes towards the Netherlands that we can see much of his 
world view expounded. 
The Protestant Cause 
On 11 June 1573, Herle composed a lengthy report on the Netherlands situation. 
The importance of this document is emphasised by the fact that it survives in three 
copies, one in the State Papers, and two in the Cotton manuscripts.
11
 Herle described it 
as ‗certaine discourses which the Prince of Orenge had with me,‘ and it focused on the 
need for England to support the Dutch against the Spanish. This idea would become a 
rallying cry for the Cause, and indicates that Herle was associated with aggressively 
radical Protestants, and could have been one himself. At the time Herle wrote this letter, 
the Queen was indisposed towards aiding the Dutch directly. Elizabeth‘s public stance 
was that Orange and his supporters were ‗no better then rebells to their K[ing].‘12 This 
did not prevent those who believed in the Cause from attempting to persuade her to 
share their view. 
Herle highlighted several reasons why England should intervene in favour of the 
Dutch, all of which mirror ideas modern historians have postulated as catalysts for 
intervention. He argued that Philip ultimately planned to attack England, ‗wanting only 
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th'opportunitie of tyme to see those troubles of Fraunce and of the Lowe Countries once 
ceassid, the easlier then and with more advauntage to atcheive his purpose.‘13 The threat 
to invade England, Herle wrote, had been ‗hearde and observid even from the K[ing] of 
Spaines owne mowthe.‘ Furthermore, the fates of England and the Low Countries were 
closely intertwined. The sea passage from Spain to the Netherlands ran through English 
waters, making it a vital strategic area for Philip if he expected to reintegrate the entire 
Low Countries into his empire. 
Herle supported these strategic reasons for allying with the Netherlands by 
emphasising the danger posed by international Catholicism, claiming that the Pope and 
Philip were working together to encourage sedition within England. This was obvious, 
Herle claimed, as the Catholic nations intended the ‗utter ruyn and rooting upp of all 
those of the reformid religion,‘ amongst whom the ‗English Nation kepe the first 
place.‘14 While Philip‘s relationship with the papacy was often turbulent, in the 1570s 
their interests intersected sufficiently to form a close alliance.
15
 Philip himself was 
deeply religious, pursuing what Geoffrey Parker has termed ―messianic Catholicism,‖ in 
which Philip considered his personal agenda synonymous not only with that of Spain, 
but of God.
16
 Herle emphasised the religious aspect of the expected conflict between 
Spain and England, claiming that Philip thought of English Protestants ‗with an 
immortall hatred never to be reconciled.‘17 
Herle‘s focus on the religious nature of the Franco-Spanish alliance against 
England and the Netherlands was complemented by a subtle domestic Catholic 
conspiracy to subvert Protestant rule in England. Herle claimed that Philip and Mary, 
Queen of Scots, conspired to take Elizabeth‘s throne. ‗Beholding that there is no yssue 
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of her Majesties bodye to succede in the Realme after her,‘ the Spanish King 
encouraged internal dissent to weaken all other claimants, ‗then by some newe 
allyaunce‘ with Mary would ‗assure him selfe of the whole state for ever.‘18 This 
internal disintegration would be aided by ‗Englishe Papists which are not a fewe in 
number,‘ who, inspired by Catholic success in the Low Countries, would ‗desier and 
hope for a like alteracon at home.‘ 
In order to overcome this two-pronged Catholic attack on England, Herle 
recommended that Cecil advise the Queen to support the Netherlands against Spain. If 
the ‗lowe Countries [could] be strengthenid and countenanced to holde oute then is it a 
thinge assured that the Spannyards shall...loose their longing for making an invasion in 
Englande.‘19 Elizabeth, said Herle, should ‗take theim into her protection and defend 
their comon cause of religion and libertie against the Tyranny of Spaine and the bloudy 
devices of Rome,‘ referencing his belief in the zealous Protestant Cause. 
Herle‘s focus on religious solidarity combined with strategic necessity shows 
how the ad hoc appointment of connected individuals such as Herle undermined 
England‘s long term diplomatic interests in Europe. Rather than representing 
Elizabeth‘s interests, he was clearly siding with her more zealous councillors who 
argued for intervention in the Netherlands. This bias was only to be expected, given that 
Herle‘s position overseas was largely due to these same councillors‘ influence, but 
made for an inconsistent diplomatic service which could not be relied upon to feed 
unbiased information back to the Queen. Herle‘s letter reads more like an advert for the 
Cause than it does a balanced view of the Netherlands situation. With policy makers 
basing their decisions on this sort of information, it is no wonder that Elizabeth was 
notoriously indecisive. 
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 Herle‘s partiality was not only tied to his belief in the Cause, but also to his 
association with Dutch politicians. While the letter detailed above implies that Herle 
was working with Orange himself in 1573, it was Herle‘s association with Orange‘s 
representative in London, the Dutch politician Paul Buys, which was most indicative of 
his divided loyalties. Orange‘s representatives had offered Elizabeth the sovereignty of 
Holland and Zealand as early as 1573, when the Spanish advance towards Flushing left 
them in a dire situation.
20
 When the Queen refused, the offer languished until September 
1575 when the Spanish financial collapse and consequently faltering military push 
within the Netherlands gave Orange hope that the war could be won with English 
assistance. Orange‘s ambassadors discussed the transfer of sovereignty to Elizabeth 
with the English Privy Council in January 1576, but both Councillors and the Queen 
balked at provoking Spain by openly contesting Philip‘s title. Councillors placed the 
issue before the Parliament which opened in February, but Hatton and his pro-Habsburg 
allies successfully blocked Leicester‘s attempts to use parliamentary opinion to push the 
Queen into accepting Dutch sovereignty.
21
 
 In March 1576 Herle became involved in this ideological struggle, representing 
Buys‘ interests to Cecil and Elizabeth. Herle and Buys attempted to defuse a diplomatic 
bombshell which threatened to end any chance of Elizabeth taking sovereignty of the 
Netherlands. A group of Sea Beggars, pirates operating under William of Orange‘s 
letters of marque, had kidnapped the Portuguese ambassador‘s fiancé during a naval 
altercation near Dover.
22
 The ambassador‘s fiancé had been under Elizabeth‘s 
protection as she crossed from Calais to Dover, and the incident infuriated the Queen 
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who promptly ordered the seizure of all Zealand ships in English ports.
23
 Herle and 
Buys claimed that the ‗pore men of Holland‘ had never intended to kidnap the 
ambassador‘s fiancé, and were merely retaliating against the Portuguese who had 
thrown their men overboard.
24
 The Dutch wished to ‗intertayne good amitye with the 
K[ing] of Portingalle & all his subjects‘ despite this blunder. 
 Cecil‘s response does not survive, but when Herle reported Buys‘ rejoinder a 
few days later, he showed how his own opinions on the matter differed from the Lord 
Treasurer‘s. Buys was told that the English thought that the Dutch had not been 
provoked, and ‗rather lykely that the Flusshingers dyd lye purposely in awaytt there for 
those shippes,‘ essentially an accusation of piracy by Cecil. Herle passed on Buys‘ 
response that the accusations were ‗malycyously practised‘ lies, and himself suggested 
that Elizabeth ‗appoint on or ij suffycyent dyscrete persons to be resydent for her in 
Holland & Zeland‘ to investigate the charges and similar incidents and report back to 
the Crown.
25
 Presumably Herle intended that he should be one of these appointees, but 
the diplomatic situation with Spain made this idea untenable. Sending representatives to 
the Dutch would have been tantamount to Elizabeth awarding the Dutch diplomatic 
recognition, a fact which Herle must have been aware of to some degree. 
 Herle‘s inability to correctly represent Cecil and Elizabeth‘s interests in the 
Dutch conflict is further shown by a letter of 14 March 1576 in which he claimed:  
Itt is given owtt verey malicyously amongst gentillmen & sowdyers, & 
amongest those of good sort that proffesse the Relygion that your 
L[ordship] hath bin the only lett & overthrowe of this Holland service, 
disswading her majestie from the enterprise, where otherwise the Erlles 
of Lecester & Sussex, were ernest favorers & furtherers of ytt.
26
 
Cecil rightly saw this as an attack on his lack of support for the Cause, and must have 
both indicated his displeasure at this impertinence and explained his need for 
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dissimulation. In Herle‘s next letter he was eager to tell the Lord Treasurer that he had 
‗Pawll Buiz understand, of that good estymatyon that yow have him in, & of the good 
that ye wysshe unto the cawse,‘ despite needing to ‗gyve theme hard words accordyng 
to the allteracyon that tyme, partyes, & occasyons dyd minister.‘27  
 Herle‘s explanation of Cecil‘s actions allows us to see how the Lord Treasurer 
was successfully playing both moderate and radically Protestant sides in the debate over 
intervention in the Netherlands. While Cecil did not want to take action against the 
Dutch, strengthening the international Catholic conspiracy he feared in the process, he 
recognised the need to publicly align his opinion with Elizabeth‘s. Cecil pretended to 
share the Queen‘s anger at the Dutch pirates while using Herle to secretly assure the 
Dutch of his friendship behind her back. Walsingham, similarly worried that this 
incident would undermine the Cause, spent the next few months coaching Orange on 
the intricacies of negotiating with Elizabeth.
28
 Herle did not practice this level of 
dissimulation, clearly aligning himself with both the Cause and the Dutch politicians 
whom aggressive English Protestants wished to aid against Spain. 
 In the late 1570s, English involvement in the Netherlands became embroiled 
with Elizabeth‘s protracted series of marriage negotiations with the French Duke of 
Anjou, generally referred to as the ―Anjou Match.‖29 While Cecil and the Earl of Sussex 
were vocal supporters of the marriage, noting that it would strengthen England‘s 
international position considerably, Leicester, Walsingham and the other firmly 
Protestant councillors opposed it, raising Anjou‘s Catholicism and the fear of a Valois 
on the English throne as concerns. Elizabeth‘s opinion on the marriage changed during 
the 1570s. When it was first broached in 1572 she emphasised the differences in age 
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and religion between herself and Francis, but kept negotiations open to maintain 
diplomatic channels.
30
 By 1579, however, Elizabeth had shifted from what Susan Doran 
has termed ―matrimonial diplomacy‖ to seriously considering the proposal.31 In the end 
she only backed down in the face of popular hostility to a Catholic marriage.
32
 
However, the Anjou match, alongside Philip‘s capture of Portugal, proved significant in 
refocusing Elizabeth on the dangers of Spanish expansionism. 
 In March 1581 Herle was commissioned by Cecil and Leicester to negotiate 
with Orange in Antwerp, where he passed on Leicester‘s messages, ‗intertayneng the 
best offices I cowd betwen yow bothe.‘33 Herle discussed Anjou‘s arrival in the Low 
Countries, and his negotiations with the States to accept him as their sovereign. Anjou 
and the States General signed the Treaty of Plessis-les-Tours, awarding him the title 
―Protector of the Liberty of the Netherlands,‖ in September 1580, but the treaty would 
not become official until the Estates repudiated Philip as their sovereign.
34
 This took 
until July of the following year, and Herle was sent to report on the process. 
Herle‘s bias in favour of the Cause came to the fore again in these letters, with 
the addition of a personal distaste for the French Catholic Anjou. In March 1581 Herle 
revealed to Leicester the disagreement between Anjou and the Dutch over his 
maintaining his Catholic religion in an overwhelmingly Protestant state.
35
 Similar issues 
were concurrently being raised in England in response to Anjou‘s marriage suit, and this 
is unlikely to be a coincidence. John Stubbes‘ book Discourie of a Gaping Gulf 
VVereinto England is Like to be Swallovved by Another French Marriage brought many 
of these arguments into the public forum, but received a furious response from the 
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Queen, who declared it the work of a seditious libeller.
36
 By 1581 Leicester had realised 
he needed to accept the Anjou Match in order to ensure England was not left isolated, 
but there is no evidence Herle felt the same.
37
 Having spent much of his time in the 
Netherlands, he could have been unaware of Leicester‘s change of heart, and thought 
this news would allow the Earl to raise the issue in Elizabeth‘s mind without directly 
insulting her as Stubbes had.  
 Herle‘s own dislike for Anjou came across strongly in these letters, a fact which 
clearly influenced his depiction of events. He portrayed Anjou as a Catholic mercenary, 
demanding freedom of worship as well as ‗300,000 gylldernes by the monethe‘ from the 
States to pursue the war against Spain. Herle further opined that the French Wars of 
Religion were advantageous for England, and that he hoped Anjou would be sucked 
back into them as a French Netherlands would ‗be a nere peril unto England.‘38 As 
Elizabeth fully supported Anjou by this point, Herle was clearly at odds with his Queen 
in making his dislike of Anjou shown. This also indicates how out of touch with 
domestic politics Herle could become on his extended overseas missions, making anti-
French arguments that were no longer tenable in the tense international climate.  
The Orange Assassination Attempt 
 Herle‘s biases and the choices he made about what information to send back to 
England could have drastic consequences for English foreign policy. The trust placed in 
Herle, and the problems this could cause, is exemplified by his premature reporting of 
William of Orange‘s assassination in 1582. Herle reported that on 18 March the Prince 
had been attacked by an assassin who got close to Orange then ‗sodaynlye discharged a 
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pistoll (that he helld unsene) att the prince.‘39 Luckily the firearm‘s recoil sent the bullet 
off course through the Prince‘s cheek without causing serious damage, ‗a provyden[ce] 
of God most admirable‘ as Herle commented. Orange‘s bodyguards inflicted thirty-
three ‗mortall wowndes‘ on the assassin, despite the Prince‘s cries to take his attacker 
alive. 
 According to Herle, reports that Orange had died reached Antwerp, where a mob 
of townsmen immediately threatened Anjou, ‗the frenche, & the papists...that not on of 
theme sholld be lefte alive.‘40 The army, reassured that Orange was alive and that the 
assassin was Spanish not French, suppressed mob action and defended Anjou‘s 
lodgings. While Herle‘s dislike of Anjou came across strongly in his previous letters, 
the Duke‘s actions in the aftermath of the assassination attempt seem to have endeared 
him to Herle. On 25 March, Herle related Anjou‘s plans to tell the ‗Imperyall dyett, & 
the Kyngs & princes of Christendom‘ about Philip‘s responsibility for the assassination 
attempt, and warn them likewise to beware.
41
 Philip and his ministers had sponsored 
various assassination attempts against Orange throughout the revolt, expecting that 
without his personal leadership and charisma Dutch resistance would founder.
42
  Faced 
with Anjou‘s leadership in a time of crisis, the States swore ‗to holld hym & obeye 
hym, as their Soverayne.‘43 Anjou in turn promised protection and to maintain their 
‗privylegs‘ subverted by Philip. Herle approved, for though ‗Holland & Zeland made 
difficulties‘ about swearing allegiance to a foreigner, they eventually ‗agreed with the 
rest & made their othe.‘44 
 Although Herle‘s distaste for Anjou was ameliorated by the Duke‘s actions, 
bringing his interests closer to those of Elizabeth, his ability to perform his duties in the 
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Netherlands adequately was called into question a week later. Herle informed Leicester 
that Orange‘s wound had begun to bleed profusely after the torn scabrous tissue that had 
previously ‗coverd som vayne that was hurte by the bullett‘ became detached.45 The 
doctors took extreme measures to preserve Orange‘s life, with servants taking turns 
applying pressure to the wound inside his throat.
46
 
On 2 April 1582, Herle reported that Orange had taken a turn for the worse, 
losing ‗more than 30 owncs of blood‘ when his wound reopened and his physicians 
gave him a week to live ‗att the furthest.‘47 Herle therefore counselled Cecil to quickly 
ensure stability in the Netherlands, because without the Prince Anjou would not know 
what course to take. Herle recommended that the Queen re-examine her opposition to an 
alliance with Holland and Zealand. By joining with the Low Countries Elizabeth could 
‗brydell the K[ing] of Sp[ain],‘ and ‗cownterpeyse the Frenche, yf they sholld exceede 
lymites.‘48 Furthermore, Herle argued disingenuously, allying with these provinces 
would offend neither France, because of Anjou‘s agreement with the Dutch, nor Spain 
because Orange‘s provinces were not bound by the Pacification of Ghent. 
 By rushing to advise Cecil and Elizabeth, Herle left himself open to criticism 
when his news turned out to be incorrect. Almost a fortnight later, Herle wrote 
apologetically to Leicester of the Prince‘s recovery. While this letter is badly damaged 
and missing sections, Herle had clearly been severely rebuked for prematurely reporting 
Orange‘s death. Herle now admitted Orange was ‗in no peryle att all.‘49 Herle had 
damaged his reputation with Elizabeth, who made her displeasure known. He had been 
warned not to announce things ‗that nether were assured nor lykelye.‘50 Herle tried to 
claim that he had written, not knowing Orange would die, but fearing that Elizabeth 
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would be unprepared for the new situation if he did. On April 28, almost two months 
after the assassination attempt, Herle informed Walsingham that Orange had recovered. 
Herle had found him ‗hable to walke in his chamber‘ and asking after Leicester, Cecil, 
and Walsingham‘s wellbeing.51 
Despite his gaffe about Orange, Herle claimed to Leicester that ‗I am well 
respected here, by myne own yndustrye,‘ and alleged that Anjou had offered him ‗very 
good termes‘ to ‗remayne yn this contry, gyveng me the credite to have accesse unto 
hym.‘52 However, Herle promised to ‗dyrect non other cowrse, butt that which shall be 
prescribed me from your L[ordhsip].‘53 Given Herle‘s continued credit issues in 
England, including his difficulties with the Waads, it exemplifies his negative 
assessment of Anjou that Herle would pass up this offer of financial security in the Low 
Countries. Loyalty to his Queen and his wish to remain close to his sister in England, 
might also have played into Herle‘s refusal. 
* 
 This chapter has discussed Herle‘s role as informant about the increasingly 
important Netherlands. Herle‘s experiences show that the ad hoc nature of England‘s 
approach to foreign policy caused severe difficulties in practice. The Tudor state made 
use of ―connected‖ individuals who sometimes were not up to the task of keeping 
Elizabeth promptly, fully, and accurately informed of developments overseas. As these 
men were often the government‘s only source of information about what occurred in 
Europe, this could have disastrous consequences. The Netherlands were vital to English 
strategic and economic concerns throughout the Tudor period, and the conflict there 
between Philip and his Dutch citizens was a central concern in the highest circles of 
English policy making. 
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 Privy Councillors such as Cecil and Leicester chose Herle as an intelligence 
gatherer and negotiator because of his connections in the Netherlands, most notably 
with Paul Buys and William of Orange. Yet although these connections made Herle 
invaluable, they also divided his loyalties. Herle‘s letters show how his own biases often 
factored into the reports and recommendations he made, particularly in his support of 
the Protestant Cause, the Dutch‘s right to rebel against Philip, and his dislike of Anjou. 
Furthermore, in his zeal to keep Elizabeth informed of major events in a timely manner, 
Herle sometimes overcompensated and moved into the realm of predicting rather than 
reporting events. This tendency was exemplified in Herle‘s disastrously premature 
report of Orange‘s death. 
 These observations about Herle‘s place in the English foreign service can be 
extrapolated outwards to wider observations about the inadequacies of Tudor foreign 
policy as a whole. Despite Herle‘s obvious biases and colossal mistakes, he retained his 
career in this area, and never seems to have been in true danger of losing his place. In 
fact, the next chapter details further sensitive work that Herle was trusted to undertake, 
most notably his embassies to East Friesland. This highlights the worrying possibility 
that if Herle was rewarded for such flawed service, perhaps he one of the better 
examples of this system in action. 
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Chapter V: The End of Herle’s Career 
In 1583 Herle was recalled from the Netherlands, possibly a delayed response to 
his mistake over Orange‘s ―death.‖ He again began uncovering conspiracies against the 
English government, especially the Throckmorton plot. This chapter will argue that 
Herle‘s involvement in this major Elizabethan conspiracy, has been mistakenly 
downplayed by historians, and that it significantly enhanced his career prospects by 
bringing him closer to Walsingham. Comparing Herle‘s reports to A Discouerie of 
Treason, the official version of the Throckmorton plot, shows that Herle‘s information 
was instrumental in uncovering the plot, and that the government edited this information 
for political reasons. Herle‘s success in uncovering the Throckmorton plot probably 
explains his appointment as ambassador to East Friesland to negotiate trade rights and 
block Spanish advances.  
While his three embassies to East Friesland were undoubtedly a significant 
achievement for Herle, they proved devastating to his interminably shaky finances. The 
ineffective Elizabethan foreign service relied on ambassadors paying their own way, 
perhaps with a small stipend, and recouping losses upon their return when they were 
rewarded with offices, titles and pensions. Herle received none of these, perhaps due to 
his failure in the second embassy, his record of tarrying too long on assignment, and his 
poor future prospects due to sickness. Herle died in 1588, abandoned by his patrons and 
deeply in debt. 
The Throckmorton Plot 
The primary conflict between Protestantism and Catholicism in the 1580s, in the 
Low Countries, impacted on English politics much less than the sporadic outbreaks of 
violence in France. What made the conflict between the Protestant Huguenots and 
Catholic Guisards important was the existence of Mary, Queen of Scots. As heir 
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presumptive to the English throne, and to some de jure queen of Scotland, Mary posed a 
unique danger to Elizabeth‘s regime. To Catholics, Mary symbolised their repression 
and persecution. To Protestants she threatened a return to the pyres of ―Bloody Mary‘s‖ 
reign. As first cousin to the Duke of Guise, many Englishmen held Mary responsible for 
the massacre of Protestants on St Bartholomew‘s Eve in 1572. 
 Mary‘s political significance was eclipsed throughout the 1570s by the English 
attempt to consolidate the two kingdoms‘ interests through the Anjou Match. By 1583 
these negotiations had broken down, partly because of intense opposition to Anjou‘s 
Catholicism. Since Elizabeth would now die childless, Mary represented a greater 
danger to Protestant England. Cecil had failed to push Elizabeth into executing Mary for 
the Ridolfi plot. He had been forced to settle for Norfolk‘s head. Yet the intervening 
years had only confirmed Cecil‘s conviction that Mary posed a mortal threat to him and 
his queen. With Cecil now Lord Treasurer and Walsingham Secretary, two of the most 
powerful men in England saw Mary as the single greatest threat to the regime‘s security.  
 Cecil exposed Mary‘s continued involvement in conspiracies to overthrow 
Elizabeth during what is generally called the Throckmorton plot, named after Francis 
Throckmorton, who was publicly tried as the ring-leader. Together with Sir Francis 
Englefield in the Low Countries, and Thomas Morgan in France, Francis Throckmorton 
formed what Stephen Alford has dubbed a ‗spidery network of conspirators.‘1 
Throckmorton acted as part advisor, part messenger, relaying letters between Morgan, 
Englefield, the French and Spanish ambassadors, and Mary. Walsingham‘s organised 
surveillance of the French embassy had first made him and Cecil aware of the 
conspirators. Like his success in the Ridolfi plot a decade earlier, Herle played a key 
role in this enterprise. By now he was one of the more experienced government 
intelligencers, a natural choice to aid in Walsingham‘s infiltration of the French 
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embassy. His earlier success, as well as his common reputation as Cecil‘s servant, 
meant that Herle took a less direct role in uncovering the Throckmorton plot. His 
contribution, nonetheless, was vital. 
Surveillance of the French Embassy 
 Herle maintained his interest in Low Countries affairs, but for most of 1583 he 
was stuck in London, perhaps due to his unpaid debts. He stayed in close contact with 
Cecil, but worked mostly with Walsingham. This was partly because when 
Walsingham‘s moved into Cecil‘s former position as Secretary, he became de facto 
spymaster. A more significant factor, however, was Walsingham and Cecil‘s morbid 
fear of Mary. This obviously entailed surveillance on prominent Catholics in London, 
particularly those connected to the Queen of Scots. Herle‘s considerable experience 
such work made him an obvious choice for Cecil to recommend to Walsingham. The 
Secretary may not have been entirely comfortable trusting Herle, undoubtedly Cecil‘s 
man, and this probably explains Herle‘s less ―hands on‖ role in the operation. 
Throughout the unravelling of the Throckmorton plot, Herle supervised Walsingham‘s 
own spies, reporting to the Secretary. Walsingham needed to maintain a certain distance 
from his agents, because their primary target was the French embassy, a suspected 
hotbed of pro-Marian activity. 
 In late April 1583, Walsingham‘s spy in the embassy informed him that 
‗someone called Herle came to our house.‘2 Although the spy‘s tone indicates he 
considered this visitor unimportant, Herle‘s name probably alerted Walsingham that 
Cecil‘s operations were overlapping with his own, so the Secretary contacted Cecil to 
organise a joint surveillance operation. John Bossy has described Michel de Castelnau, 
Henri III‘s ambassador to Elizabeth‘s court as ‗a genial and civilised man...genuinely 
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interested in England and the English...who got on with Elizabeth and her councillors.‘3 
Castelnau was therefore somewhat of a rarity amongst ambassadors to England, 
especially by comparison with his Spanish counterpart Don Bernardino de Mendoza, 
who frequently clashed with courtiers, and treated the English as hopelessly provincial 
heretics.
4
 Castelnau‘s political influence at court had waned since its zenith during the 
Anjou marriage negotiations a few years earlier, and his focus had gradually turned to 
working for Mary‘s release.5 He hoped that a free Mary, under French control, would 
restore France‘s former ties with Scotland. Her role as presumptive heir would not have 
escaped him. 
 Between 18 and 20 April 1583, Walsingham received several letters, signed 
―Henry Fagot,‖ from Salisbury Court, reporting visitors and events at the house. 
Castelnau kept an intellectual table at his embassy in Salisbury Court.
6
 One house-guest 
was Giordano Bruno, the Neapolitan author, philosopher, and poet. A lapsed priest in 
exile, Bruno used his considerable social skills to make himself welcome at many 
European courts.
7
 Around 13 April 1583, he arrived at Salisbury Court, carrying a letter 
from Henri III ordering Castelnau to take him into his household.
8
 Bossy has 
convincingly argued Fagot was Bruno. From the timing and content of Fagot‘s letters, 
Bossy concluded that he was ‗an Italian priest of anti-papal convictions.‘9 No evidence 
of Fagot exists before or after this period. Peter Costello has argued that Bossy‘s 
argument consists entirely of persuasive yet circumstantial evidence, but this chapter 
accepts Bossy‘s argument.10  
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 Fagot‘s letters described the ambassador dining with ‗M. Throckmorton,‘ who 
had ‗recently sent the Queen of Scots‘ £300.11 A wealthy young gentleman from a 
Catholic family, Throckmorton‘s association with Mary‘s supporters seems 
unsurprising. Similarly ‗Milord Henry [Howard], a Roman Catholic and Papist‘ came to 
the house that night to speak with the ambassador. Fagot also reported Herle‘s arrival at 
the embassy.
12
 Conversing with Castelnau in Italian, Herle told the ambassador that ‗he 
knew very well that [the English] were trying to make the French believe a lot of 
rubbish, but they were mistaken in thinking that the French would swallow it.‘13  
Fagot also noted that Herle was ‗an agent for the ambassador, but does not trust 
him.‘14 The phrasing is ambiguous about who did not trust whom, and Bossy follows 
the strict reading that Herle did not trust the ambassador, but the logical assumption 
would be that the ambassador did not trust Herle.
15
 By now Herle‘s affiliation with 
Cecil was well known, ruling out the double-cross that he managed by befriending 
Bailey during the Ridolfi plot. From Fagot‘s report, it seems that Herle was trying to 
impugn the veracity of previous intelligence the French had received from some 
Englishmen. What this information was, we have no way of knowing, although it may 
have come from sympathetic Catholics, since Herle informed Castelnau that ‗he was 
sure the Kings of Spain and France would put an end to all this nonsense,‘ suggesting 
that he was likely discussing an alliance between these two powers. 
Herle was at least partially vindicated later the same day, when a representative 
of the Spanish ambassador visited Castelnau, and indicated that an agreement between 
the French and Spanish monarchs could be reached.
16
 Amicable communication 
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between Mendoza and Castelnau significantly improved their previous relations, as 
Mendoza rabidly opposed the Anjou marriage in which Castelnau had invested so much 
effort.
17
 This changed relationship between the ambassadors alarmed the Queen and her 
councillors, who feared a Franco-Spanish alliance. By 1584, Castelnau could write to 
Mary that Elizabeth ‗has never been so suspicious of everybody or so nervous for her 
estate as she is at present, now fearing the king of Spain, now the king [of France], 
sometimes both together.‘18 Henri and Philip‘s interests were beginning to intersect 
around Mary and the restoration of Catholicism. The belief that Castelnau and Mendoza 
were actively collaborating with the Queen of Scots‘ supporters to bring this about 
crystallised over the next few months. 
In mid-June Fagot assured Walsingham that ‗the chief agents for the Queen of 
Scots are M. Throckmorton and Lord Henry Howard,‘ who only ever visited Castelnau 
at night.
19
 Furthermore, he informed Walsingham that he had ‗made the ambassador‘s 
secretary so much my friend that, if he is given a certain amount of money, he will let 
me know everything he does.‘20 Notably, the secretary offered Fagot Castelnau‘s 
correspondence with Mary, allowing Walsingham to alter its contents and reseal it 
before Mary was any the wiser. The identity of the secretary who passed information to 
Fagot remains unknown, but it is unlikely Herle had direct contact with him. Herle‘s 
surviving letters only detail meetings with Fagot, and he may have had no idea who the 
mole in the embassy was. 
Bossy speculates that Herle and Fagot‘s relationship began during the summer 
of 1583, sometime between May and August.
21
 By November 1583 they were certainly 
working together, as Herle sent Cecil a letter informing him, from Fagot, of the 
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movements of various persons at the embassy.
22
 The reason for this sudden detail was 
probably the recent arrests of Edward Arden and John Somerville, the latter having been 
captured on his way to London, where he planned to kill Elizabeth. The threat of 
assassination panicked Cecil and Walsingham into springing the trap on the 
Throckmorton conspirators prematurely, as they feared the two plots were linked. In 
preparation for rounding up those involved in the Throckmorton plot, Cecil probably 
asked Herle for an update on those who were visiting Castelnau. 
Herle described two conspirators, ‗Archeballd Duglasse & Kithe,‘ as having 
‗pryvate confference secrettly together.‘23 Herle particularly recommended that Douglas 
‗be looked unto, for he is a very practiser of the Scottish Q[ueen‘s] factyon, & yett 
ynsynuates himsellf into an oppynion of her majesties service.‘24 Herle claimed that 
Douglas had ‗dellt coninglye with som men of good sorte,‘ and tried to bribe him 
recently, ‗presumyng belyke that I had neede‘ of ready money. While Herle was 
certainly not the most honourable man in London, it seems unlikely that he would 
betray Cecil and his Queen. More probably, Herle included this detail to enhance the 
authenticity of his intelligence by emphasising that it was first-hand, and to subtly 
remind Cecil of his pressing debts. 
Bossy has argued that Fagot provided the substance of this letter, but it reflects 
Herle‘s method of tailoring his information to Cecil‘s prejudices.25 He spent an entire 
page reinforcing Cecil‘s fears of the international Catholic conspiracy, although the 
‗D[uke] of Gwise‘ rather than Philip was the ‗director of the action.‘26 Guise planned to 
marry Mary to an unnamed Catholic, to have England conferred upon him by the Pope, 
‗so as she [Mary] shall nott be establisshed esteemed Q[ueen] by her own right & 
pretensyons, butt meerely by the Popes collucyon.‘ This describes what became known 
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as the Throckmorton plot reasonably accurately, and was Cecil‘s first concrete 
information about it.  
Herle and the Howards 
The most likely candidate for the anonymous Catholic was Henry Howard, the 
executed Duke of Norfolk‘s younger brother. Herle seems to have held a grudge against 
him. His brother‘s execution left Howard the senior member of the most powerful 
conservative family in southern England. Herle repeated the popular rumour that 
Howard was ‗supposed to be a preest,‘ and ‗in the secrett register of the popes 
cardynalles.‘27 He informed Cecil that a relative of Howard‘s had ‗receved l[ett]res & 
reliqwes from beyond the seas,‘ indicating contact with exiled Catholics as well as the 
papacy, and ‗hath att this present a notable Jesuite desgysed in his service.‘ Herle did 
not name this disguised Jesuit, although in the margin next to ‗a notable Jesuite‘ he 
scribbled ‗among all the Jesuites,‘ indicating his importance in that order. Unfortunately 
Herle felt this identity too important to trust to writing, and promised to ‗secrettlye & 
faythfylly‘ advertise Cecil in person.28  
Bossy has claimed that these attacks on Howard came ‗undoubtedly from 
Fagot,‘ but Herle is the more likely source.29 Nothing said about Howard was exclusive 
knowledge to those living in the embassy, and while Fagot had no special reason to hate 
Howard, Herle had been intimately involved in Norfolk‘s downfall. While the Howards‘ 
power had been greatly diminished by their leader‘s execution, they remained a political 
force, and Henry Howard would have welcomed any chance to redeem his family‘s 
name at Cecil and Leicester‘s expense. Herle had been around the court and in Cecil‘s 
service long enough to understand these power dynamics. He would be far more willing 
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to see treachery in Howard‘s smallest misstep than would Fagot, an Italian priest who 
barely spoke English and spent the majority of his time in the embassy. 
 Similarly Herle elaborated on Francis Throckmorton‘s activities. Herle 
‗advertised master secretorye this last somer‘ about Throckmorton‘s involvement with 
the Catholics in the French embassy.
30
 Although the original letter to Walsingham has 
not survived, he summarised it for Cecil. Throckmorton had ‗long & pryvat conferencs‘ 
with the ambassador ‗att seasons suspyceows,‘ and participated in ‗masse their att 
severall tymes.‘ Herle concluded that Throckmorton was ‗very busy & an enemye to the 
present State.‘ Furthermore, Throckmorton‘s kinsman, Arthur Throckmorton, had dined 
with Castelnau, and his brother Thomas planned to leave England shortly with someone 
named Digby. Thomas Throckmorton and Digby were both ‗papists & noted of to carye 
yll & busy myndes.‘ In a few short paragraphs, Herle built up a picture of the 
Throckmorton family as a hotbed of Catholic resistance. When placed alongside his 
information about Howard and the Jesuits, Herle made a strong case for the corruption 
of England‘s some of leading families by Papal, French, and Marian agents. With such 
information arriving on their desks on a near daily basis, little wonder that Cecil and 
Walsingham tended towards paranoia. 
The day after this long letter, Herle wrote to Cecil about Howard again. This 
time he attacked Howard‘s ‗booke agaynst prophesyes,‘ which Herle claimed contained 
‗sondry heresyes & spyces withall of Treson.‘31 ‗Som lerned man...of good judgement,‘ 
who were ‗asswell qwalleffyed in state cawses, as devynitye‘ had so judged it.32 Herle 
cited the opinions of experts to impress upon Cecil that Howard‘s work was subversive. 
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Howard & Throckmorton’s Arrests 
 Between 16 and 20 November, Francis Throckmorton and Henry Howard were 
arrested.
33
 These arrests were premature, prompted by Arden and Somerville‘s arrests as 
noted above, and some of the conspirators escaped to write Leicester’s Commonwealth, 
attacking the Earl but leaving Cecil oddly unscathed.
34
 Howard‘s arrest probably 
resulted from Herle and Fagot‘s information, which also influenced Throckmorton‘s 
arrest. Tortured in the Tower, over the next few weeks Throckmorton‘s confession 
provoked Mendoza‘s expulsion, a fate Castelnau managed to avoid despite his 
complicity. However, Herle stepped up his surveillance of Castelnau, hoping that the 
capture of his fellow conspirators would panic the ambassador into revealing more. 
 On 23 November, Herle sent another detailed report to Cecil. He described 
Douglas visiting Castelnau days earlier for another ‗long & ernest consultacyon.‘35 
Herle must have either seen detailed notes of what they said, or spoken to another 
present at the covert meeting. In this case Bossy‘s chain of information from 
Castelnau‘s secretary to Fagot, then through Herle to Walsingham and Cecil, seems 
likely.
36
 Herle revealed that the discussion ‗cheeffly conserned the late l[ett]re receved 
from the Scottish Q[ueen]‘ by the ambassador.37 The conspirators feared that 
Walsingham had intercepted Mary‘s letter, and revealed ‗the secretts‘ to Elizabeth. 
Herle again damned Douglas as ‗ever a practiser & irreligyows, & a reveler in the end 
of all secretts to serve his own Torne.‘ Significantly, Douglas held secrets about Mary 
and the Guises. In a rather clumsy metaphor, Herle described Douglas as playing ‗with 
a verey long ij handed sword, that reches into mani places att ones, beyond this Iland.‘ 
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Herle alleged that after Douglas left, Castelnau discussed Throckmorton‘s 
capture with his secretary, wondering if he should go to Court and ‗by som cowrse of 
Terrificatyon‘ ‗withdrawe her majestie from procedyng to far in examnyneng these 
actyons.‘38 Castelnau may have contemplated threatening to withdraw French support 
from Elizabeth, hoping to push her into backing down.
39
 Herle claimed that Castelnau 
knew he needed to act quickly, because every moment Cecil and Walsingham had 
Throckmorton increased the likelihood of uncovering their ‗gretter fryndes, nott yett 
discoverd.‘40 The ‗gretter fryndes‘ were probably the Catholic Earls of Arundel and 
Northumberland, although Mary and Castelnau are possible candidates. The fact that 
Castelnau failed to act indicates that he realised exactly how tenuous his position was in 
England. Castelnau could not risk the chance that demanding Throckmorton‘s release 
would provoke Walsingham to examine their relationship more closely. 
 Herle‘s letter tried to make the French embassy central to a subversive Catholic 
plot to overthrow Elizabeth, focusing north of the border on the Scottish Earl of 
Angus.
41
 Herle accused Angus of choosing companions who were ‗ether discontented 
persons, or Recusants,‘ and servants who ‗were all notoryows papists.‘42 He assured 
Cecil that he ‗thought nott impertynent to have your wisdom acqwaynted therewith, to 
judge there & of theire effects, as in vallew they might import.‘43 Clearly Herle, like 
Cecil, perceived events in England and Scotland as closely linked, given the Marian 
sympathies amongst the nobility of both nations. As Elizabeth sent Walsingham to 
monitor the situation in Scotland within weeks, the authorities evidently shared Herle‘s 
concerns.
44
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 By early January 1584, after Walsingham returned from Scotland, Fagot began 
writing to him once again.
45
 Fagot named some of the same conspirators Herle had in 
his November communications, notably Douglas and Throckmorton. He confirmed 
Herle‘s previous warnings about Douglas, adding that ‗he has a pension from the 
ambassador.‘ Fagot also emphasised the widespread nature of the conspiracy. He also 
informed Walsingham of a Catholic prisoner in the Fleet prison, who ‗thanked God that 
M. Throckmorton had not told the truth of what he knew,‘ for then they would all be 
doomed. Given Herle‘s past imprisonment and connections in London, it is likely that 
Fagot received this information from him. 
 In February Herle told Walsingham more about Castelnau‘s visitors.46 This 
series of notes, probably a copy of Herle‘s own memo as they are not in his hand, is 
undated and was filed at the end of 1583 in the State Papers. However, its mention of 
Mendoza having been expelled from England places it after 21 January 1584.
47
 Herle‘s 
memo listed people who frequented the embassy: one of Mendoza‘s former employees 
named Curtois, Bishop Scory‘s son Sylvanus, and a French monk named Victor.48 
Sylvanus, a Catholic convert, formerly served the Earl of Leicester and was a notorious 
disappointment to his father who had been prominent in the Edwardian church.
49
 Victor, 
said Herle, was ‗sarvinge one Noel,‘ likely meaning Henry Noel. Noel was an 
influential courtier, able in 1583 to block prosecution of one of his servants for 
murdering a carman.
50
 None of this intelligence was probably to lead to more arrests, 
and Bossy notes the absence of information about the would-be assassin William 
                                               
45 Henry Fagot to Walsingham, January 1584, TNA SP 12/167, f.155r, original in French translated and 
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48 TNA SP 12/167/57, f.154r. 
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Parry‘s clandestine visits during the same period.51 While Parry was no Throckmorton 
or Howard, there seems no reason why Herle and Fagot should not mention him. 
A Discouerie of Treason 
 While Herle‘s surveillance of the French embassy continued, Throckmorton was 
executed for high treason. At his trial Throckmorton claimed his confession had been 
falsely extracted, a claim that worried the government enough to publish a pamphlet 
decrying his change of heart. A Discouerie of the Treasons Practised and Attempted 
Against the Queenes Maiestie and the Realme by Francus Throckemorton appeared in 
1584 and, like Salutem in Christo and The Copie of a Letter did for the Ridolfi plot, 
provided the government‘s version of events.52 Like these earlier pamphlets, A 
Discouerie of Treason was published anonymously as ‗a letter sent from a Gentleman of 
Lions Inne to his friend,‘ although it is often attributed to Cecil.53 The pamphlet gives us 
a clearer understanding of Herle‘s place in Walsingham‘s operation. Furthermore, by 
examining the government‘s response in light of Herle‘s writings, we can see what 
information they included or left out, a factor which can tell us much about the author‘s 
intentions. 
A Discouerie of Treason was concerned primarily with undermining 
Throckmorton‘s allegations that his confession had been falsely extracted, and was 
contained ‗mere inuentions of himself by police [policy] to auoyde the torture.‘54 To 
answer these accusations, the pamphlet gave a detailed review of the events around 
Throckmorton‘s arrest. It was based upon ‗secret intelligence giuen to the Queenes 
Maiestie,‘ a phrase which suggests that Herle‘s reporting of the ‗long & pryvat 
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53 William Cecil, A Discouerie of the Treasons Practised and Attempted Against the Queenes Maiestie 
and the Realme, by Francis Throckemorton, London: C. Barker, 1584, STC 24051, no sig., page facing 
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conferencs‘ between Throckmorton and Castelnau was instrumental.55 The pamphlet 
emphasised Throckmorton‘s role as a courier between Mary and ‗certaine Catholique 
Noblemen and gentlemen‘ whose names were discovered amongst Throckmorton‘s 
papers.
56
 Although Herle described Castelnau as the link between Throckmorton, Mary, 
and other Catholics, Mendoza was depicted as Throckmorton‘s primary co-conspirator, 
to whom he ‗resorted often,‘ and who ‗did incourage him therein.‘57 Castelnau‘s 
complete absence from the tract makes a revealing contrast.  
From what Herle told Cecil and Walsingham, we know that the ambassador was 
deeply implicated in the plot. The fact that A Discouerie of Treason does not mention 
him implies that Elizabeth and Cecil did not want to alienate France. Mendoza had been 
a constant irritant since his arrival, while Castelnau had become close with several 
councillors during the Anjou negotiations, and in the tense international situation 
England needed the French. After the decision to expel Mendoza, Elizabeth needed 
friendly relations with Henri to prevent any prospect of a Franco-Spanish Catholic 
alliance against England. Henri resolved the situation in November 1584 by recalling 
Castelnau to France. 
 A Discouerie of Treason hinted at the spectre of international Catholicism that 
Herle described. Amongst Throckmorton‘s papers were ‗twelve petidegrees of the 
discent of the Crowne of England...in the defence of the pretended title of the Scottish 
Queene.‘58 These papers had been ‗printed and published by the Bishop of Ross,‘ and 
were probably similar to those Herle had reported Bailey carried over from France for 
the Bishop a decade earlier.
59
 In Cecil‘s eyes, and like Ridolfi‘s plan, the Throckmorton 
plot involved a foreign invasion backed by English Catholics and ‗agreed on by the 
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Scottish Queene and her confederats in France,‘ Rome, and Spain.60 The pamphlet 
named the Duke of Guise as ‗the principall leader and executor of that inuasion.‘ All 
that prevented the Duke from invading was ‗the assistance of a conuenient partie in 
England to joyne with the forraine forces, and...howe to let the Scottish Queene at 
libertie without peril of her person.‘  
Herle’s Ambassadorship to East Friesland 
Throughout the early 1580s, Elizabeth refrained from openly confronting Spain 
in the Netherlands, providing only secret financial assistance to Anjou and the Dutch.
61
 
Leicester and Walsingham urged direct involvement, but Anjou used the marriage 
negotiations to convince the Queen that he could represent her interests, keeping 
England out of the Netherlands. Anjou‘s poor leadership contributed to the loss of 
strategic towns to the Spanish, before he returned to France in June 1583. Anjou died in 
June 1584, leaving the Huguenot Henry of Navarre embroiled in conflict to pursue his 
claim as the French heir presumptive, and William of Orange was assassinated in July. 
This sudden power vacuum in the Netherlands coincided with the formation of the 
French Catholic League, a paramilitary organisation under the control of the Guisards. 
The Catholic League looked to Spain for funds and guidance, a fact which confirmed 
Cecil and Walsingham‘s suspicions about the pan-European Catholic conspiracy, but 
more immediately kept the French out of the Netherlands.  
 In mid-1584 Elizabeth posted Herle to Emden, the main trading port in the 
northern Netherlands province of East Friesland. As reward for his work in uncovering 
the Throckmorton plot, Herle received the diplomatic post he had pursued for so many 
years. This posting meant Herle left his more accustomed milieux in Antwerp for 
extensive periods, and achieved what could be considered the apex of his career.  
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Herle‘s instructions were to ascertain the Counts of East Friesland‘s views on 
Spanish rule in the Netherlands.
62
 Walsingham feared that Philip was negotiating for 
unrestricted access to Emden‘s waterways, outflanking Dutch defences by opening up 
the northern provinces of the Low Countries. Herle was to persuade Count Edzar, who 
controlled the greatest part of the rivers in question, to oppose Philip‘s attempts to 
‗increase his greatnes in thes parts to the preiudice of th'Empire and the whole state of 
Christendom.‘ Siding with Philip, warned Walsingham, would bring the Count‘s 
forcible conversion to Catholicism or deposition. If Edzar refused, Herle was instructed 
to ask the neighbouring Protestant German princes to pressure the Count.
63
 
It reflected the limitations of English diplomacy in the Empire that 
Walsingham‘s instructions were vague about how Herle was expected to accomplish his 
embassy and his powers of negotiation. In late July, Herle raised this issue with Cecil, 
asking for advice on his negotiations in Emden, explaining that his instructions had not 
been detailed enough to fully understand what was expected of him.
64
 The fact that 
Herle addressed this query to Cecil, rather than questioning Walsingham, reflects his 
appreciation of the delicacy of his relationship with Walsingham. It also indicates that 
although Herle had worked with Walsingham‘s agents during the Throckmorton plot, 
Cecil ensured that Herle received the diplomatic post. 
 A little over a month after receiving his instructions, on July 22 1584, Herle still 
lingered in Amsterdam, which he blamed on ‗contrarie wyndes‘ and ‗wante of 
convenient shipping.‘65 Herle‘s report to Elizabeth described local events in such detail 
and at such length that he felt compelled to apologise for having ‗exceeded muche the 
proportion and limittes of a l[ett]re to a Quene my Soveraigne.‘66 Herle confessed he 
‗thought not fitt to judge‘ the wheat from the chaff. Together with his tardiness in 
                                               
62 Unknown scribe (annotations by Walsingham) to Herle, 8 June 1584, TNA SP 82/1/75, f.72r. 
63 ibid., f.72v. 
64 Herle to Cecil, 29 July 1584, BL MS Lansdowne 43, f.24v. 
65 Herle to Elizabeth I, 22 July 1584, Bodleian MS Rawlinson C 424, ff.1r, 6v. 
66 ibid., f.6v. 
128 
 
carrying out the Queen‘s orders, this was a major blunder, since providing judicious 
summaries constituted a large part of an ambassador‘s work.67 Overworked senior 
officials like Cecil and Walsingham waded through mountains of paperwork each day, 
and needed their subordinates to sift important intelligence from the masses of 
information they accrued. Herle could never be described as concise, but his reports 
from this period are particularly prolix. He seems to have been so carried away by the 
status of the position he had finally gained that he became loquacious with 
consequence. 
The main topic of conversation in Amsterdam was the repercussions of the 
assassination of William of Orange. Herle reassured Elizabeth that far from crippling 
efforts against the Spanish, the Prince‘s murder caused the locals to swear revenge on 
‗the Tirant of Spaine‘ and to ‗defende their Religion and liberties...even to the last drop 
of their blood.‘68 Further, said Herle, the Dutch wished to be ruled by neither the French 
nor the Spanish, and hoped instead that the Queen would assume sovereignty of the 
Netherlands. Herle tailored his report to Elizabeth‘s vanity, claiming that the Dutch 
called her ‗their Savior, and the Princesse of greatest perfection in wisedome and 
sinceritie that ever governed.‘ 
Herle told Elizabeth that Orange‘s assassin, a Frenchman named Balthasar 
Gérard, was a Jesuit, information that would help Cecil and Walsingham‘s attempts to 
push the Queen towards a more radical anti-Catholic position.
69
 Jesuits were infamous 
for their resistance theory, that heretical ―tyrants‖ could be murdered in God‘s service, 
and Gérard‘s attack seemed to be evidence of this practice. The government‘s attack on 
Jesuit missionaries continued throughout the 1580s. Cecil published his anti-Jesuit 
propaganda, The Execution of Justice in England, in December 1583, and Herle had 
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taken two dozen copies in various languages ‗touching the justice in England executed 
upon those Jesuites and Seminaries, not for religion, but for treason.‘70  
Herle knew that identifying the assassin as a Jesuit would support his insinuation 
that Elizabeth faced similar threats from the Jesuits within England. ‗It is a maxime 
among them,‘ wrote Herle, ‗that they be all Judithes, that kill princes, and ar therfore 
stirred up and warranted by the Pope to be canonized for the same.‘71 He claimed no 
shortage of Jesuits willing to do the deed, since ‗it is well knowne, that there ar entred 
above vij score lurking Jesuites into the Realme of late, and they doe secretly repaire 
more and more.‘72 
 A week later Herle updated Cecil on his progress. He apologised for the fact that 
he still had not reached Emden, reiterating his excuses to Elizabeth.
73
 Most of the 
information in this letter was stale, repeated from his previous report, because, 
explained Herle, Walsingham had conveyed ‗her majesties plesure I sholld dyrect mi 
packett to her alone.‘ Herle apologised in advance for sending fewer updates to Cecil 
than usual, claiming that it was due to the ‗obedyence I carye to her majesties wyll & 
nott to want of dutye.‘  
 Herle‘s warning proved accurate, as his next surviving letter from Emden dates 
from 3 October 1584. It informed Walsingham that Herle had sent a ‗packett of 
l[ett]res...conteyneng at large the substance of that which I have negocyated here.‘74 
Unfortunately these letters, and the details of Herle‘s negotiations, are lost. Herle found 
them frustrating: 
The pryncipall cawse which I do handell here is so Towghe, & these 
persons so slowe & dull of capacytye that I have to dele with, as that I 
canott hitherunto com to any conclusion. 
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Yet Herle felt that the negotiations were approaching success. ‗I have so Labord the on 
& the other,‘ wrote Herle, ‗that I hope in God to conclude verey shortly their differencs, 
to her majesties highe comendacyon.‘ No further letters from Herle about this 
ambassadorship to East Friesland survive, although more can be gleaned from a Privy 
Council letter of 1585, after England‘s stance on the Netherlands had altered 
dramatically. 
Herle’s Second Journey to East Friesland 
By 1585 Cecil and Walsingham had convinced Elizabeth that the decline of 
Dutch fortunes meant England could no longer remain ostensibly neutral in the conflict. 
John Norris was dispatched to the Netherlands with a small professional force of 2,500 
men, with orders to prevent Parma from taking Antwerp. Although Antwerp fell shortly 
after Norris‘ arrival, Leicester soon arrived to command a larger expeditionary force. 
Despite this, the Queen still sought to avoid full-scale war with Spain, and continued to 
entertain negotiations for peace up until 1588.
75
 If Elizabeth wished to avoid leading the 
Dutch rebels to victory, she could have hardly picked a more appropriate general than 
Leicester.  
In March 1585, the Privy Council informed Leicester about the situation in 
Emden. In the months since Herle returned to England, the count had complained to 
Elizabeth about ‗many wronges, spoyles & injuryes‘ he felt the Dutch had done to 
him.
76
 Elizabeth referred the matter to Leicester for mediation, ‗as Lieutenat Generall of 
her forces in thos Countryes.‘ The Council ordered Leicester to send an envoy to 
Emden, and Cecil recommended Herle as ‗one best acquaintid and of sufficient credite 
already‘ with the Count.77 Leicester was free to choose another ambassador, ‗though it 
[would] be hard to fynd any meter for this purpose‘ than Herle. On the other hand, 
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while Elizabeth agreed that Herle was the best choice, the Privy Council reported that 
she ‗hathe noted some slackenes in him in executyon of the charges that have heretofore 
ben comyted unto him,...tarryeng long in the places to which he hath bene sent.‘78 
Herle‘s habit of hiding from his debts overseas when given important responsibilities, 
had become a problem for the Queen.  
 Despite Elizabeth‘s reservations, Leicester gave Herle the task. No letters from 
Herle dealing with this mission survive, and we must piece together scraps of 
information from many other sources. Herle had been sent to ensure that English 
merchants could access Emden unimpeded, and Leicester expected his ambassador‘s 
success. He wrote to Cecil between May and June 1585: 
For the passage of our merchants to Emden I have delt for yt reasonably 
I dowbt not & do look for the retorn of William Herll whome I sent a 
month synce thether.
79
 
Judging Cecil‘s note about matters to discuss with the Queen, it seems Herle‘s second 
visit to Emden did not go smoothly. Contrary to Herle‘s previous expectations, the 
Count was now ‗wholly devoted to the K[ing] of Spayne,‘ perhaps because he had 
‗lately receaved the order of the golden fleese.‘80 The Count‘s ‗intertaynment was could 
& contemptible,‘ conveying ‗that he was indifferent, to talk either peace, or war.‘ Cecil 
recommended that the ‗benefitt of the trade & traffick of our marchants‘ be withheld 
from the Count in future.  
Herle‘s failed mission was an orphan no-one wanted to acknowledge, let alone 
pay for. Privy Councillors avoided the subject. Cecil made a note to discuss ‗the 
successe [result] of William Herles employement towardes the E[arl] of Emden‘ with 
the other Councillors.
81
 However, Leicester later noted that ‗her majestie cannot be 
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induced to beare William Herles charges.‘82 As Herle was officially mediating between 
Emden and the Estates General, argued Leicester, the cost of his travel ‗ought to be 
borne by the States.‘ Leicester‘s own expedition was massively under-funded and 
therefore he was attempting to cut corners by foisting the costs of Herle‘s travel and 
upkeep onto the Dutch. No details survive of who paid for Herle‘s travel, but judging by 
his rapidly increasing debts Herle was probably left to foot the bill himself. 
 Herle spent the months between June and August 1585 in London, ‗extremely 
sick,‘ and unable to go to court.83 He saw this as a major impediment to his 
reimbursement and further employment, and asked Cecil to recommend him to 
Elizabeth. A delegation from the Low Countries was due to arrive in London. Herle 
pointed out that since a number of the delegation‘s members ‗have allredie insinuated 
them selves unto me,‘ he would be able to gather additional information from them, to 
aid English negotiators. Unfortunately for Herle, he remained ‗greviously sicke,‘ unable 
to capitalise on his ties to the Dutch envoys because he could ‗scarce walke in my 
Chaumber.‘84 Even by August 1585, Herle remained ‗wasted with melancholie,‘ and 
‗not hable to travaile for my self.‘85 He asked Cecil to remind the Queen of his recent 
service, and pass on to her his assessment of the situation in East Friesland. Regrettably 
Cecil was also sick and absent from Court.
86
 Both Herle and Cecil were tired and ill, a 
fact which probably contributed to the disagreement over the Treasurer‘s letters 
discussed in Chapter III which occurred at this point.
87
 Cecil was also possibly still 
angry with Herle over his failure in Emden. 
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Herle’s Third Journey to East Friesland 
 By December 1585 Herle‘s disagreement with Cecil was sufficiently forgotten 
that Herle felt able to send the Lord Treasurer a substantial memorandum on the state of 
the Low Countries, intended for the Queen.
88
 Herle recommended comprehensive anti-
Spanish action in the Low Countries. Any measure taken against Philip was reasonable, 
argued Herle, because he had conspired to destroy ‗your person and kingdom, to satisfie 
his unmeasurable ambition, that aspires to the vth monarchie of the worlde, under his 
unlawfull Catholick title.‘89 Herle‘s reference to the fifth monarchy drew on apocalyptic 
ideas of a final universal empire described in the book of Daniel, which heralded the 
end of days.
90
 Indeed, this letter is far more religious in tone than the majority of 
Herle‘s reports. He describes Philip as ‗an heretick,...the usurper of Kingdomes, and the 
subverter of Goddes trew religion,‘ a foe Elizabeth was duty-bound to oppose.91 Herle 
asked the Queen to burn ‗these my papers and observacons, for I have none to beholde 
nor trust to, but yourself.‘92 She obviously ignored his request; somewhat ironically, 
given the number of Herle‘s other letters which have been lost. 
Herle suggested renewed negotiations with the Count of Emden to open East 
Friesland‘s waterways to English ships, and close them to the Spanish.93 This evidently 
appealed to Elizabeth, as Herle made another journey to Emden in 1586. The only 
evidence about this journey is Leicester‘s passing mention in August. He informed 
Cecil that he was ‗faine to referre all things to the report of Master Herle, especially 
touching the matter of Embden,...wherin he can thorowly advertise you what is doon, 
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being imployed there for her majesty.‘94 A few days later he assured Cecil that despite 
his earlier lapses, Herle had ‗taken great travell in this voyage to Emden,‘ and ‗byn 
carefull to do me all servyce for hir majestie that he could for his havior.‘95 Herle must 
have gone to East Friesland significantly before August. By 22 August 1586 he had 
returned to his lodgings at Temple Bar in London. In October he wrote ‗I have spent vij 
moneths, beyng a poore man‘ which helps date his trip to March 1586, and shows that 
he still had not been reimbursed for his expenses.
96
  
Immediately upon his return in August, Herle reported to Cecil. Though he had 
been careful to avoid delays this time, he had been ‗most dangerowsly tossed att seas 
with contrary wyndes, with excedyng stormes, & with incredible lightnyng & 
thonders.‘97 Exhausted by his travails, Herle promised to make his report in person the 
next day. If he submitted a detailed written report of his actions in East Friesland it has 
disappeared. His next letter to Cecil, however, claims that Herle ‗well served‘ the Queen 
and her merchants ‗preserved from undoyng att Embden.‘98 Herle‘s mention of 
merchants suggests he had been negotiating over England‘s trade interests in the 
northern Netherlands. With the southern Netherlands increasingly under Spanish 
dominance, Elizabeth needed to secure the northern route to the German states and their 
lucrative markets.  
Herle attempted to leverage some recompense from the success of his latest 
mission. Herle described the outcome of his mission with cloying false humility: 
Whatt honor it dyd purchasse to [her] majestie in those partes, whatt 
assurance to our Traffyck & merchants & how grett obligacion in Erlle 
Edzard, for the favor Receved, by her majesties procurement, is fitter for 
your L[ordship] to judge, than for me [to] expresse.
99
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Nevertheless, Herle asked ‗that mi expences & dyett be answerd.‘100 Leicester had 
assured him ‗that ‗servants ar nott to bere the charge of their Soveraignes service,‘ but 
his last journey to East Friesland cost him £300 ‗of myne own purse.‘ Herle had not, he 
claimed, ‗receved of her majestie‘ £800 ‗to this daye in recompense of all mi poore 
services.‘ Herle begged Cecil to ‗hellp mi cawse‘ when Walsingham returned to Court. 
 Herle‘s inability to gain reimbursement for his diplomatic services was not an 
uncommon problem amongst Elizabethan ambassadors. Valentine Dale, ambassador in 
Paris between 1573 and 1576, accumulated a large debt which he never paid off.
101
 
Robert Beale was given a diet of £2 per day as ambassador to the German princes in 
1577-1578, but claimed that his journey cost him far more than this.
102
 Even Sir 
Nicholas Throckmorton, given a magnificent allowance of plate with which to impress 
the French during his 1559 embassy in Paris, was forced to take out a loan of £1,000 to 
cover his expenses.
103
 This frugality on Elizabeth‘s part could cause serious problems, 
probably contributing to Sir Edward Stafford‘s acceptance of 3,000 crowns from the 
Duke of Guise to allow him to read the reports Stafford sent to Elizabeth.
104
  The only 
way to recoup such losses was through further service, with the hope that this would 
eventually lead to a lucrative position or pension. Walsingham himself had experienced 
significant financial difficulties when he was appointed ambassador to Paris in 1570 
with a diet of £3/6/8 per day, but easily paid off his debts after being appointed 
Secretary and Privy Councillor on 20 December 1573.
105
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In January of 1587, still apparently deeply in debt, Herle attempted to repeat his 
previous success in the Netherlands by asking Cecil to post him there. Although the 
letter is badly damaged, Herle clearly hoped the Treasurer would be ‗disposed to 
employe me in Holland‘ so that he could work on Cecil‘s behalf and strive ‗withall mi 
skyll & diligence to obey yow.‘106 When this last attempt to recover his finances 
through service failed, he asked for Elizabeth‘s permission to leave England. ‗I have 
nether fee lefte to serve her, nether credite nor hope to mayntayne mi sellf longer, nor 
ever had land or office, to tye me‘ to England, claimed Herle. Now he sought leave ‗to 
gett mi lyveng abrode.‘107 Herle also hoped for ‗her graciows Testymoniall & favor, for 
mi loyall behavior & duty contynewed, to her majestie & the State, duryng mi service.‘ 
With these two last gifts, Herle declared, ‗I shall holld my sellf fully satisfyed & 
rewarded.‘ Despite his complaints about lack of rewards, Herle promised to maintain 
his ties with Cecil, stating that ‗yf I lyve & prevayll abrode your L[ordship] shall fynde, 
that I will nott be undutifull for your honorable goodnes towards me wherof I have very 
largely tasted.‘108  
Herle’s Death 
While Herle‘s last letter contains many of the same complaints about his debts 
and Elizabeth‘s failure to reward his services, it also contains evidence of his impending 
death. In the month between 12 April 1588, when Herle again asked Cecil for 
permission to travel to Germany, and 3 May 1588, Herle‘s health went rapidly 
downhill.
109
 ‗I have bin of late,‘ he complained, ‗at dethes dore, escaping the going in 
very narowly, butt God in the myddest of mi greves & angwisshes, doth still releve & 
                                               
106 BL MS Cotton Galba C XI, f.76r. 
107 BL MS Lansdowne 55, f.217r. 
108 ibid., ff.217r-217v. 
109 Herle to Cecil, 12 April 1588, BL MS Lansdowne 58, ff.67r-67v; Herle to Cecil, 3 May 1588, TNA SP 
12/210/4, ff.7r-7v. 
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delyver me.‘110 Herle‘s escape from death, cannot have been quite as narrow as he 
claimed, because he still hoped to travel in Europe if given ‗leve for mi departure.‘ Yet 
despite this, the letter reads very much as a final appeal. Herle, having written little 
about his religious convictions previously, used the language of a man who felt his 
death was imminent. ‗There is a God that beholldeth & censureth all things, otherwise 
unkyndenes & greeff, had long synce kylled me,‘ wrote Herle. His mention of 
‗unkyndenes‘ was likely in response to Cecil‘s indifference at Herle‘s plight. ‗Yf He 
that forgave mi synes, most paye mi detts, I humbly refferre it to his devyne goodnes & 
dispensation, that sees the cleerenes & grownd of mi conscyens on that behallf, 
byddyng the worlld A diew.‘ 
This letter of 3 May 1588 was Herle‘s last, and he died shortly afterwards. 
Although his exact date of death remains unknown, we know he died at some point 
between writing this letter and Leicester‘s death on 4 September 1588.111 A packet of 
Herle‘s letters in the National Archives bears the inscription: 
L[ett]res to W[illia]m Herle from my L[ord] Burghley L[ord] Tresoror of 
England, found amongst his wrytyngs and brought to the Erle of Lecester 
at the deth of Herle.
112
 
A date closer to May than September would seem likely, given the lack of further letters 
from the normally prolific Herle, and Leicester‘s preoccupation with preparations 
against the Armada that summer. Robyn Adams notes that the administration of Herle‘s 
goods was granted on 8 February 1589.
113
 Considering Herle‘s dire financial straits at 
the time of his death, he would have had little to pass on to any surviving relatives. 
* 
                                               
110 TNA SP 12/210/4, f.7r. 
111 Adams, ‗Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester (1532/3-1588).‘ 
112 Cecil to Herle, 18 August 1585, TNA SP 12/181/43. 
113 Prerogative Court of Canterbury, London, ‗William Herle St Clement without the bar of the New 
Temple, London, 1589, f.90,‘ Edward Alexander Fry (ed.), Index of Wills Proved in the Prerogative 
Court of Canterbury, Vol.3 (1558-1604), London: British Records Society, 1907, p.79. Cited in Adams 
‗‗Both Diligent and Secret,‘ p.11.  
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 This chapter has charted the last years of Herle‘s life, beginning with the 
Throckmorton plot and ending with his death. It has argued that Herle‘s role in 
uncovering the Throckmorton plot was greater than previous historians have believed, 
and that his description of the plot‘s main elements was probably the first accurate 
information that Cecil received about its scope. It further argued that Herle was 
responsible for the early emphasis placed on Henry Howard in reports of conspirators, a 
focus Herle encouraged due to his belief that undermining Howard would ensure 
Cecil‘s continued dominance, as Norfolk‘s execution had a decade earlier. The 
comparison of the raw intelligence contained within Herle‘s reports to the government 
account in A Discouerie of Treason shows how the information Herle provided was 
edited for political purposes.  
The diplomatic high point of Herle‘s career during his embassies to East 
Friesland merely added to his mounting debts. The high cost of embassies was a 
problem common to Elizabethan administrators, and could only be solved through 
gaining sufficient rewards to counter any debts run up during Crown service. While 
some ambassadors were rewarded amply, Herle was not. Although two of his three 
embassies to East Friesland seem to have been successful, his one failure seems to have 
been enough to convince Cecil and Elizabeth that he did not have the necessary abilities 
to become a career diplomat. Herle‘s rapidly deteriorating health, his quarrel with Cecil 
detailed in Chapter III, and his mistaken report of Orange‘s death described in Chapter 
IV, probably all contributed to Herle‘s superiors‘ abandonment of him in his final 
months.   
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Conclusion 
 This thesis has analysed William Herle‘s letters in their historical context. In 
doing so, it has provided new insights into both his life and the wider Elizabethan 
world. While previous historians have largely ignored Herle, we now have a detailed 
study of Herle‘s life in its historical context to complement the extensive literary 
analysis of his letters that Robyn Adams has published over the last five years. This 
study has shown that a focus on the more unsavoury aspects of Herle‘s life led previous 
historians to dismiss his significance prematurely. Conyers Read‘s judgement of Herle 
has enjoyed unwarranted longevity through others‘ willingness to focus on Herle‘s 
involvement in the Ridolfi plot to the exclusion of other aspects of his life. Through 
reassessing Herle‘s life as a whole, we have seen that his role as a spy and stool pigeon 
was only one small facet of his remarkably active and varied career. 
 The first chapter introduced us to two of the overarching themes of this thesis: 
the dual nature of Herle‘s career, and his life-long association with his patron, William 
Cecil. Herle was unremarkable amongst the Tudor gentry in his early life, leaving no 
records behind and entering into the lucrative trade with Antwerp under the tutelage of 
Sir William Garrard. When Elizabeth took the throne in 1559 Herle‘s life changed 
completely, as he was brought into Crown service while Cecil became Secretary of 
State. This proved the first of many times in which Herle reinvented himself to advance 
his career. While Herle enjoyed five years of success in his new role negotiating loans 
for the government in Antwerp, his career derailed in 1565 by increasing debts and 
accusations of piracy. 
 Chapter II detailed Herle‘s role in the Ridolfi plot, and his reports of other 
conspiracies in its aftermath. Having ended any chance of a respectable career in 
finance with his foray into piracy, Herle expanded the intelligence gathering role he had 
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dabbled in over the preceding decade into his primary occupation. He played a crucial 
role in uncovering the Ridolfi plot and entrapping its instigators, a success which he 
failed to replicate through his further efforts as a spy.  
The third chapter emphasised the centrality of Herle‘s patronage ties to his life. 
A solid patron-client relationship was vital to his social standing, career advancement, 
and even his survival. While he cultivated a number of powerful patrons, his ties to 
Cecil were the most important consideration in Herle‘s life. Cecil provided protection 
and rewards for useful service. It was only through the Secretary‘s frequent intervention 
that Herle‘s creditors were kept at bay, with stallments preventing those less well 
connected than Herle from collecting on his numerous debts. While Herle received a 
number of rewards for his service they tended to be lost soon after. The lease in 
reversion he received for his work in the Ridolfi plot was discharged early to pay off his 
creditors and his office of Rhaglaw in Cardiganshire was sold back to the locals. This 
thesis has argued that even the monopoly Herle received on oil production was given up 
to settle his debt with the Waads. The only office he seems to have held for an extended 
period of time was as the gentleman porter in the Tower. 
We have seen that the primary reason for Herle‘s interminable indebtedness was 
the inefficiencies of the English civil service. Herle‘s positions took him overseas for 
extended periods of time, particularly to the Netherlands as detailed in Chapter IV, 
where he was forced to pay his own way through taking out loans in the absence of 
government funding. Herle experienced similar problems recouping the losses he 
incurred during his embassies to East Friesland, and his difficulties were shared by 
many other Elizabethan ambassadors, indicating the problem was with the system rather 
than Herle. While he always attempted to recoup his losses upon returning to England, 
Elizabeth and Cecil preferred to force his creditors to wait for repayment, rather than 
paying back Herle‘s loans for him. While this gave Herle temporary relief, it proved a 
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long term disaster for his finances, as his debt compounded with every new posting. 
This was the dark side of the patronage system, with those in power abusing Herle‘s 
dependence on their benevolence and pushing him into a cycle of poverty he could 
never hope to escape from. 
While Herle remained useful to his patrons, they acted on his behalf. This was 
particularly noticeable in his early career, with Cecil organising Herle‘s release from 
prison and providing a letter of recommendation for Herle to press a marriage suit. The 
fact that these actions on Herle‘s behalf decreased over the course of his career implies 
that it was future, rather than past, service which motivated his patrons‘ generosity. As a 
young man who was largely unknown and with a lifetime of potential service ahead of 
him Herle was useful to Cecil, and he exerted this leverage to substantial reward. As his 
profile raised and his ties to Cecil became widely known, however, Herle‘s utility as a 
spy decreased. He expended much of his credit with Cecil and Elizabeth in an attempt to 
find more secure offices, but never managed to find one that would allow him to both 
maintain his patronage ties and make his fortune. 
Herle‘s conflict with Cecil in 1585 over his alleged dispersal of the Lord 
Treasurer‘s letters proved a watershed moment in his life. While Herle maintained a 
solid business relationship with Cecil after their disagreement, the amicable tone which 
characterised their early letters was markedly absent from later communications. 
Herle‘s move from a narrow but solid patronage base with Cecil to a wider but weaker 
one that utilised Cecil, Leicester, and Walsingham‘s influence proved problematic for 
him in the long term. His inability to leverage their professed support into concrete 
benefits was exemplified by his failure to garner the position of clerk to the Privy 
Council. Despite support from both Cecil and Leicester for Herle‘s bid, Hatton‘s 
candidate received the post ahead of him. 
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While Herle failed to turn the patronage system fully to his benefit, this was 
clearly not the case with all the Elizabethan gentry. Thomas Waad was noted in Chapter 
III as an example of someone of similar social standing to Herle who was able to gain 
far more from his patronage ties to Cecil and Walsingham than Herle ever did. As we 
saw, this success was less about Waad‘s comparative merit than it was his age and the 
timing of his rewards. Herle was middle aged before he received his first real 
ambassadorship, in the form of his three journeys to East Friesland that were detailed in 
Chapter V, whereas Waad acted as secretary to various ambassadors from his early 
twenties. Herle‘s liminal status, moving between intelligencer, diplomat, and criminal 
throughout his life, meant that he was unable to concentrate on a single area long 
enough to climb up the social ladder. 
Despite the extremes that Herle experienced in his career, he remained a 
gentleman all his life. His massive debts and frequent imprisonment had no lasting 
effect on his social standing, nor did the bestowal of the office of Rhaglaw or his 
appointment to ambassadorships. Herle‘s experiences are indicative of a wider lack of 
social mobility in Elizabethan society. While truly exceptional individuals such as Cecil 
and Walsingham transcended the stratification of Elizabethan society, for the majority 
any rise or fall was a generational process. Herle was born a member of the gentry, and 
died as such. 
The litigious nature of Elizabethan society is apparent throughout Herle‘s letters. 
While no Chancery Court records of Herle‘s cases survive, we have seen his 
involvement in a wide variety of legal battles reflected in his writings. From his 
deposition for piracy, to his protracted legal battles with the Waad brothers and the 
Cardiganshire gentry, to his numerous creditors suing him for unpaid debts, Herle was 
clearly an active member of one of the most litigious societies in world history. If other 
Elizabethans of his social standing were as prolifically legalistic as Herle, while leaving 
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similarly few official records of such, then this aspect of Tudor society has been 
substantially underestimated by the current historiography. 
Perhaps most interestingly, Herle‘s letters have provided us with an 
unprecedented insight into the mindset of some of the most powerful men in 
Elizabethan England. Herle‘s experiences show how significant Cecil‘s fear of an 
international Catholic conspiracy was in the formation of English foreign and domestic 
policy. While Walsingham and Leicester‘s opinions are not as clearly implied in Herle‘s 
letters as Cecil‘s are, the fact that Herle copied many of his detailed reports on the 
conspiracy to these councillors indicates that the core of the Elizabethan Privy Council 
maintained a pessimistic, perhaps even alarmist, view of the international situation. The 
dichotomous view of the world as divided into good and evil, that historians such as 
Collinson, Lake, and Smith have argued was central to early modern thinking, has been 
confirmed in Herle‘s letters, with the addendum that these terms were synonymous with 
Protestant and Catholic, Anglo-Dutch and Franco-Spanish.  
The centrality of the Anjou Match to Elizabethan politics has been corroborated 
by Herle‘s letters. It not only dictated English attitudes towards the French and Spanish, 
but informed Herle‘s prioritisation of information he passed to Cecil. The marriage 
negotiations also demonstrated Cecil‘s political acumen as he manipulated both the 
Dutch and his Queen. While the Lord Treasurer publicly encouraged Elizabeth to 
entertain Anjou‘s advances despite opposition from other councillors, revitalising his 
waning influence over the Queen, he secretly utilised Herle as a back channel to advise 
the Dutch on how best to ensure Elizabeth‘s intervention in the Netherlands. This 
secondary level of negotiation is a fascinating area that higher level discussions of 
politics have been unable to explore.  
The importance of men such as Herle in enabling the Elizabethan governmental 
system to function has been demonstrated throughout this thesis. We have seen how 
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Herle‘s reports directly influenced government policy over and over again. The 
underdeveloped nature of international communications meant that policy makers at the 
highest level were reliant on Herle‘s ability to observe events in Europe and report back 
in a timely and accurate manner. The problems inherent in this system were shown 
through Herle‘s premature reporting of Orange‘s death, with the lambasting he received 
from Elizabeth and Cecil demonstrating how disastrous inaccurate information could 
be. Similarly, Henry Howard‘s arrest as one of the Throckmorton plot conspirators can 
probably be laid at Herle‘s feet. The fact that Walsingham was willing to order the 
arrest of one of England‘s leading nobles largely due to evidence provided by Herle 
indicates the degree to which Privy Councillors relied on those who provided them with 
information. Contrary to David Lewis Jones‘ snipe that Herle‘s ‗powerful 
friends...considered him useful but not entirely trustworthy,‘ Herle played an integral 
role in the Tudor governmental system.
1
  
                                               
1 Lewis Jones, ‗William Herle (d. 1588/9).‘ 
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